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ABSTRACT 
WEAK STATES AND SECURITY 
Rakipi, Albert 
Ph.D., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal 
September 2006 
Although the weak 1 failing states have often been deseribed as the single most 
important problem for the international order s ince the en d of Cold W ar (F .Fukuyaına 
2004:92) several dimensions of this phenomenon still remain unexplored. While this 
phenomenon has been present in the international politics even earlier, only the post 
Cold W ar period accentuated its relationship with security issues. 
Following the Cold W ar' s "peaceful" period and the bloody 1990s, the Balkan region 
today represents a mixture of weak states and international protectorates, positioned 
equally far from failure as from evcntual success. This study proposcs that there is a 
strong correlation between the wcak state and security issues. By fuıther investigating 
this kind of relationship it will analyze ho w state strength impacts security in the post 
Cold war world. The study will focus on domestic threats to security, concentrating on 
the Balkans, and in particular, analyzing the range of security problems for Albania 
and Macedonia. It therefore represents a genuine debate on the security dilemma at 
the domestic !eve! in the post Cold war environment based on the argument that 
iii 
internal security issues. have gained more importance relative to external threats with 
the demise of the öipolar international system. 
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ÖZET 
ZA YIF DEVLETLER VE GÜVENLİK 
RAKİPİ, ALBERT 
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Hasan Ünal 
Eylül2006 
Her ne kadar başarısız /zayıf devletler Soğuk Savaşın bitiminden bu yana 
Uluslararası Düzen açısından öncelikli bir sorun olarak tanımiamyorsa da, bu konunun 
hala ineelenmeyen boyııtları mevcuttur. Bu konu Uluslararası Siyaset çalışmalarında 
dana önceleri tartışılmış olsa da, Soğuk Savaş sonrası ortarndaki gelişmeler 
zayıf/başarısız devletlerin güvenlik ile olan ilişkisini daha fazla gözle görünür hale 
getirmiştir. 
Soğuk Savaş döneminin istikrarlı yıllarını ve 1990 'lı yılların kanlı geçmişini 
geride bıraktığımız şu sıralanla Balkanlur bölgesi ne tam anlamıyla ba~arısız olmuş ne 
de tam anlamıyla başarı örneği olarak gösterilebilecek zayıf devlet örnekleri ve 
uluslararası himaye altında tutulan bölgelerden oluşmaktadır. Bu çalışına zayıf 
devletlerle güvenlik konuinn urasında çok güçiii bir ilişki olduğunu iddia etmektedir. 
V 
Bu ilişkinin incelenmesi neticesinde devletin gücünün aıtışı ile güvenlik arasındaki 
ilişkinin de ortaya çıkartılması amaçlanmaktadır. Bu çalışma öncelikli olarak güveliğe 
devletin içinden kaynaklanan tehditler üzerine odaklanacak bu minvalde de genel 
anlamda Balkanlar bölgesini özel anlamda da Arnavutluk ve Makedonya örneklerini 
inceleyecektir. Soğuk Savaşın bitimiyle beraber devletiçi güvenlik sorunlannın devlet 
dışı güvenlik sorunlanna göre daha fazla önemli olmaya başlamasının ışığında bu 
çalışma genel olarak devlet içi düzeyde yaşanan güvenlik açmazlan üzerine detaylı bir 
tartışma yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Zayıf Devletler, güvenlik, Arnavutluk, Makedonya, Güvenlik 
Açmazı, Balkanlar, Avrupa Birliği, NATO 
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CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION: THE ARGUMENT 
1.1 Tl-lE CONTEXT 
The Cold war period hroııght ahııut n peaccfııl period in the Balkans. While this 
peace was signifıcant from the perspective of an ab sence of local conflict, it was not self-
sustained from a regional perspective. lt was the nature of the international system at the 
time that "dictated" peace in the region, and not the evolution of a local regional system 
that made conflict irrelevant as it happened in Western Europe with the European Union. 
However, the forty years of peace in the Balkans were quite significant when considering 
the fact that since their creation, Balkan states had quarreled violently over a myriad of 
ethnic, religious or territorial issues. 
The conflicts that occurred after the creation of Balkan states. have been 
signifıcant enough to warrant the attention of Great Powers, and international scholars. 1 
Relative to other regions, the effects of Cold war peace on the Balkan region were 
1 For example, an International Commission was set up to investigate the massacres of the BalkanWars 
(1912-1913). See, Canıegie Endownıentfor Intenıational Pea ce, Report of 1913. Almost a century later 
another Commission was established to investigate th~ security situation after the disintegration of 
Yugoslav federation and very recently the third International Commission on the Balkans published a new 
report. See The Balkans in Europe 's Future, International Commission on the Balkans, April2005. 
obvious. With the single exception of the Greek Civil W ar that ended in 1949 and in 
whlch Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and to a ce)i:ain extent, Albania, were involved,Z for almost 
fifty years the region was free of bloody conflict. The "national questions" that had 
immersed the Balkan peoples for so long in bloody strnggles, 3 were frozen due to the 
natnre of the international system at the time--that is the hipolar balance of power 
resulting from East-West rivalry. On the other hand, many other regions experienced 
.c;. 
bloody conflicts during the Cold war. They resulted from the state building processes that 
were occurring throughout the post-colonial world but, more often than not, they were a 
result of superpower rivalry that tended to become "hot" in these peripherical states. 
However, the Balkans was a relatively dangerous area for the two superpowers to "allow 
local conflicts" in. In this context, the Balkans "enjoy" a specific characteristic that sets 
them apart from many other regions. Its political map resembles the "leopard's pelt"4 due 
to the incredibly rich ethnic mix of the various ethnic groups that inhabit the peninsula. 
Any local conflict witlıin a state or between two states could escalate easily into a regional 
war. Given the clear division of the Balkans into two opposite camps, with Greece and 
Turkey being in the Westem camp, a regional war may well have escalated into a conflict 
between the two riva! camps. 
The dangers of a possible superpower clash in the Balkans were exacerbated due 
to the fact that, hlstorically, the Balkans have been located in the borders of great empires. 
2 Yugoslavia, Bulgaıia and Albania helped the Greek "democratic arrny" forces ofELAS with sııpplies, and 
in the case of Albania, bases within i ts terıitorial borders. The UN General Assembly condemned this help 
and called on the three nations to discontinue it. 
3 Camegie Endowment for International Peace Report. According to the report, Balkan conflicts are not 
characteıized simply by clashes between regular arrnies but between who le populations. 
4 Quoted from Pedrag S imi c, "Do the Balkans exist?"'ln Pedrag Simic,ed, EU, NATO and South em 
Europe,(Belgrade- Institute oflntemational Politics and Economics and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung,2002) 
:p.57. 
2 
This is not true for most other peripherical regions. During the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, as the peoples of the region won their independence from the old 
empires, the region rernained as the nearest periphery of the Great Powers that shaped the 
nature of the international system. The region remained in between the European powers 
and Russia. This in between position remained valid after World War Two, as the 
international system was sliding quickly towards bipolarity. The famous "division 
percentage"5 of states in zones of influence in the Moscow Conference in October 1944, 
confırmed the strategic importance of this periphery. Traian Stoianovich writes that, "no 
region is fully open or fully closed to the rest of the world"6• A mathematical division of 
the Balkans between East and West carried with it the real possibility that local conflicts 
could spread into a "nightmare scenario" of a war between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. 
The sensitivity of the two superpowers on the dangers of possible conflict in the 
Balkans becaıne cvident during the Grcck Civil W ar (1946-1949), the fırst and last Cold 
war battlefıeld in the region. US intervention in this conflict occurred .due to the 
conviction that the Soviet threat was not limited to Greece but constituted serious 
implications for Turkey and indeed for Westem European Security generally.7 As a 
matter of fact, there are indications that Stalin himself applied pressure on Yugoslavia to 
cease its aid for the Greek communist forces of ELAS/EAM, due to the fear that a local 
5 Stalin and Churchill agrced to the following distribution of great power influencc in the Balkan States: 1 O 
per cent Russian in Greece, 50 percent in Yugoslavia and Hungary, 75 per cent in Bulgaria and 90 per cent 
in Rumania,90 per cent British (in accord with United States) in Greece, 50 per cent in Yugoslavia and 
Hungary, 25 per cent I Bulgaria and 10 per cent in Rumania see .L.S. Stavrianos The Balkans sinc.e 1453 
(Londn-Hurst and Company, 2000), p.67. · 
6 Traian Stoianovch," A dialogic lntroduction", In L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since /453,(London- Hurst 
and Company ,2000.), p.7 • 
7 John S. Kollliopoulos and Thanos M.Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel From /831 to the Present. 
(London-Hurst & Company, London 2002), p.295 
3 
conflagratiori in the Balkans had potentially explosive effects for the tense peace that was 
uneasily settling between the Eastem and Westem camps. 
From the viewpoint of security, the effects of the Cold war on the Balkans were 
two fold. First, the Cold war imposed peace, or at least, it did not allow conflicts between 
states in the region of the Balkans, for a relatively long period of time. More than a 
sustainable peace, the Cold war froze any possible Balkan conflicts, and, in so doing, also 
froze the process of searching for solutions to the "unsolved" national issues. 8 It is 
important that we underiine that irrespective of the fact that the Cold war did impose a 
"kind of peace," it did not necessarily produce, for all the Balkan countries, cooperation 
and communication. For instance, in the case of Albania, the order provided by the Cold 
war was a negative peace. hı other words, whilst between the units (the republics), within 
the Yugoslav Federation, the Cold war produced cooperation and national ties, in the case 
of Albania, the Cold war produced only total isolation. Beginning in 1948 with the 
Cominfarın denunciation of Yugoslavia and culıninating with the break with the Soviet 
Union after the death of Stalin, Albania had practically no ties with other Balkan nations. 
Second, apart from peace between the states in the Balkans, the Cold war imposed peace 
and order within these states. By propping up states or regiınes that ınay have otherwise 
had difficulty in maintaining the monopoly over the ıneans of violence, the two 
antagonistic camps ınoved Balkan societies even further from the Robbesian state of 
nature than they would have otherwise been. S ince any internal conflict could have led to 
8 Almost all the Balkan peoples were displeased with the post WWJ peace agreements. Apart from the 
Albanians, whose territories on which they Jived, wereJeft outside of the borders of the state that was 
intemationally recognized, both the Serbs and the Macedonians also cl aimed that there is a 
Serbian/Macedonian national issue stili waiting to be solved. 
4 
' a regional conflict and thus an East-West escalation, all the powers concerned made 
certain that they did not pour fuel on the Balkan fire. 
During the Cold war, the security concerns forall the Balkan countries were both 
international and domestic. The extemal security threat was the foreign enemy, in other 
words, the imperialist world - and in the case of Albania, in the vernacular of Enver 
Hoxha, there was alsa the revisionist world headed by Soviet social imperialism and its 
supporters. The domestic security threats were the internal ideological or class "enemies," 
of the party where "the party'' stood for the regime, the state and the people. 
Within this strategic thinking of security, a number of states that could have 
otherwise fallen pray to external aggression or internal implosion survived successfully .. 
From an external perspective, as James Dobbins has argued, during the Cold war, the 
United States and Soviet Union each- and in same cases, both- propped up a number of 
weak states for geopolitical reasons. But with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, 
Moscow lost its capability and Washington its geopolitical ratianale for sustaining such 
regimes. 9 On the otherhand, intemally these states were propped up by powerful 
organizing ideologies and extensive security apparatuses that were justifıed by the needs 
of the Cold war. 
To suın up, the end of the Cold war reınoved the "defensive shell" that provided 
security for the region for forty years in tenns of the conflict between states. This 
9 James Dobbins, Anıerica's Role in Niıtioıı-Bui/diııg: From Gernıaııy to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA; Rand 
Corporation,2003), p.xiv. 
5 
histoncal moment posed the challenge of refonnulating security policies: How each 
country · individually, and, the region as a whole, would integrate into the new 
international security system. At the same time, the end of the East-West conflict was 
accompanied by the collapse of communism as the organizing ideology of a number of 
states including Balkans ones. In practical terms, this meant the end of a regime of terror 
which was the fundamental instrument that had maintained the domestic order. This also 
signifıed that in the post Cold war environment, the tormer communist states were notji·ee 
of domestic conjlict. 
Immediately after the end of the Cold war, it became clear that the remaking of the 
Balkan States could be based on the principles of liberal democracy since ınany scholars 
saw the end of the Cold war as the triumph of the liberal philosophy. But, in terms of 
internal security, the triuınph of liberal democracy would require a new type of thinking 
for providing internal stability without the extensive ıneans of coercion available in 
communism. In this context, the traditional analysis of the ran ge of security probleıns as a 
review of threats from alıroad or, in other words, a review of the security dilemma at 
international level does not suffıce. In the past, the security agenda in the Balkans was 
conceived only in terms of interstate relations because there were a number of serious 
interstate conflicts that remained unsolved. But, this conceptualization may have often 
acted as a self-fulfılling prophecy with states breaking the precarious regional balance of 
power in the hope of gaining coınparative advantage over the ir neighbors. Y et, in the post 
Cold war world practically all the conflicts that took place in the Balkans were intrastate 
ones. Even after the "Wars of Yugoslav Succ~ssion", the security agenda of Southeastem 
6 
' Europe at the beginning of the twenty-fırst century remains radically different. 10 
Moreover, this security agenda dominated essentially by domestic threats was not just a 
Balkan phenomenon. As Georg Sorensen points out, since the end of the Cold war there 
have been very few interstate wars. Instead, domestic conflict (intrastate conflict) is 
sharply increasing in very weak states. 11 Other authors also argue that today's security 
issues are related to the nature of individual states. 12 This study proposes that there is a 
strong correlation between the weak state and security issues and it will investigate that 
relationship in order to fınd out how state strength impacts security in the post Cold war 
world. The study will focus on domestic threats to security, concentrating on the Balkans, 
and in particular, analyzing the range of security problems for Albania and Macedonia. In 
other words, this thesis aims at discussing the security dileroma at the doınestic !eve! in 
the post Cold war environment based on the argument that internal security issues have 
gained more importance relative to external threats with the demise of the hipolar 
international system. 
1.2 THE SECURITY DILEMMA AT THE DOMESTIC LEVEL 
Generally speaking, is it suffıcient to study the range of security issues of a state 
by merely analyzing the security dileroma at the international !eve!? More specifıcally, 
can a clear and fina! tableau of the security concerns of Albania and Macedonia in the fırst 
post Cold war decade be fonned merely by studying the external security threats which 
arise from the relations these states have with other countries? 
10 Barry BuzanandOle Weawer, Region s and Powers, The stn1ctuı'e qf International Security( Cambridge-
University Press, 2003),p.384 
1 1 Gcrogc Sorcnson, The trum.:/Vrmation (~ll lı e state Be:vvnd the Myth ql Retreat(Lundun - Palgravc 
2004),p.xiv 
12 Buzaıı and Weawcr, p. 385 
7 
' Traditionally, the security/insecurity of a state has been gauged by studying the 
threats from abroad to a given state. However, while the national security of both stat(;s 
was threatened - Albania in 1997 and Macedonia in 2001- the threat was not extemal. In 
short, in what circumstances was the national security of the two countries seriously put in 
peril, if not as a result of outsiders' actions? What conditions !ed to the creation of a 
security dileroma at domestic !eve!? In essence, the post communist systems are marked 
by constant conflict over the most basic criteria of how power is to be .Jegitimate, 
distributed, applied and generated. 13 
Theoretically speaking, is there any such thing as a security dilemma in the 
domestic realm? A number of authors argue that with the end of the Cold war the security 
dilemma has been adapted from its applications in international relations to explain 
rivairi es in domestic politics. 14 The concept of Security Dileınma was fırst introduced by 
John Hertz (1950). The efforts of states to enhance their security may guarantee greater 
defense (protection), but in the conditions of the cxistcncc of international anarehy, the 
upgrading of security measures for a state could lead to a growth of insecurity for other 
states. Hence, in a self-help system, the upgrading of security in any given state, 
inevitably leads to a growth of insecurity for other states. 
13 George Schopflin ,Nations, Identity, Power, the New Politics of Europe (London: Hurst & 
Company,2000), p. 174. 
14 See for example Nelson Kastir "Domestic Anarchy, Security Dilemmas and Violent Predation" in 
Rotberg Rotberg, ed. When Statesfail causes and consequences ( Princeton -University Press 2004),pp.54-
76. See also Barry Posen "The security Di lernma and ethnic conflict" in Michael Brown, ed, Et/ın i c 
conflict and International s ecurity( Princeton,- University Press, 1993),pp. 103-24. 
8 
< 
According to George Sorensen, 15 John Hertz's reasoning is directly related to a 
way of thinking about national sccurity that gocs back to· Thomas Hobbes . Hobbes' 
account of security is essentially that of personal, individual security. Ho b bes argues as to 
what life would be without the existence of the state, using the abstraction "state of 
nature." S ince people are self-regarding and egoistic, the set of relations between people 
in the state of nature is anarchical. According to Ho b bes in the "state of nature," there is 
no security for human beings, but only a permanent insecurity, a "state of war" of every 
man against every man. "(1946) 
As the only solution to salvation from the "every man against every man" 
situation, Ho b bes proposes the creation of a sovereign state. W ith the creation of the state, 
Ho b bes maintains, there is no more dornestic anarchy, and if we were to use John Hertz's 
concept, the security dilemma is valid only at the international !eve! and is connected to 
relations between states. 
The Robbesian account of security is closely related to the existence of the state. 
The state is supposed to provide protection for the population from within and from 
outside. Based on the reasoning of Hobbes, without the creation of a sovereign state there 
is no security and protection for the population as regards external and internal threats. 
But is it inevitable that with the creation of the state and the establishment of a central 
authority, order and security are insta!led in the domestic realm? 
"s orensen,p.75. 
9 
Robbes' reasoning, according to Which domestic anarchy can be. eliminated 
immediately after the creation of a sovereign state, is challenged by a number of scholars. 
There is no reason to believe that the recognition of a sovereign state in the international 
system will solve forever the issues of domestic anarchy. In fact, precisely because the 
international system does not easily recognize the cöllapse or fragmentization of states, 
they tend to keep on-going even when they cannot guarantee domestic order. This 
problem has been coined, "the Robbesian paradox" or "Robbes' dilemma."16 Rence, 
beside the classkal Rertz-Robbesian security dileruma which exists at the international 
level, there is another security dilemma at the domestic level. 
According to the realist account of international relations theory, the security 
dilemma evolved simply as an onteome of the international anarchy in conditions of the 
lack of international govemment. In the case of weak 1 failedl collapsed states, domestic 
anarchy either prevails or is a serious and constant threat. And, when states break down, 
the notion of anarchy can be applied in the same ınanner as in interstate relations. 17 
According to Sorensen the actual shape of the security dilemma is directly related 
to the domestic structures of the states. It cannot merely be assumed, as Robbes di d, that 
states provide political goods for their citizens. 18 
16 Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, W ar and t/ıe State of W ar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
ı 996),p .. 82. 
17 Ncison Kastir "Domcstic Anarchy, Sccurity Dilcmmas and Yiolent Prcdation" in Rotbcrg Rötbcrg, cd. 
W/ı en States fa il causes and consequences, ( Princcton -University Press 2004),p.56. 
18 See Bary Buzan and Ol e Waevcr, Region s and Powel·s: The Structure of International Security 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),p. 12. 
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' In realist IR theory, states are characterized in terrus of power and traditionally the 
concept of power has been closely related to the phenomenon of war. In theoretical and 
practical literature, the problem of war in itself has been characterized essentially as a 
Great Power phenomenon. But according to Kalevi Hölsti, war in the second half of the 
twentieth century has not been predominantly a great power activity. Most wars, since 
1945 have occurred in the Middle East, Africa, Central Aınerica, South Asia and South 
East Asia and more recently in the Balkans. So he proposes that to study war, the focus 
will have to be on states other than the "powers." 19 
To put it differently, while the security dileruma at internationallevel is dependent 
on the power of the state vis-a-vis other contenders for power, the security dileroma at 
domestic !ev el is dependent on the strength/weakness of the state in the domestic realm. 
For our analysis, state strength is not measured in terrus of military capability. In 
order to defıne the state strength we used the Kalevi Holsti defınition based on Max 
W eber concept: 
'The state strength can be measured in the capacity of the state to 
coınmand loyalty-the right to rule-extract the resources necessary to rule 
and provide services, to maintain the essential element of sovereignty. A 
ınonopoly over the legitimate use of force within defined territoriallimits, 
and to operate within the context of a consensus-based political 
community. 20 
19 Hoısıi, p.82. • 
2° Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, W ar and the State qf W ar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
ı 996),p.83. 
ı ı 
Further, in order to understand and explain the security dilenıma at the domestic 
!eve!, Barry Buzan invites us to investigate the strength/weakness of state, proposing as 
the central variable: the strong/weak states.21 
1.3 THE THESIS: THE WEAK STATES AS THE MAIN SECURITY 
THREAT 
This study will argue that in the post cold war enviromnent, the main threat to 
Albanian and Macedonian national security is the weak state phenomenon. The analysis 
from this perspective of the security problematique for both countries, will allow us to 
make some modest generalizations about the correlations between weak states and 
security. 
W eak states are not a new phenomenon in the arena of intemational politics. They 
have been part of major historical tuming points in history as, for example, during the 
process of decolonization. After the demise of the Cold war, weak states have become a 
common phenomenon in post-conflict sitnations such as in Eastem Europe, the forrner 
Soviet Union and the forıner Yugoslav Federation. 
Traditionally, the weak/ failed state phenomenon has not been analyzed from the 
security perspective. The issue of failed states presented itself forcefully on the 
intemational agenda with the collapse ofSoınalia's central govemınent in January 1991. 
21 Buz:m hml Wacwı·. p. J·1. 
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' Yet, Somalia- and subsequent erisis in Haiti, Zaire Cambodia, East Timor, Sierra Leone -
was at that time primarily seen as a humanitarian and /moral problem in the western 
world.22 However post Cold war developments suggest that weak/failedl collapsed states 
are presenting a serious security threat not only to national security but also to regional 
and international !eve! as well. According to Francis Fukuyama, since the end of the Cold 
war, weak and failing states have arguably become the single most important problem for 
international order23• The tragic events ofSeptember the eleventh 200ı marked the 
turning po int on the debate on weak/failing states both at the academic and policymakers 
!eve!. Before September ı ı attacks, U .S policymakers viewed states with sovereignty 
defıcit exclusively through a humanitarian lens. 24 While the theoretical debate on the 
sccurity problcınatiquc rccstablishcd the statc at the center of the dcbatc , the discoursc 
at the policy makers !eve! suggested the need to revise the strategic thinking and 
planning to face this new security threat, naınely weak or failing states. Therefore, the 
American administration introduced a new National Security Strategy with completely 
new strategic vision: 
For most of the twentieth century the world was divided by a great struggle over 
ideas: destructive totalitarian visions versus freedom and equality. That great 
struggle is over. America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are 
by failing ones25 
22 Louise Andersen International Engagement in Failed States Choices and Trade-of!s ( Danisb Institute 
of lntemational Studies ,(2005),p. 13. 
23 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and world order fntlıe 21 st Century ( lthaca,N. Y-
Cornell University Press, 2004),p.92. 
24 Stewart Patrick "Weak States and Global Thrcats: Fact or Fiction?" Washington Quarterly( Spring 2006 
):p.27. 
25 
"National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002, at http://wwwwbitehouse.gov/nsc/nssl.btml. 
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' . Stewart Patrick argues that this new preoccupation with weak states is not limited 
to the United States. In the United Kingdoın, the Priıne Minister' s Strategy U nit has 
advocated a goveınınent-wide approach to stabilizing fragile countries and Canada and 
Australia are following suit. The United Nations have been siınilarly engaged: the 
unifying theıne of last year' s proposal for UN reform was the need for effective sovereign 
states to dea! with today's global security agenda.26 
Especiall y since the Kosovo war, the Balkan security agenda was doıninated both 
at theoretical and practical !eve! by state building issues. A decade after the Dayton 
Agreeınent, and fıve years after the fall of the Milosevic regiıne in Belgrade, the Balkan 
region is as close to failure as it is to success. For the moment, the wars are over, but the 
sınell of violence stili hangs heavy in the air. The region's profıle is bleak- a ınixture of 
weak states and international protectorates. 27 
Generally speaking the transitions of Eastem European states in general and those 
of the Balkans in particular, from totalharian and aulocratic regiınes towards deınocratic 
ones have been considered to be largely unsuccessful. The teasons can be found in the 
phenoınenon of weak states. W ith few exceptions, the process of transition was conceived 
siınply as the deınolition of the fonner system, while the challenge of creating new 
political institutions based on liberal deınocracy was haınpered by weak and weakening 
state institutions. 
26 Stewaıt Patrick "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?'' Washington Quarterly (Spring 2006 ): 
p.28. 
27 Ivan Krastev The Balkans in Europe's Future, !nteJ;ıational Conınıission on the Balkans ( Sofıa- Center 
for Liberal Siratcgies, 2005),p.24 
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The challenge to stability in the Balkans comes from the presence of a chain of 
weak states in the region. Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina can be classifıed 
as 'weak states'. If w e define state-building as the creation of new government 
institutions and the strengthening of existing ones,28 the Balkan states are weak as the 
state-building process is still undcr way. For cxaınplc, this process in Maccdonia is bascd 
on the new Ohrid Agreeınent29 between the Albanians and the Macedonians. !ts 
population being ethnically mixed, Macedonia has to prove that it can ignore the old 
temptation to build a state based on the idea of ethnicity. 
In 2003 Serbia and Montenegro, with EU mediation, signed an agreement to 
completely revise the relations between the two constitutive units of the ex-Yugoslav 
federation. In the meantiıne, both of these units embarked on a process of internal state 
building which lead three years later to their separation from each othefl0• Albania, after a 
number of internal challenges such as the 1997 implosion when almost all state 
institutions ceased to exist, has started the difficult process of rebuilding these institutions. 
Finally, in Kosovo the state-building process and the buildup of institutions are on-going 
regardless of its fina! status. 
28 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and world ord er in the 21 st Century ( lthaca,N. Y-
Corne/1 University Press, 2004), p./7. 
29 On August 13,2001, the Macedonian and Albanian political leaderships signed the Ohrid Agreement- a 
political agreement that ended the Albanian am1ed insurrection in FYROM. For more details regarding the 
Agreement, see: "Macedonia: War on Hold", International Crisis Group, August 15,2001, http://www.intl-
crisis-group.org/projects. .. 
30 The 21 st M ay, 2006 referendum in Montenegro where a majority votcd for the independcnce of the 
youngesi Balkan country broke up the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. 
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The strengthening of these states is dependent on the success of the state-building 
processes. Furtherınore, the Balkan states are moving slowly towards regional and 
European integration. Thus, the processes that these states are working on are threefold: 
state building process, regional integration, and European integration. While the state-
building and regional-integration processes are vital for the integration of the Balkans 
with the EU, these processes are happening simultaneously rather than consecutively. 
Two dilemmas arise from these challenges: First, will the states of the region be 
able to move away from the European state-building model according to which "war 
makes states"?3 1 Second, will the Balkan states be ab le to cope with the challenges of 
regional and European integration? W e must not forgel that while the integration of the 
W estern European countries emerged from the economic and political needs of these 
states, in the Balkans regional integration is simply offered as a model from outside. 
The following study is an attempt to research the weak state phenomenon, 
especially as it has been developing in the Balkans. This phenomenon cannot be studied 
independently of the variables that influence it. The identification of the root-canses that 
bring about the "weak state phenomenon" will serve as the basis for following the security 
dynamics in the region. The study will analyze the relations between the "weak state" 
concept and intra state conflict. Furtherınore, the study will focus on the potential 
iınplications of this phenoınenon for regional and European security. 
31 Charles Tilly, W ar Making and State -Making, (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1978), p.68. 
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1.4. THE STRUCTUR OF THE STUDY 
The fırst part of this study focuses on the creation of a theoretical framework for 
studying the weak state phenomenon and the relationship between weak states and the 
security problematique on the regional and international systems. V ery often, the rea!ist 
thinkers of international relations have used the weak state concept in order to defıne the 
power of one state vis-il-vis another state. Generally, for all traditional theories of 
international rclations, the unilying charactcristic of all weak states is the abscncc of 
power or strength. For example, Michael Handel has adopted a systemic approach by 
using the term "weak state" to refer to state power and behavior in the international 
system, looking at powcr-statc rclations through an international pcrspcctivc. Marshall 
Singer has also focused on the dynamics of changing relationships between weak and 
powerful states. However, Singer says, "the power dynamics operate in all relationships, 
whether among individuals groups, or states".32 On the other hand, Barry Buzan and John 
Migdal have studied the power dynamics within the state-that is the relationship of 
individual groups or the whole society to the state. In these two studies, the semantics 
"strong/weak wtate" refers to the dynamics of power-state relations in the domestic 
environment. 
However, for the purposes of this study, we are interested in determining a state' s 
strength only from a doınestic perspective. Further, from the perspective of the 
international system, the fırst part of the essay will answer the question: why have weak 
. 
32 Marshull Singcr, Weak States in a World (?( Powers: tlıe Dynamics (?( International Rdatiousltips. 
(London-The Free Press, 1972), p.3. 
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states become a source of regional or even global instability in the post Cold war 
environment? 
In the second part, this theoretical perspective on weak states and security will be 
applied to the case studies of Albania and FYROM, respectively in the fourtlı and the fıfth 
chapters of the second part. The fal! of the communist regime in both countries propelled 
the state building process into a new phase, completely different from its dynamics in the 
communist period. 
Five years after the fall of communism, when Albania was seen as making 
progrcss with institutioıı builtiing and rcforıns in the ccoııoıııic and political liclds 
designed to achieve the two-fold transformation towards liberal democracy and market 
economy, in 1997 this smail Balkan country was turned into an international ptotectorate. 
As a result of the chaos following the fall of the pyraınid schemes, the Albanian 
authoritics by thcir free will invitcd a multinational forcc to restore law and ortler in !heir 
country. State institutions collapsed under enlirely domestic pressures. What were the 
reasons for the complete loss of security and the transformation of society into the 
Robbesian "state of nature"? 
On the other hand, Macedonia, which for alınost a decade was regarded as the 
most successful model of a multi-ethnic state in the Balkans, in 2001 was ravaged by 
internal tunnoil, which threatened to become a civil war, raising serious question marks 
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for the very existence of the state. Y et, no external threat sources were identified during 
that conflict. 
The identification of threats from within both in Albania and Macedonia will be 
analyzed through the state building process that both countries are going through after the 
fall of the old communist rcgimc. Thesc two clıaplers are prccc<.le<.l by u revicw of the 
histoncal context that has influenced the weakness of these states from the internal 
perspective. This review of the historical context and of current developments during the 
fırst decade after the Cold war constitutes the third chapter. 
The ch o ice of Macedonia and of Albania to study the corrclation of the w e ak statc 
with on the security problematique is not a coincidence. Whilst Macedonia presents a case 
of a multi-ethnic s ta te, Albania is alınost a mono ethnic state. 33 Or, to put it differently, 
state weakness in Macedonia flows from its multi-dhnic make up while in Albania it has 
nothing to do with ethnicity. The analysis of the phenomenon of the weak state and of 
security/insecurity in the two states with different ethnical compositions will allow us to 
make useful theoretical generalizations about the impact of weak states on international 
relations. 
Part three of the study endeavors to reply to the question: ho w can s ta te weakness 
be overcome? This is one of the fundaınental questions in the study of security problems, 
not only at doınestic, but also regional and internationallevels, with which the thinkers of 
ll According to the latest census, 1989, the ethnic minorities in Albania constitute no more thaiı 2 per cent. 
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international relations and policy oriented researchers are coming up against on the 
theoretical as well as practicallevels. 
Although this study makes an analysis of the· security dilemrna at the domestic 
level through the weak state perspective, it is necessary to also take into account the 
interplay between domestic and intemationallevels-by no means an easy task since there 
are no clear divisions between the international and domestic realms. The impact of 
outside interventions on Balkan developments in the last sixteen years has been such that 
it has shaped the very institutional fabric of the new and old states in the region. Barry 
Buzan and Ole Waewer argue that the interplay between domestic and international 
factors will determine the future of international protectorates in Bosnia and Kosovo and 
international involvement in Macedonia. 34 
Based on these concepts, the sixth c hapter of the study analyzes the foreign policy 
account of weak states. The research on weak states foreign policy will facilitate the 
discussion of the role which international institutions could play in order to mitigate the 
negative effects of state weakness. 
Since the League of Nations, the weak state phenomenon has coexisted with great 
power interference in the security dilemmas created by the existence of such states. After 
the end of the cold war, the returo of this phenomenon has been accoınpanied by the 
reactive policies of the international coınınunity. Thus,. the seventh chapter of this study 
34 Bary Buznn tmd Olc Wacvcr, Rl'~ions and Pmı·c,:,·: Th<' Strıwtıll'<' f!f'lntl'rllotional Scc11i"iiy (\anıhriılg<': 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.l2. 
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' willlook at the role the international community has played in assisting the state building 
process in weak states. This role will be studied from the point of view of the two 
institutions that have been most deeply engaged in the Balkan region, namely the 
European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
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CHAPTER2 
WEAK STATES AND SECURITY: A THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
2.1. CO NCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS 
There is much confusion on the separation between the concepts "weak state" and 
"strong state". Thus, any mention ofMilosevic's Yugoslavia or Hitler' s Getınany as weak 
states will be vehemently rejected by human rights workers and even by Jiberals who 
understand the term "strong state" to 111ean a state with, at the very least, a dominant 
coercive apparatus. Such perceptions are understandable if we keep in mind that a liberal 
democratic state is, by defınition, "weak": preservation of a sphere of individual rights 
means a sharp delimitation of i ts power. 35 
Many people may be surprised to hear that "China is a weak state" and 
"Luxeınbourg is a strong state". Milosevic's Serbia was a weak state while modem 
Slovenia is a strong state. Enver Hoxha's Albania and Ceausescu's Roınania were weak 
states and so are modem Albania and Roınania. Switzerland and the United States of 
Ameıica (USA) are strong states. Macedonia is a weak state. At a fırst glance, it appears 
that these categorizations are based on a coınparative logic of one state vis-iı-vis another. 
35 Francis Fukuyama, The en d of History and the Last Man, ( ;-.!ew York : Avvon Books Ine., 1992.), p. 15. 
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Thus, China is compared to Luxembourg and according to our statement China, one of the 
world' s stronger powers ( according to variables such as population, territory, and relative 
economic and military power) is a weak state while Luxembourg, a little ''village" (in 
terms of size, population ete.) is a strong state. 
Clearly, the above statements contain a power relationship. Michael Handel ( 1 990) 
Barry Buzan (1991) Marshall Singer (1972) and Joel Migdal (1972)- just to mention a 
few authors - speak of weak states and power state relations. However, despite the fact 
that they all use the same defınition for the term "weak state" and they all base their 
analysis on the power/state relation rapport, they do not analyze the same phenomenon. 
For all of the above authors, and more generally for all traditional theories of international 
relations, the unifying characteristic of all weak states is the absence of power or strength. 
For example, Michael Handel has adopted a systemic approach by using the tern1 "weak 
state" to refer to state power and behavior in the international system, looking at power 
statc rclations through an international pcrspcctivc. Marshall Singer has also focuscd on 
the dynaınics of changing relationships between weak and powerful states. However, 
Singer says, "the power dynamics operate in all relationships, whetlıer among individuals 
groups, or states". 36 On the other han d, Barry Buzan and John Migdal have studied the 
power dynaınics within the state that is the relationship of individual groups or the who le 
society with the state. In these two studies, the seınantics "Stronglweak State" refers to the 
dynamics of power-state relations in the doınestic environment. 
36 Marshall Singer Weak States in a World of Power;: the Dynamics of lnternatioiıal Relationslıips, New 
York: The Free Press, 1972), p.3. 
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Thus, if we returu to our prevıous assertion that Albania is a weak state while 
Luxembourg is a strong state, the degree of strength in both states has been detennined 
from the domestic perspective. On the other hand, from the international perspective, 
both states are weak since they possess nonc of the requirements of power projection 
necessary to show one's strength. However, for the purposes of this study, we are 
interested in delennining a state's strength only from a domestic perspective. 
According to John Migdal, a state's strength depends "on the capabilities of the state to 
achieve changes in the society that their leaders have sought through state planning, 
policies and actions. State strength as be measures not only in tenns of state's 
capability but also in tenns of state's willingness. History provides repeated examples 
of corrupt, incompetent or venal regimes- Zimbabwe today under President Robert 
Mugabe, for example - that have driven promising countries into the ground37 
Capabilities include the capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, 
extract resources and appropriate or use resources in detennined ways."38 From an 
international perspective, the tenn "weak state" sometimes has been used to convey the 
low economic and military capabilities of a given state vis-a-vis other states. 
In order to clarify the concept of weak states from a domestic perspective, Barry 
Buzan eınphasizes the fundamental difference between weak and strong states and weak 
and strong powers. According to him, the tenns "weak" or "strong" states refer to the 
degree of socio-political cohesion; weak and strong power will refer to the traditional 
distinction among states in respect to their military and economic capability in relations to 
37 Stewaı1 Patrick" Weak States and Global Threats: F~ct or Fiction?" The Washington Quarrerly 29:2 
( 2006): p.29 
JR Joel S.Migdal, Strong Societies and Wealc States, (New Jcrsey: Princcton University Press, 1998), p. 67 
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each other. 39 The term "state" will be defıned according to Max W eber' s notion of the 
state as an institution - an organization- enforcing regulations, at least in part through a 
monopoly of violence.40 Weber's model's is a matter "of development of certain 
instrumentalities whose purpose is to make the action of the state effective: bureaucracy, 
courts, and the military for example. Clearly, the more coınplex and highly developed 
these instruments are, the greater the capacity of the state to act on its environınent and 
autonoınously impose collective goals distinct from the private goals generated within the 
social system itself.41 
Methodologically, in defıning "weak/strong states" and the effects of state power 
in security matters we will focus our attention on the type of analysis that Waltz calls the 
second image. 42 This analysis focuses on the nature of the internal structure of states. 
Therefore, our outlook will be from the bottom up, which will allow us "to open the 
box'ı43 -to observe the workings of the state-unit structures. 
However, while we look at the capabilities of a certain state or the lack thereof in 
the domestic realın in order to pinpoint i ts degree of strength, it is clear that these 
domestic capabilities are interrelated to the given state's relations with other states and 
with the international system. In this context, we have to pick the perspective through 
39 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear- an Agendafor /ntemational Security Studies in the Post-Co/d W ar 
Era, (London: Pearson Longnıaıı, 2004 ), p.97. 
'".MigJal, p.72. 
41 B. Badie and P. Bimbaum, The Sociology of the St at e (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,l983), p.35 
42 Keneth N.Waltz, Man, the State and War,(New York- Colunıbia University Press,1968.), p.74. 
43 Martin J-lollis and Steve Smith. F.xplaining mu/ wulc1rstmrdiug lntenwthma/ Rdations.(OxfonllJnivcrsity 
Press, 1991 ), p.%. 
25 
which we will analyze the weak state phenomenon: the domestic perspective, the 
international perspective, or a combination ofboth. 
This study will focus on a combined perspective for two reasons. First, a state does 
not exist independently of the international environment and therefore it is not immune 
from the events that occur in the international system. Second, the research of weak states 
is not our aim per se. W e intend to understand the dynamic of relations between weak 
states and the sccurity conccrııs from a domcstic and an international pcrspcctivc. For 
cxamplc, though the main rcasons for the failure of the Macedonian and Albanian states 
are found within the two politics, the regional conflicts have also influenced negatively 
the state-formation process in these countries. llistorically, changes in the international 
defense environment have affected state structures and effectiveness. According to 
Michael Dech, as the nation-state grew into a large and intrusive govemment apparatus, it 
was required to raise the revenue necessary to support the arıııed forces by taxing 
peasants, urban artisans and merchants. The basic assumption is that during the last 
centuries, the insecurity of the international environment has strengthened modem states 
by broadening their scope and cohesion. 44 
In order to understand the internal structures of the state we may use Barty 
Buzan' s simple descriptive model, made up of three elements: the idea of the state, the 
physical base of the state and the institutional expression of the state. According to Buzan, 
these elements are crucial because they are "distinguishable from each other, and the 
44 Michael Dech, "W ar and Strong States, Peace and Weak States", International Organization,64 (2000): 
p. 237. 
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' examination of the linkages between them is a fruitful source of insight into the security 
problematic."45 
The idea ofthe State 
The physical base of the state ----~ The Institutional expressian 
of the state 
Buzao's model gives us all the tools needed to taekle the state-formation process. 
This multifaceted process combines histoncal perspectives with the ever-changing 
dynamics of state and nation relations and the organizing ideologies that have 
metamorphosed constantly. However, a clearer focus is needed when dealing with the 
modern failed state problem. Thus, we will have to borrow from Buzao's model those 
components that have an immediate correlation with state capabilities in the domestic 
realm. 
The second element of Buzan' s model, the physical base of the state, does not 
impact directly on our research object. As we will see, weak states are recognized 
internationally as sovereign entities.46 This ıneans recognition of the state as sovereign 
over its territory, borders, and population, natural and human resources-all eleınents that 
ınake up the physical base of the state. S ince our analysis will focus on states that have 
obtained international recognition, we will take the variables that make up the physical 
45 Buzan, p. 65. 
46 Weak States are inteınationally recognized. Whcreas there are states that are not recognized 
inteınationally but they are strong units in tcrms of functional perfoınıance. Northeın Cyprus is one such 
political unit. 
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base of the state as exogenous. Second, these variables do not enjoy an immediate and 
direct correlation with the state' s relations with its populace, and thus have no impact on a 
state's weakness or strength. For example, let us consider the variables population size 
and territorial size. For the purpose of our analysis, the size of the population that is 
located Within a given s ta te is taken as exogenous to the model. The size of populations or 
territories becomes important if the strength or power of a state is being studied from the 
international perspective, but not from a domestic perspective. Thus, it is not population 
or territorial size that make Luxembourg a strong state from the domestic perspective. On 
the other hand, Russia with a relatively large population and territory continues to exhibit 
the features of a weak state internally though, from an international perspective, these 
variables do contribute to Russian strength. When viewed from the domestic perspective, 
strong states do not have to be large states. But, population and territory become important 
variabtes when dealing with states that may be called middle or great powers. Even a state 
that is weak from the perspective of its domestic capabilities may be included in the group 
ofpowcrH that have an iınpact on the intcriıational system. 
In today's increasingly globalized economy, the role of natural resources in the 
success of a state has greatly decreased. According to Enriques Juan, it is the quality of a 
nation's resources that facilitates its fast-paced development". lsrael is only about 20,000 
square kilometers in size and has a population of just 5.7 million. But whereas Israel lacks 
the oil resources of some of its Arab neighbors, its population publishes ten times more 
scientific and technical articles per person than the closest ruımer up does, the United 
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States, does.47 However, the quality of natural or human resources is not a given, constant 
variable. Why does Israel demonstrate high capabilities to extract resources and to create 
and mobilize qualified personnel? 
W e have to observe the internal dynamics of the variable "population" from a 
qualitative point of view that seeıns to have an immediate correlation with the security 
problem. For example, the birthrate in Western European countries does not iınpact the 
ability of those states to penetrate society by fulfilling its needs efficiently, or in the law-
abiding attitude of their citizens towards state institutions. But, if this is taken as a true 
proposition, how do we explain the perception that the high birthrate of the Albanian 
ethnicity in Macedonia has direct effects on the functioning of the Macedonian state and, 
therefore on its security probleıns. The high birthrate of Albanians in Macedonia is 
perceived as a threat to the Macedonian ethnicity that risks becoıning a minority in the 
next decades. The Macedonian S ta te that now is "firınly in the hands" of the Macedonian 
ethnicity ınay fall in the "hands of the Albanians". However, this perception does not 
come siınply from the difference between Albanian and Macedonian birthrates, but from 
the basic principles on which the Macedonian state has been build, or the "organizing 
ideology of the state" in Buzan's terıninology. If the Macedonian State were build on the 
inclusive principles of citizenship rather than nationality, the high Albanian birthrate 
would not constitute such a threat. 
The territory of a state is a dynaınic element as well. The processes of state 
creation and consolidation have been accompanied with changes in territory. This 
47 Enriques Juan, "Too many Flags?", Foreign Policy, 116, ( 1999): p. 30. 
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' histoncal process of territorial gains/losses continues but "territorial losses do not 
necessarily or even usually threaten the state with extinction. Gerrnany, Pakistan Mexico 
and Poland have all lost substantial areas without disrupting the histoncal continuity of the 
state."48 Also, the struggle for territory amongst states, or even the "arbitrary" divisions of 
!and, has not impacted the internal processes of state forrnation. Ethnic minorities 
constitute a threat to a state when they engage in separatist movements or agitate for 
unifıcation with the "mother-country." Or, territories that have remained outside "the 
natural geographical borders" of a nation may encourage irredentist politics in the state 
that cönsiders these territories as its own. This would have a direct impact on the domestic 
politics of the state unit. 
The Balkans is a typical region in this regard, where almost all states have 
territorial claims towards each other. In this case, the process of state fonnation may slow 
down, and the impact on regional security dynaınics ınay be quite extreme. 
Thus, we cannot have a thorough understanding of the state fonnation process in 
the Balkans without considering the histoncal baggage of ethnic grievances. However, 
territorial disputes and ıninority probleıns do not have an immediale iınpact on doınestic 
state capabilities. This is true if we consider the case of Macedonia. While the "state 
capture" phenoınenon is present in Macedonia, it would be wrong to propose that this 
follows from the rejection of the state by the ethnic Albanian minority. The traditional 
perspective on the correlation betwecn these two plwnoınena states that the armed 
Albaniaıı moveıneııt represeııts an atteınpt to, carve out an ethııic Albaııiaıı state out of 
., Buzan, p. 92. 
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Western Macedoni~.49 Another view states that the Albanians are simply asking for more 
rights within the framework of the existing Macedonian state. 50 Than, what are the 
motives that compel the Albanians, and more generally, an ethnic group within a 
multiethnic state structure to challenge the state and reaffirm themselves through the use 
of their own national symbols? On the other hand, it would be illogical to state that the 
failure of the Albanian state to collect taxes or provide a reliable supply of water and 
electricity follows from the fact that the state borders do not correspond to the "natural 
geographical borders" of the Albanian na tion. W ithout ignoring, the historical baggage, 
contested borders or ethnic gricvance the prcsent state torın is rclevant to understand 
security issue. In the Balkans the state - form has some parallels with the African 
situation in that the states are more an arena, for than the agent of, power politics. Elites-
being them ethnically pure or not - fight unscrupulously to stay in power irrespective of 
the ideological transformations necessary .51 
Another component of Buzan's model, the idea of the state, although vitally 
helpful for classifying a state as weak or strong, has elemen ts within it that are not directly 
related to the failed state phenomenon. According to Buzan, the two main sources of the 
idea of the state are to be found in the nation and in organizing ideologies ... the 
importance of the nation to the idea of the state is hinted at by the term national security 
49 T. Gocevski Etluıic Coexistence in the Post Conjlict period,( Skopje- Macedonian Center for Peace 
and Euro Atlantic Integration ,2003), p.l15. . 
50 Peter Atanasov "The Progress of the 'Ohrid Process' in Macedonia" in Jean-Jacque de Dardel, Gustav 
Gustenau and Plamen Pantev,eds, Post- Conjlict Rehabilitation Lessons from South East Europe and 
Strategic Consequencesfor the Euro-Atlantic Conınıupity, ( Vienna and Sofıa ,2006): p. 115. 
51 Barry Buzan and 01e Waver, Region s and Powers, the Structure of International Secıwity, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003): p.384. 
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itself. Why natio~al security?52• Nations and organizing ideologies have played a vital 
role in the creation, strengthening and eventual demise of states. However, the influence 
does not flow one way only. First and foremost, it has been states that have taken a 
primary role in the creation of nations. Mohammed Ayoob53 says that the early modem 
European states became states before they became nations. For example, the unifıcation of 
states such as Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century was achieved through the vital 
involvement of core states such as Brandenburg-Prussia and Piedmont-Savoy. This 
relationship is well illustrated by the famous remark of Massimo d' Azeglio on the fırst 
seance of the Italian Parliament: "W e have made Italy, now we have to make Italians."54 
Charles Tilly points out that the category of National States has preceded and Iıelped the 
process of nation-state formation. According to him, the national states are relatively 
centralized, differentiated, and autonomous organizations successfully daiming priority in 
the use of force within large contiguous and clearly bounded territories" while nation 
states are those "whose peoples share a strong linguistic, religious and symbolic 
identity."55 
Despite the fact that the dynamic, two-way state-nation relations have given birth 
to a number of models, 56 there is no model that takes a strong state from a domestic 
52 Buzan, and Ole Waver, p. 70. 
53 Ayoob, Mohammed, The Third World Secw·ify Predicament: State Making, Regional Coııflict. and the 
International System, (Bouller: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p.175. 
54 E.J Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990): 
p.44. 
55 Charles Tilly, Coercion Capital and European States: A.D. 990-1990, (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 
1990), p.43. . 
56 Buzan suggests four models of possible state- nations relationship. First is the primal nation state, 
exemplifıed by Hungary, ltaly and Japan. The second model has been called the State nations. Here the state 
p1ays an instrumental role in crcating the nations rather than the other way around. The third model is the 
part nation ~ state. This is where anation is dividcd up among two or morc states. The fourth model can be 
called the multinational· state and comprises those states which contain two or more substantially complete 
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perspective as a given. For example, the USA and Nigeria are similar according to the 
state nation model, but while the USA is a strong state, Nigeria is not. Another example 
would be Macedonia and Switzerland, similar in the multination states model, yet worlds 
apart in terms of domestic capabilities. The former is a typical weak state exhibiting weak 
institutions and limited capabilities, while the larter is an example of a strong state 
domestica!ly. Since a relatively large number of strong states belong within the nation-
state model - France, Britain Italy, Japan, Hungary ete.- one might suggest that this is the 
most appropriate model for a strong state. If we consider the efficient penetration of 
society as a variable, Switzerland, the USA and Belgium also belong within the strong 
state category despite the fact that they are not nation-states. 
Remembering that when Albania was recognized as an independent state in 1913, 
almost half of Ottoman Albania that coincided with the geographical spread of the 
Albanian nation remained outside its borders, than Albania belongs to, in the words of 
Buzan, the part-nation-state category. Howcvcr, siııce lcss than 3 percent of Albanian 
population is comprised of ethnic minorities, we can consider Albania as a nation-state in 
i ts own right. 57 
Thus, one cannot look for the factors that make Albania a wea.k state within these 
two models. To sum up, the relations between nation and state have a rich historical 
tradition that has given rise to a number of models that attempt to explain it. Despite the 
nations within their borders. See Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear- an agenda for international 
security Studies i the Post-Co/d War Era,(Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 72-75. 
57 Theoretically, social divisions in Albania may occur on a religious basis since the population is divided 
into Muslim, Christian Orthodox, and Catholic. However, in practice Albanians have built their identity 
araund language and not religion. Thus, these divisions are practically non-existent. 
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dynamic nature of these relationships, in order to identify the causes that lead a state to 
fail in fulfilling its obligations we will look beyond these models. Thus, these models will 
be taken as exogenous to o ur analysis, and Albania' s classification as a part-nation-state 
or Macedonia' s as a multinational state will be taken as a given in our search for the 
factors that lead to a weak state. 
Organizing Ideology - historically, organizing ideology, one of the two basic 
elements of the concept 'state', has played a critica! role in the creation, flourishing or 
ultimate disappearance of states. Organizing ideologies such as liberal democracy, 
communism, fascism, or religious ideologies such as Islam and Christianity have actively 
shaped the strnctures that make up the state. For example, Nazism dictated the change 
that occurred in the institutions of the German State in the thirties. The state carne to 
resemble a military machine and military and coercive institutions became dominant. This 
ideology reshaped the ınutual relationship between society and state. State bureaucracy 
seemed to be efficient, and state institutions seemed to enjoy legitimacy, yet within hardly 
more than a decade the Gerınan State. was destroyed. On the other hand, communism 
created a state bureaucracy of another kind58 but citizen loyalty to the state was based on 
terror and fear, not on legitimacy. Both, communist and fascist states seemed to be strong 
in terms of !heir presence and penetration in society. This is a special category of weak 
states: the seemingiy strong one, always an autocracy, which rigidly controls dissent and 
"Francis Fukyama, The End of HisfOIJ' and the La st Man, (New York: Avvon Books, Ine., ı 992.) ,p. ı 6. 
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is secure but at the same time provides few political goods. In extreme case - such as 
North Korea, the regimes permits its people to starve59 
Let us take the exaınple of Albania. Many of the elements that make today' s 
Albania a weak state flow from its communist past. However, Hoxha's state was able to 
penetrate Albanian society quite effectively. lt is also true that in the early years, the 
regime enjoyed popnlar legitimacy. As we will see in the following chapters, the 
comrnunist state had a powerful presence throughout state territory not only through the 
coercive security apparatus. Even in the most remote areas, together with the police and 
state security services, the regime built health centers, posta! services, schools and cultural 
centers. The urbanization process was speeded up, which brought about closer relations 
between different regions of the country. The creation of a unifıed offıciallanguage may 
be interpreted as a forced process that stopped the development of local dialects that may 
have enriched the language, but it also served as another catalyzer that brought disparate 
regions closer together and facilitated comınunication throughout society. 
Up to now, there exists no defınitive answer for the qucstion of which organizing 
ideology provides the most help in the strengthening of state capabilities in the doınestic 
realm. However, to analyze the weak state phenomenon, we will choose the liberal 
democratic fraınework. 
59 Rotbcrg ı. Rotbcrg 'The failurc and Collapsc of Nalion-Statc, Brc:.ıkdown, Prcvcntioıı and Rcpair", in 
Rotberg I. Rotberg ed, When States Fail Caı1ses and Consequences, (Pıinceton University: 2004 ),p. 5 
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Why choose liberal democracy as an organizing ideology? Can a state be classified 
as strong only if it uses this framework as i ts organizing principle? Strong European states 
have not functioned only within this ideological framework. As a matter of fact, often they 
have used more than one organizing ideology to shape their institutions. Nationalism has 
bcen a natural prccondition for the cstablishınent of na tion ~Iate~ in Europe, the majority 
of which are considered today to be strong states. Outside the European realm, Saudi 
Arabia is an example of a strong state that has nev er been a liberal democracy. 
Also, as Francis Fukuyaına pointed out, it is possiblc for a country to be liberal 
without being particularly democratic, as was the case of eighteenth-century Britain.60 
However, from a domestic perspective, eighteenth-century Britain may be considered a 
strong state. As we have already mentioned, totalitarian states too may be considered as 
strong for at least a time, according to the criteria we have used to define strong states. 
Our decision to consider only liberal democracy as an organizing ideology is 
dictated by the simple fact that the object of our research is the weak state phenomenon in 
two countries, Albania and Macedonia, that have chosen liberal democracy as their 
organizing ideology. 
The second reason is the model of the state that w e will use as a reference point to 
compare the ınodels that have been build in Albania and Macedonia. Thus, when we say 
that Switzerland, Luxembourg and the USA are strong states, or Macedonia and Russia 
are weak states we ınake this statement only after comparing these states to a particular 
60 Fukyanıa, p. 34 
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' model. This model is the liberal democratic state. As time passes by "sovereign states 
share many characteristics in common and over time they become more and more 
alike ... "61 .Karl Marx ventured that backward states sa w the image of their future in more 
developed capitalİst states. Also, liberal modernization theorists such as W alt W. Rostov 
expect states to end up at the same level of development, sharing the same characteristics, 
once they have passed through the stages of growth. 62 
From this point ofview, all the strong Westem European states are also similar. In 
the last fıfty years, all these states have organized their institutions according to the liberal 
democratic framework. After a decade of strife, Balkan states are trying to function within 
this very ideology as well. Lately, even in Afghanistan attempts are being made to build a 
state on more or less liberal principles. This model is being offered to goveming elites 
everywhere as the only way to gain reallegitimacy through the electoral process and the 
free vote. Consequently, the theoretical ground that has been chosen in this essay in order 
to analyze the weak state phenomenon and security problematic is liberalism. 
2.2 OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS 
There are no widely accepted defınitions of the concepts 'weak states' and 'failed 
states'. However, as we have already discussed, the way to go the heart of the problem is 
by analyzing the domestic perspective. The degree of strength of a state will be measured 
in tcrnıs of its domcstic capabilitics- not in tcrıns of i ts strcngth vis-iı-vis other coııtcndcrs 
61 Georg Sorenson, "States are not "!ike units": Types of State and Fomıs of Anarchy in the Preseni 
International System," Journal ofpolitica/ Pfıilosoplıy, Vol 6,(!998): p.79. ,, 
• Sorenson, p.82. 
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of power.63 Wit!ıin' the domestic perspective, the problem will be analyzed in terms of 
capacity to comrnand loyalty- the right to rule- to extract resources necessary to rule and 
provide services, to maintain that essential element of sovereignty, a monopoly over the 
legitimate use offorce within defıned territoriallimits, and to operate within the context of 
a consensus based political comınunity.64 If we accept that "nationstates exist to deliver 
political goods "65 to their citizens, than their weakness varies according to the relative 
capacities of the state to provide these public goods. Although eınpiricisın does not allow 
us to defıne clearly the terms according to which a state ınay be classifıed as "weak", we 
can identify three types of states that fail to provide public goods efficiently and 
satisfactorily: weak states, failed states and collapsed states. 
Acconliııg to Robert Rot lıcrg, the collapscd statc is casily idcııtifialıh: as an 
extreıne version of a failed state. It has a total vacuuın of authority. 66 As the capacity to 
provide public goods is a matter of degree, than the scale of power on the domestic realın 
becoınes an essential element to define the concept of weak states. In these terıns, a 
collapsed state exists in a de jure cl early dcfined sovereign territory where there is a 
coınplete vacuuın of central power and, de facto, no functioning government or central 
state institutions in place. The order that prevails is the rule of guns. From the point of 
view of the existence of a central authoiity, a failed state passesses two, or mo re, de fa c to 
63 Michael Stohl and George Lopez, Wesrplıalia, rlıe End ofrhe Co/d W ar and rhe New World Order: Old 
Roots to a "New" Problem, at http://www.ippu.purdue.edultbiled statesll998/papers. 
64 Kalevi J. Holsti, The Srare, W ar and rhe Srare of W ar, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.), 
p.72. 
65 Security, education, health services, economic opportunity, envirori~ental survei1lance, a 1egal framework 
of order and a judicial system to adıninister it, and fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads 
and communications facilities See Robert 1. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure", The 
WashingTon Ouarterly, ( Summer 2002): pp. 85-96. 
66 Rorberg , p. 90. 
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' governınents: One governınent is recognized intemationally, but it has lost all doınestic 
legitimacy. In these conditions, other ethnic, religious or other groups set up parallel 
structures that control de facto part of the territory or take over ınany of the duties and 
responsibilities of the de jure governınent. 
From the po int of view of "authority", a state ınay be considered a "failed state" 
even when there is only one central governınent. In this case, "authority" does not provide 
a good enough yardsticl(. In this case, we will use the capacity to provide political goods 
as the necessary yardstick. A failed state and a collapsed state are concepts that are very 
close to each other. According to Robert Jackson, "a failed or collapsed state would be 
indistinguishable from the state of nature" in which anarchy is way of life By failed states-
Jackson says- I shall be referring exclusively to states which cannot or will not safeguard 
miniınal civil conditions, i.e. peace, order, security, ete. doınestically.67 
According to Robert Rot berg, failed states are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, 
and bitterly contested by warring factions. In failed states, governınent troops often battle 
armed revolts !ed by one or ınore rivals. Other features that characterize failed states are 
the loss of control over their territories, extreme levels of erime, physical violence and 
corruption. From the point of view of delivery, failed states are coınpletely unable to 
provide public goods. 
67 Robert Jackson. Surrogate Sovereigntv? Great POi~'er Responsihilitv and "Failed States". (Institute of 
International Relations, The University of British Columbia November I 998. ). p.35. 
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' On the other hand, while weak states are clearly differentiable from collapsed 
state, they are similar to failed states. It is entirely possible, but not unavoidable, for a 
weak state to degenerate into a failed state. For example, Albania and Macedonia may be 
classified as weak states in the sense that they have proved incapable to provide an 
acceptable amount of public goods. However, while Albania did degenerate once into a 
"collapsed state" during the 1997 crisis, Macedonia has never slid into a "failed" or 
"collapsed" state condition. 
From the po int of view of authority, weak states have a govermnent in place and, 
differently from failed states, they are usually quiet. Although tense, the siıiımering 
tensions rarely "spill out in the streets" and, when they do, the state takes coııtrol of the 
situation rather quickly. In this context, weak states are quite similar to failed states. The 
difference is that the degree of weakness is sınaller than in failed states. Often, weak states 
may lose control of part of their territory in times of crises, but they quickly find a "good 
enough" solution to regain it. This was the case in Albania in 1991 and in Macedonia in 
2001. Weak states have very limited capacities, although the degree of weakness does 
vary from one weak state to another. 
For Waltz, states vary only in terrns of their status as powers68 but states vary also 
in ten11S of their degrce of socio-political cohcsion.('" According to Buzan, "when the idea 
and the institutions of a state are both weak theıı that state is less of a state then one in 
"Waltz, p.Il3. 
69 Suzan, p.68. 
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which the idea and institutions are strong."70 More concretely, the strength of a state 
depends from its capacity to obtain domestic politicallegitimacy. 71 
Conscqucntly, politicallcgitiınacy is the main critcria uscd to dcfıııc the wcak statc 
'phenomenon. Any government in any regime needs some kind of legitimacy in order to 
stay in power and to takc actioııs on bchalf of the socicty. Wc can obscrvc a mıınbcr of 
sources of state legitimacy: 
Legitimacy through Long practice of Statehood: Political legitimacy may come 
from a long practice of statehood. In countries with a long tradition of statehood, states do 
possess legitimacy. According to Buzan, "the existence of a strong state may simply 
. reflect a long history during which the state had time to consolidate and mature. France 
and Britain cl early benefıt in this way. "72 Thus, legitimacy pertains to the experience that 
the people have to get organized in a modem state and to the extent that the state is 
accepted by its citizens as necessary in order to fulfıll their need to be politically and 
socially organized. In this respect, Balkan states do not enjoy a high degree of 
legitimacy. 73 Historically, Balkan countries were closed agrarian economies with a very 
limited industrial sector. The low !eve! of economic development meant that it took a 
relatively long period of time for the idea and need of a state to emerge in the region. In 
70 ıbid, p.76. 
71 Hoısti., p. ı ı 3. 
72 Buzan, p.66. 
73 Thcre is an ongoing dcbatc among scholars as to why the statc dcvclopcd in Europc as the form of social 
organization. The modern state emerged in Europe "aıong with the· coming of industry and of coınpıicated 
commerciaı arrangeınents ... the modern industry and coınmerce iıeeded something like the state. See 
Charles Tilly, The formatian of Nalian States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, I 975.), p.76. See al so Phillips Shvely, Po";er and Clıoice,( McGraw-Hill, Ine, fourth edition 
ı 987),p.135. 
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the meantime, Westem Europe had begun for at least two hundred years to practice liberal 
ideas in both the social and the economic realm. For most Southeastem European • 
countries, liberal ideas and practices would develop simultaneously with the democratic 
ones. The idea and the need for a state in Western Europe is more deeply felt as compared 
to that in societies of Albania, Macedonia, Setbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina ete. After 
more than 500 years of development, states in industrial societies have become "strong" in 
the sense that, for the first time in history, they enjoy popnlar legitimacy.74 In the Balkans, 
as well as in all the third world countries a state tradition is lacking and therefore this 
could not be the source of!egitimacy for the state. 
Legitimacy by Results: Another source of legitimacy comes from the success of a 
particnlar state in fulfilling its obligations towards its citizens. "A governınent may gain 
and retain legi timacy from i ts people by providing for them the thin gs they möst want: 
security against physical assault, security for their country's borders against invasions, 
pride in their nation, economic security and so on. "75 Thus, in the first decade after 
WWII, communist states di d enjoy some legitimacy as a result of the short-tenn economic 
results they achieved. In the case of Albania for example, the communist governınent 
strengthened its legitimacy by conducting !and refonn on a massive scale. In a similar 
fashion, the popularity and legitimacy of the Soviet govenıment increased du e to the rapid 
economic development of Soviet Union in the first decades after WWII. Hitler's Gennany 
in the thirties is another exaınple on how a governınent attains legitiınacy through 
. 
74 Holsti,p.l24. 
75 See Phillips Shvcly, Power and Clıoice.( London : McGraw-Hilllnc .• 1987), p.l 10. 
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successful ec.onomıc reforms and development. . After the fall of communism, the states 
of the Eastem Bl oc enjoyed limited short-term legitimacy, but this had nothing to do with 
the economic results they achieved. Legitimacy by results does not imply simply 
economic results John Migdal defines the strength of the state as the capability to 
implement policies, to penetrate in society and to serve as a regulator. 77 In fact, this 
definition coincides with the meaning of the term 'state-making' since this process in 
Europe was "extracting resources, building institutions, acquiring politicallegitimacy and 
deepening and broadening the state's penetration of society".78 According to the criteria 
'Legitimacy by Results', a number of Balkan countries are weak states because they are 
unable to iınplement development policies, to collect taxes, and to achieve for its citizens 
the basic needs of human security, econoınic security and social security. Sometiınes, 
Balkan states even lose control of parts of their territories and fınd theınselves unable to 
control their borders effectively. 
Legitimacy by Procedures: Allother source of legitimacy is 'legitiınacy by 
procedures'. A state ınay strengthen its legitimacy by following certain procedures " ... in 
which many people have confidence."79 In the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the Great 
Powers kept in mind precisely this principle of legitimacy while discussing the peace 
agreements. The reestablishınent of the old monarchical dynasties that had existed before 
1789 occurred because of the need of these states for legitimacy. This legitiınacy through 
76 
'What solidifıed Hitler's hold on Gennany and gave him a degree of legitimacy by the end of the 1 930s 
was the results of his early policies. See al so Phillips Shvely, Power and C/ıoice.( London : McGraw-Hill 
Ine., ı 987), p.l 20 
77 John Migdal, Strong societies and Weak States,( Princeton: University Press, ı998), p. ı 56. 
n . 
Ayoob , p.23 1. 
79 Shveıy, p.ı ı3. 
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inheritance depended on a traditional, long-established procedure.80 Presently, the 
legitimacy of modem govemınenis must flow from democratic procedures. If at the 
present time a number of Balkan countries are classified as weak states, the reasons 
should be sought in the distortions of those democratic procedures that legitimize the 
state's institutions. A precondition for self-sustainable stability in these countries is the 
consolidation of democratic procedures to regulate the transfer of power from one 
political party to another. Y et, in most Balkan countries power has not yet been 
transferred through free and fair elections. The Macedonian experience, together with the 
experience of other multiethnic states poses the critica! question: is the institution of free 
and fair elections sufficient in order for the institutions of the state to be legitimate and the 
state to be strong? By winning the majority in free elections, a certain ethnic group may 
set up its own state while depriving other ethnic groups from the right to partidpale in 
state institutions. The Macedonians tried to cover up the national state they are building 
ever since their UN membership with the presence of a few Albanian minisıers in the 
cabinet. In the meantime, Albanian presence in the army, police, education, seeret 
service, Foreign Service, ete. is inhibited by the goveming ethnic group. The Macedonian 
example brings to our attention the substantial need for socio-political cohesion in order to 
build a strong state. If divisive ethnic and national cleavages dominate a society, the gap 
between society and state will widen and the state will be weakened, particularly if the 
state i tse if is not ethnically hoınogenous. 81 
'
0 Until a few years ago, it was generally accepted that politicalleadership was most properly passed on by 
inheritance. One king ruled; when he di ed his heir became the new king. This procedure was so important as 
a basis of legitimacy that great care was tak en to lay out precise rıiles of inheritance; if no clear heir was 
available, the result was sometimes civil war. Phillips Shvely, Power and Choice (McGraw-Hi)I Ine., fourth 
edition 1987), p. 112. · 
'
1 Gartner Heinz, Smail States and Alliances, ,(Vienna- Austrian Institute for International Affaires, 2000.), 
p.l18. 
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Legitimacy' through International Community: The international coınınunity is 
another source of legitimacy for weak states. Through programs for economic aid and 
reforms fınanced by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund or other 
fınancial institutions it becomes possible for weak states to achieve positive results. 82 In 
the Balkans, the international coınınunity serves as a source of legitimacy for weak states 
also through the special role that institutions such as the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has taken upon itself. Although OSCE Missions have the 
status of observer in electoral processes and write reports containing suggestions, it is fair 
to say that their conclusions are widely accepted as the fina! say regarding the validity of 
the elections. Furthermore, in some parts of the region, the international community has 
assumed a direct responsibility in day-to-day govemance. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
constitutes such an example. Also, Kosovo is another example where the UN 
administration is responsible for sccurity, dcfcnse, border coııtrols, foreign policy ete. 
2.3. WEAK STATESASA THREAT TO REGIONAL/INTERNATIONAL 
SECURITY 
From the security perspective, the existence of weak states is directly related to 
conflicts within these states, the most extreme cases of which are civil wars. Usually, 
weak states exhibit a low levcl of po! ilical lcgitimacy, and thcrcforc thcir institutions are 
Kı Thus, at lcast initially, a lot of cconomic akl from the European Union, or from EU mcınbcrs, in countrics 
!ike Albania, but also Romania and Bulgaria, helped the first non-communist govemments to reduce the 
social costs of the rcfonns that wcrc necessary in ordcr movc from a ccntrally phınncd to a ınarkct ccononıy. 
At the same time, a series of cconomic agrccmcnts or simply cconomic programs of the International 
Monetary Fund, European Union and so on, were vicwed and propagated by the post communist 
govemments as achievements in the field of democratic transformation. Almost all the first post communist 
govemments viewed NA TO and EU membership, or a,ny steps towards such membership as an indicator of 
their democratic rule, or as a passing grade for their legitimacy See Albert Rakipi, Weak States a view from 
within.( Vienna: PFP Consortium of Academies and Security Institute, 2002).0 17 
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i1l equipped to dea! effectively with these internal conflicts of interests. The solutions are 
usually souglıt outside statc institutions, tlıus soıııctiıncs dcgcncnıting into arnıcd 
insurrections and anarchy.83 The state may fail to solve the conflicts that arise anıongst 
different social groups even when these groups belong to the same ethnic group. The 
Albanian implosion in 1997 is a good illustration. The turrnoil followed the col!apse of 
high-risk "pyramid" investment schemes which was preceded by the breakdown of 
political consensus within the country political elite.84 As a result, the Albanian state lost 
control of its territory, the monopoly of the means of violence and all capacity for 
autonomous action. Indeed, the state enjoyed continuity only_dejure in the international 
arena asa member of the United Nations (UN). 
However, when the opposing factions represent different ethnicities, the potential 
for violence increases dramatically. Such was the case in Macedonia during the arrned 
conflict there in the spring of 2001. The violent struggle between the National Liberation 
Arrny (NLA) and govemment security forces had the potential to divide Macedonia. For a 
while the Macedonian administration and Macedonian elite as well failed to realize that 
the state was attacked from within by stressing or daiming that the erisis was the 
result of outside aggression from the UN Protectorate of Kosovo85 or as a result of 
terrorist groups infiltrating from Kosovo. 86 
83 Robert Kaplan, The coming Anarchy. Shatterlng the Dreams of the Post Co/d War. (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2001 ), p.7. 
84 Gabriel Paıtos, "Aibania: Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management" (London -17ıe International 
Security Information (1 997),p.ll. · · 
85 Branko Crvenkovski, lnterview of the President of the Republic of Macedonia, Vreme, 31 December 
2004 see 3/ 7. . 
R6 V. Buckovski, '" Maccdonia: A step ahcad bcforc cxiting the criscs," Conlemporal)' Macedonian Delense 
Il :4 (2001 ): p. 85. 
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In the decade after the end of the Cold W ar, we may notice a considerable number 
of internal conflicts-from the Balkans to the ex-Soviet republics-which reinforce a 
trend that is rapidly becoming dominant: war within states. It is in this sense that Kalevi 
Holsti argues that the phenomenon of war has not become less frequent. Instead, its nature 
has changed dramatically. W ar within states, or as he calls it "the third kind of war",87 
different from "institutionalized war" and "total war", does not correspond with 
Clausewitz's thinking of war as an organized combat between the ınilitary forces of two 
different states. 
According to Van Creveld, in the wars of the "third kind" there are no fronts, no 
caınpaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honors, no points d'appui and no 
respect for the territorial boundaries of states. 88 Wars of the third kind are usually long 
wars of attrition, fought with a vicious mixture of guerilla's tactics and terrorism. More 
often than not, they are not fought over territory per se but over issues of statehood and 
relations among communities within states.89 
Holsti believes that the primary if not exclusive etiology of internal wars resides in 
the fundamental quarrels about the nature of communities and the processes of state 
building with i ts accoınpanying problcms. The third kin d of war is typical for wcak sa tes. 
On the other hand, the majority of "hot" conflicts that took place during the Cold W ar 
occurrcJ bel wc en states. 
" Holsti, p.36. 
'"Martin Van Creve1d, T!ıe transformatian ofwar,( Nı::w York: Simon & Schuster, 1991 ), p. 206. 
R9 Hcinz Gartncr, Smail States a11d Al!iances,( Vienna: Austrian Institute of ln-tcnıational 
Affaircs,2000).p.97. 
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A number of studies prove that from 120 wars fought between 1945 and 1976, 102 were 
intrastate. Also, a study by Michael Kidro and Ronal Segal that covers the period between 
1973 and 1986 shows that in that period sixty-six wars were intrastale while 30 wars were 
fought over border changes.90 
Often these border wars originated from state building processes, regime 
protection or the desire to create a new regime. The fact that the majority ofthese internal 
conflicts occurred in the Third World reinforces the idea that they arose out of the state 
building process. 
If we accept the assumption that weak states are a source of internal conflicts, and 
the fact that the weak state phenomenon is not a novelty in the international arena, we 
must attempt to answer the question: In the post Cold W ar period, why do internal state 
conflicts threaten international security ınore than ever before? 
During the Cold W ar, internal connicts within wcak states bad dctrimcntal cffccts 
on the security of the neighboring states and regions. This is evident in the Third World 
environment. However, these conflicts proved unable to destabiiize the international 
system. 
On a practical and theoretical !eve!, the borderline between intersiate and intrastale 
wars cannot be identifıed easily. According to Rayınond Aron, it is quite possible that if 
90 Quoted by Kalevi Holsti (The State ,W ar and the S\atc of W ar( Cambridge- Cambridge University Press 
'ı 996), p. 78. 
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an integrated portion of a state's territory or a fraction of the population, refuses to submit 
to the centralized authority and undertake an arrned struggle, the conflict, though a civil 
war with regard to international law, will be considcrctl a foreign war by those who see 
the rebels as the expression of an existing or nascent nationY1 Nevertheless, in the last 
fifty years, this borderline has become much more emphatic. 
As Kalevi Holsti points out, the most cxtcrnal armcd interventions cl;ıssificd as 
interstate wars werc actually the resul! of internal rebellion and wars. Soviet interventions 
in Hungary and Afghaııistan and American intervention in Vietnam are examples. 92 
The fact that the community of independent states is becoıning quickly larger93 
with new meınbers, most of which are classified as "weak states", cannot serve as an 
argument for explaining the inercasing instability of the international system according to 
the proposition: More weak states bring about more conflicts. The reasons for the greater 
tlıreat to peace and stability in the international arena after the Cold War must be 
investigated beyond the siınple quantitative increase in states that are considered to be 
weak. The first reason must be found in the systemic change in the international system 
after the end of the Cold War. During the Cold W ar the nature of the International System 
with the deep separation into two opposing camps and a third unallied bloc (Non Aligned 
Movement) one limited the impact those weak states and intrastale conflict could have on 
91 Raymond Aron, Peace and War,(New York- The Free Press, 1981), p.7. 
92 Holsti, p.23. 
93 The number ofsovereign states in the United Nations has increased from 51 to 185. The rate ofnew-
country creation has varied. From 1950 to 1990 2,2 neVf states were created per year, up from average of 1.2 
per year from 1900 to 1950. The 1990s have seen extremc instability: From 1990 to 1998 the rate was 3,1 
new countries per year. See Enriques Juan, "Too many Flags?", Foreign Policy, ( lssue 116, 1999): p. 30. 
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the international arena. The Cold War itself, through the balance of power that it 
spawned, secured a reasonable degree of stability in the international system. 
• 
.. 
According to the realist theory of international relations, the hipolar nature of this 
system, and nuclear deterrence, were the main factors for the relative peaceful resolution 
of disputes at the time94 The weak state phenoınenon was present in both adversarial 
camps. It is not diffıcult to see that a great number of states in the Eastern Bloc could be 
classifıed as 'weak' according to the criteria we have set above. However, the overriding 
ideological conflict of the time meant that a number of unsolved problems such as 
national and minority questions were frozen. Ev en in the W estern bl oc, despite the fact 
that its core was made up of strong states, there were a number of weak states, or states 
that did not enjoy extensive legitiınacy. For example, post-war Gerrnany's situation, 
domestically and internationally, was desperate. Despite the fact that countries !ike 
Germany and ltaly had a relatively long tradition in state building, and therefore their 
citizens accepted the existence of the state, social cohesion was badly damaged. Political 
institutions and elites had lost their legitimacy and were responsible not only for the 
destruction of their own countries, but also for the great horrors they had perpetrated 
during the war. The new institutions were constantly threatened by poverty and the 
'iınposition' of democracy from above that impeded their search for legitimacy. Other 
countries, such as Greece and Turkey, were undcr the constant tlıreat of violent doınestic 
conflicts, which could have threatened the cohesion of the entire Westem bl oc. This was 
one of the reasons why the US adopted the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine. The 
94 John Mearsheimer The Tragedy ofGreat powei· Politics (New York: W.W Norton & Company. 
2001),p.52 
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' Marshall Plan was out of the need to prevent and neutralize the potential threats that came 
from the possibility of "iınminent economic and political collapse of Westem Europe 
itself. The fear that coınınunist parties in Italy and France would gain power in the event 
of economic chaos was enough to convince Americans that massive ai d was necessary" .95 
In the words of George Marshall, the Marshall Plan was directed not against any country 
or doctrine, but against poverty, hunger, desperation and chaos.96 
S ome of the internal conflicts that occurred at the time, such as in 1956 in Hungary 
or Czechoslovakia in 1968, had no rcpcrcussions on the status quo. This explains the 
Wcst's inaction after the nıilitary interventions of the Soviet Union in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, these internal conflicts threatened the security of the 
entire pro-Soviet bloc, which explains the quick and resolute military interventions 
undertakcn by the USSR. 
Also, the East-West conflict brought about an inıproveınent on the traditionally 
problematic relations between the Great Powers. As Lawrence Freedınan points out, most 
of the old great powers facing the coınmon threat of comınunism w ere banded together in 
alliance, which in tum created the conditions for ever-closer economic and political 
cooperation. So successful was this process that it has now become unthinkable for France 
and Gerrnany to renew their traditional antagonisın. 
95 Robert W e gs, Europesince 1945: A Concise History.' (New York: St. Martin's Press, ı 977), p. ı S. 
96 Stephen Vaıone, Two Centuries of US Foreign Policy, (London: Praeger, ı99S), p. ı28. · 
sı 
' Indeed, some analysts argue that it was the hipolar nature of the international 
system, and the rivalry between the two superpowers, which prolonged the instability of 
Third World countries. Often, the c!ash between the two superpowers has occurred on the 
periphery of the system, the Third World.97 However, "the superpowers' shared interest in 
avoiding direct military confrontations might have led them to enforce a degree of 
restraint on the behavior of their more adventurous Third World c!ients and hereby 
averting dangerous escalations of certain regional conflicts (in the Middle East and East 
Asia)".98 
To support our argument that the weak state phenomenon has increased the 
instability of the international system after the Cold War, we must look to one more 
factor: Organizing Ideology. In 1815, the international system functioned on the basis of 
balance of power amongst the victorious European powers on the war against Napoleon 
and defeated France, which was accepted as an equal in the Congress of Europe. Thus, 
security was build around the concept of balance of power, where aU powers were 
relatively equal to each other in strength and thus acted as a constraint on each other. The 
members of the Concert w ere the guardians of European peace with the right to interfere 
against any power that tried to increase its power relative to the other powers in the 
system. The European powers of the time banded together in the name of systemic 
stabi!ity despite the fact that they did not share the same organizing ideology. 
97 Angola, lran, Iraq, Vietnam. 
"Amitav Acharya, "The pcriphery as the Core: The Third World and Sccurity Studies.·· ill Kcith Krausc 
and Michac1 C. Williams, cds., Critica! Securify Studies: Concepts and Cases, (Minncapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), p.306. 
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Metternich' s systeln consisted of a new kind of cooperation: a liberal rnonarchy such as 
Great Britain was united with European autocracies such as Russia. 
The security frarnework in the Cold W ar era was fundarnentally different not only 
in the strncture of the balance of power (i.e. bipolarity) but even from the perspective of 
the role organizing ideologies played within it. The Cold W ar system exhibited a great 
chasm according to the organizing ideologies of its member-states, liberalism and 
communism. Both blocs created their own independent security institutions, NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact for the Western and Eastern camps respectively. 
During its lifctimc, coınınunism, as the organizing ideology cınbraccd by the 
meınbers of the Eastem Bl oc, froze national and minority problems, thus taeJeling the state 
building problem on cntirely diffcrcnt foundations. The new rulcrs of Eastern Europe 
were engaged in a ınajor enterprise of socialization in order to eliminate the "false 
consciousness" of natioııhood and to develop the 'proper' proJetarian ethos.99 This 
spccific rclationship betwccn ideology and state building was not hoınogenous throughout 
the eastern bloc. In multinational/multiethnic states such as Yugoslavia and the USSR, 
the elites tried to build a new identity from scratch. Thus, the aim was the creatioı1 of a 
"Yugoslav identity" and a "Soviet idcntity" in order to ovcrride. existing idcntitics. 
Nationalism and national questions werc declarcd to be' heresi es' in both countries. 
99 George Schopflin, Nations Identity Power The New Politics of Europe (London: Hurst & 
Company,2000), p. 150. 
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Albania too represents a specifıc casc study on the relationship bctwecn ideology and 
nation. The Albanian communist regime shaped a more "deformed" idcntity. Thus, high-
achievers within the system embraced a communist identity that overrode their Albanian 
identity. This does not mean that nationalism was cimsured completely. However, the 
glorification of the nation was subordinated to the preservation of the regime. From this 
point of view, Enver Hoxha's Albania represents a sornewhat paradoxical state where 
despite the endless talk about the nation, its survival and glory were closely tied to the 
survival and glory of the regime and the communist ideology. This may be due to the fact 
that the communist regime came to power based on the gueri!la fıglıt against the Nazis and 
it was not handed power by the Red Army which gave it more legitimacy than in other 
case of Eastem Europe. 100 Under no circumstance did the regime encourage an objective 
look at the national problems, and even less did it map out any nationalisı or expansionary 
policies. 
From the security and stability point of view, coınınunism seemed to bring peace 
and order. However, this was true only as long as the 'ideological shell' of the system 
remained unassailable. The fall of the ideological shell ıneant that nothing could prevent 
the frozen national or border questions from 'melting'. Indeed, these problems were used 
by the elites in the 90' to bui! d up and consolidate their power. Similarly to the end of the 
colonial empires, the end of the communist regimes brought about a regeneration of the 
dilemmas on 'regime narure' and 'state building.' Thus, the security dilennna was not 
simply related to the national questions or disputes over territories. More fundamentally, 
the dilemma consisted on the relationship between the state and the society it represented. 
100 Elez Biberaj, Albania in Transition The Rocky Road to Denıocracy, (USA : WestviewPress 1998),p. 20 
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' . The coınmunist regimes in the Eastem Bloc by and large identified themselves with the 
state. Thus, the fall of the regimes in some countries brought about the demise of the state 
with it. The state rebuilding dynamic became more problematic from the security 
perspective, in multinational/multiethnic states such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union 
than in countries where the population was largely purely ethnic, such as in the case of 
Albania. 
If we accept the assumption that communist regimes were able to impose order 
intemally by freezing border and national questions, we are not implying that these states 
were necessarily strong. Thus, liberal democracy, the organizing ideology in the Westem 
Bloc, gave a great dea! more legitimacy to states by ensuring economic growth and by 
helping to shape society in a more cohesive fashion. Albanian society, !ike all other 
communist societies, appeared to be cohesive but communism had silently created a great 
dichotomy within it. Half of society was considered to be an enemy by the other half. 
Also, we have to remember that civil society institutions could not dea! with this 
dichotomy since at the time they were completely absent. 
With the end of the Cold War, we are facing what Roıınie Lipshuts calls an 
"insecurity dileınma." 101 
101 Ronnie Lipschutz, "'The losecurity Dilcmnıa", Romanian Journal q{ International Studies, Yol. Vlll, 12, 
2002,): p. 94 . 
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CHAPTER3 
ALBANIA AND MACEDONIA: WHERE DO THEY COME FROM: 
THE EGIONAL AND HSITORICAL CONTEXT 
Our analysis of the weak state phenomenon in Albania and Macedonia must start 
with a brief examination of the histerical and geographical factors that have determined 
the character of the state building process in these countries. Clearly, the weak state 
phenomenon is not unique to Albania and Macedonia. Neither is it unique to the Balkans. 
However, the geographicallocation of the peninsula and the history of the region continue 
to directly influence the processes of state formation and consolidation. 
Albania and Macedonia are only two links in the 'weak-states chain' that exists in 
the Balkans and, especially in the westem part of the peninsula. Despite the different 
degrees of weakness exhibited by Balkan states, the en tire region seems to be destirred to 
remain home to a composition of weak states for quiet some time. One of the reasons for 
the weakness of the Macedonian and Albanian states li es in the lack of state tradition. 
State tradition in the Balkans does not go back very far, Balkan states being 
relative newcomers in the European political map. According to Charles Tilly, the modern 
nation-state fırst appeared in the sixteenth century. Thus, "it was after 1500 that the 
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' national state won out (as a results of) territorial consolidation, centralization, 
differentiation of the instruments of the govemıneni from other sorts of organizations and 
monopolization (and concentration) of the means of coercion."102 
It is clear that the state concept in Europe became a reality much earlier than the 
Balkan states. The latter started to be created after the Ottoman Empire started to retreat 
from its European possessions. Serbia and Bulgaria were the fırst regional states to win 
their sovereignty. But, for Albania and Macedonia, the concept of statehood starts 
throwing fırm roots only in the fırst two decades of the twentieth century. Thus, for 
Macedonia this process started becoming a reality when the old Ottoman province became 
part of the Kingdom of Serbs and Croats in 1928. On the other hand, while it is true that 
Albania proclaimed its independence in 1912 and the Great Powers recognized it soon 
after, only when King Zog I took the reins of power did the modem concept of statehood 
start to materialize. 103 
The Ottoman tradition has constituted another problem for the state building 
process in the Balkans. The governing system adopted by the Ottoman Empire allowed 
little room for the type of institution building that charactcrizes a modern statc. For 
example, in Ottoman Albania the Empirc failcd to create a central administration, a main 
prerequisite of the modem centralized state. Obviously, this helped the Ottomans retain 
their power by the ancient divide et impera logic, but from the point of view of state 
102 Charles Tilly, Coercion Capital and European States: A.D. 990-1990. (Cambridge: Ba~il Blackwcll, 
ı 990), p. 63. . 
103 Bcmd Fischcr, King Zog and the Struggle.for Stability in Albania,( London: Hurst & Company, 2004), p. 
195. 
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formation, the country' s regions developed in different ways. Ev en within the four 
vilayets (administrative territories) that made up Ottoınan Albania, state administration 
was very segınented. Finally, the Ottoman Iradition meant that the region was cut off 
from the cconoınic and political dcvclopıncnts in the rest or Europc. 
The reasons for the creation of states in the Balkans are different from the ones 
that existed in Westem Europe. The Balkan State was not bom out of a need for the 
further development of the local econoıny. It was not the result of econoınic pressures or 
the desire to expand ınarkets. Let us reıneınber that the organized British state was bom 
precisely out of the need for ınanaging economic development and conquering eınerging 
markets. In the Balkans, the creation of independent states was seen as the only altemative 
to Ottoman occupation .. The Albanian state was formal!y established in 1913, in the wake 
of Turkey's disintegration. 104 Thus, it was national moveınents that gave birth to the new 
states. But, these moveınents, when successful, could only create the façade of a new state 
by winning international recognition. They were ili equipped to build robust internal 
institutions to encourage the development of the new states on the road charted by their 
ınuch-older European counterparts. 
From an international perspective, the Balkan Peninsula has always constituted a 
battleground for the great powers. Since the end of Mettemich's Concert of Vienna, 
almost all of the great po w ers have vigorously pursued tlıeir contradictory interests in this 
region. In this context, the Cold W ar proved to be an exception to the rule. But despite the 
104 Darek Hall ," Albania in Europc: Condenıned to th~ pcriphcry or Bcyond" Geopolitics, Vol .6, issuc 
1,(2001): p. 107. 
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changes in the international system, the traditional relations between the great powers and 
the Balkans continued to be influenced by the legacy of the past. It seemed that rising 
antagonism between the Balkan peoples revived their alliances with western powers 
dating back to the time of the Second W ar World105 For example, Germany pushed for 
and achieved international recognition for Slovenia and Croatia, the old Habsburgian 
provinces. While as France is concerned one should remember the speech of French 
President François Mitterrand : W e should not ignore traditional friendship. For us as 
for Russia it is Serbia. Slovenes and Craats rather tum to the Germanics. 106 Furthermore, 
the nature of the relationship between the US and Russia was challenged in 1995 by their 
opposing viewpoints on the Bosnian conflict. Great power politics in the Balkans has not 
only created border problems, but it has also harmed the state building process in the 
region. Often, weak states have been under the iıifluence of one or anather outside power, 
thus being unable to focus on their domestic challenges effectively. 
From the point of view of state boundaries, the peace settlement of both Balkan 
wars and the First World W ar created at least as many problems as it solved. The post-
Versailles ord er left most of the Balkan states unhappy with the status quo, though it must 
be said that it is quite possible that any peace settlement would have left some of them 
unsatisfıed. After the Second Balkan W ar, Albania preserved with Austrian and to a lesser 
extent Italian, help her 1913 borders that had been decided in the London Conference of 
Aınbassadors. Huge swathes of territory inhabited by Albanians remained outside the 
borders of the nascent state. As a result of the peace settlement, the political map of the 
105 Daniela Heirneri and W im Van Mcrus "The Balkans Bctwcen Paris and Berlin" Southeast European 
and Black Sea Studies, Vol.4 No.3 ( 2004): p.346. 
106 Roland Dumas, Le fil ct la pclotc (Paris: Plon 1 996:), p. 354. 
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region resembled a salade macedonienne, from the point of view of the complex ethnic, 
religious and cultural mix that inhabited the new states. It was in this difficult environment 
that the newly independent Balkan states embarked on the processes of state 
consolidation. They were not only threatened from the outside - something that often 
helps in strengthening state and national cohesion - but also domestically, due to the 
presence of hostile national minorities that rejected the statehood of "the other." 
Macedonia finds itself in such a position, tlıus prompting observers to call it a "mini-
Balkans. "This has caused a number of conflicts between Balkan states, often dosing the 
lines of communication between them and ev en degenerating into open warfare. 
The complex nature of the ethnic problems in the region has often translated into 
wars within a state spilling over into wars between states and nations. According to a 1913 
report by the US-based Carnegie Endowınent, in the Balkans warfhre does not remain 
within the framework of opposing annies, but among the respective peoples as well. This 
has caused large-scale massacres of civilians, which have been remarkably well preserved 
by Balkan memory. 
The processes of liberal economic development started Iate and continue to 
proceed slowly. This is the second reason for the classification of the. states in the region 
as 'weak.' Traditionally, short-tenn political goals and security concerns have sapped 
Balkan energies away from economic problems and concerns over institution building. 
The agrarian structure of Balkan economies did not favor the state-building process. Not 
only has agriculture dominated the Balkan region but its basic structure did not evolve 
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either from the pe~spective of capital or from that of labor. For example, in the case of 
Albania; Michael Kaser argues that the agrarian and petty mercantile economy of the 
Vilayet of Shkoder and the Albanian- inhabited zones of the Vilayet of Yanina changed 
little in the four centuries of Ottoman rule. 107 Even after Balkan states achieved 
independence, the region remained poor and, quite often, states continued to be isolated 
from each other. More often than not, a state emerged from its isolation only when it 
declared war on a neighboring state. Economically, the peninsula's markets have been 
hard to penetrate and, more importantly, the incentive to penetrate them is smail because 
of the lack of economies of scale. Constant isolation and periodical retums of instability 
and open warfare have not helped in this regard. Finally, the persistent economic 
insecurity that characterizes many Balkan states has resulted in aid dependency syndrome 
that, in its turn, makes sustainable economic growth diffıcult in the long term. 108 
Traditionally, the Balkan community has been an agrarian community. This has 
constituted another stumbling block in the state building process. It also explains why 
Balkan national movements started relatively Iate. According to Eric Hobsbawn, in 
agrarian societies national consciousness is developed Iate or not at all. 109 
Later on, the Cold War completely separated the region from Europe, and for a 
time, all states except Yugoslavia continued to operate in isolation. This does not mean 
that the state building process did not continue to evolve at this time. But, this process 
107 Michael Kaser "Economic Continuities in Albania's Turbuleni History" Europe-Asia Studies 
No4(200!): p. 628. 
108 Ruby Gropas "Functional Bordcrs. Sustainable security and EU- Balkan relations "Southeast European 
and Black Sea studies,voi4,No.1 (January 2004): p. 57 .. 
109 Eric Hobsbawn, Nation and Nationalism since 1878, (Cambridge: Can1bridge University Press, 1990), p. 
89. 
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would have proce~ded faster and more effıciently if regional states functioned within a 
more open framework of cooperation and exchange with the European mainstream. 
At the time, the Balkan states were divided not only along the Iron Curtain but also 
among themselves. The. çase of Albania is the most extreme: isolated from the West, 
isolated from the Eastern bloc after the 60s and isolated from its Balkan neighbors. Let us 
remember that while the Eastern bloc was isolated from the West, its ınember states were 
cooperating with each other quite intensively in the political and economic fields. 
The wars of the last decade have contributed negatively on the state building 
processes in the region as well. By the early nineties, Balkan states had aclıieved different 
levels of development according to the different policies that they followed during the 
Cold War. Yugoslavia followed a relatively liberal economic policy, and its different 
republics kept up intensivc comınunication lines with cach other and with the outside 
world in the realm of capital markets. Albania, as the most isolated country in the region, 
inherited a failed economy and absolute poverty from the communist regime. However, 
the ten years of conflict gravely damaged econoınic development in the ex-Yugoslav 
republics. Communication lines were cut, and potential foreign investınent was scared 
away. Presently, to travel from Tirana to Belgrade takes as long as ıraveliing from Tirana 
to Washington D.C. After ten years of con11ict, Balkan states are "forccd'' 110 to sigiı Free 
Trade Agreements with each other as the way to European integration. For Yugoslavia, 
110 In the EU's regional approach to the Balkans, free tyade agreements are considered to be a necessary bul 
not sufficient eondition. Albania already has signed one with Macedonia and is presently negotiating with 
other countries. 
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' this sounds like back to the future, since before the Milosevic era, Yugos!avia functioned 
asa common market with robust lincs of communication bctwcen its rcpublics. 
Another serious obstacle to the state-building process remains the war erime 
legacy. The events of March 2004 in Kosovo confirmed that the war crimes legacy 
continued to be an obstacle to the full restaration of peace and security throughout core 
parts of South East Europe. ı ı ı The way of dea!ing with the war erime !egacy is a real test 
of will for both govemments and societies to adopt democratic princip!es. Further, 
addressing properly the war erime legacy is part of EU conditiona!ity. The freezing of 
negotiations with Serbia by the EU when the fonner failed to respect the deadline and 
hand over Mladic to The Hague is the latest example of such conditionality. ı ı ı 
ı ı ı Gow James "Security in South Eastern Europe: the war crimes legacy ·· Southeast European and Black 
Sea Studies voi.S No! January 2005): p.l3. ·· 
ı ı ı Tirana Times 12 April (2006), p. 19. 
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CHAPTER4 
ALBANIA, A WEAK NA TION STATE 
4.1.HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Albania emerged from the harshest Stalinist system as one of the weakest states in 
the region. Y et, the approach taken by this small Balkan country to address security issues 
and its own national question may have an impact on the stability of the entire 
region.Historically, Albania represents one of those rare cases whose important 
geopolitical position in a volatile region has threatened its political existence, while at the 
same time serving as a casus belli for seeking protection by an outside power.Every strong 
power that has arisen in the Italian Peninsula has expanded in the Balkans by using 
Albania as a bridgehead. On the other hand, whenever a powerful state has emerged in the 
Balkan Peninsula, it has tended to reach the Adriatic coast and use Albania as a 
springboanJ lor cxpansioıı tu the Wcst. 111 At the eıııJ or the l3alkaıı wars, Albaııiaıı 
territories became the objects of negotiations for partitioning among the neighbors. 
1 13 Stavro S kendi Albania Ea.vt -Central F:urope ımder the Communists ( London : Athıntic Press, 1957), 
p.9. 
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On 16 December 1912, the Aınbassadors Conference of the Great Powers 
supported the creation of an independent Albanian state within its present borders as a 
coınpromise between the divergent approaches taken by the Great Powers vis-iı-vis the 
Albanian question. The motives behind the support that Austria-Hungary and, to a lesser 
extent, Italy, gave to the creation of the independent Albanian state, sprung from fears of 
Serbia's threat to expand into the Adriatic and the resulting expansion of Russian 
influence in the area. Austria-Hungary advocated the creation of Greater Albania with 
Kosovo and a large part of modern Maccdoııia's tcrritorics, whilc Russia vchemcntly 
opposed the plan. During the First World W ar, Albania became a transit route for the 
armies of the warring powers, but also of the neighboring countries, among w hi ch quite a 
few were planning to remain in occupation of the country, thus placing its existence in 
jeopardy almost from the day of its inception. In one exaınple, Italy went so far as to 
declare on 3 June 1917 "The unity and independence of all Albania under the aegis and 
protection of the Kingdom of ltaly". 114 
At the end of the First World W ar, Albania's future as an independent state was 
seriously tlıreatened again. The Allied Powers and the armies of the neighboring countries 
invaded its territories. One of the options apparently enjoying even the consensus of the 
Allied Powers was the splitting up of Albanian territories among Greece, Italy and 
Yugoslavia. One of the options upheld by Italy at the Peace Conference in Paris was to 
place Albania under Italy' s full control. W ere this to be rejected, the next option was 
division, if independence was not agreed upon. Albania achieved real statehood after the 
114 Skendi , p.12 . 
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World W ar I, in part because of diplomatic intercession of the United States. 115 W oodrow 
Wilson, President of the US, strongly opposed Albania's division. He advocated Albania's 
integrity and independence due to the principle of self-determination, one of the leading 
principles of the League of Nations. 
From another perspective, the very creation of the Albanian State brought about 
the problem ofinsecurity. The Great Powers' consensus in 1912 to support the creation of 
a small independent Albania left outside its borders large chunks of Albanian territories 
historically populated by Albanians. In 1912, the Albanians had a state, but a divided 
nation. In spite of the insistence of the League of Nations, Albania's borders reınained 
undefined for a longtiıne. Even when this was finally done, Greece refused to recognize 
its borders with Albania. Moreover, even today it continues to ignore the Florence 
Protocol since it maintains the State ofWar116 Law with Albania. Furthermore, Albania's 
existence was questioned immediately after the end of World W ar II, when Tito' s 
Yugoslavia was trying to make it into a seventh republic of the Yugoslav Federation. In 
1946, Albania signed an Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation with Yugoslavia, 
which was followed by a number of other economic cooperation agreeınents. By signing 
the treaty, both countries agreed to coordinate economic policy (or 'plan' in communist 
jargon), standardize their monetary systeıns and create a custoıns union. This ensured 
ı 15 Eugene K. Keefe , Albania a Countıy Study (Washington D.C: Library of Congress,2004), p. 12 
ı ı 6Greece has not abrogated the State of W ar law with Albania that has becn adopted during the Second 
World W ar. At the time, Greece considered Albania as an aggressor since ltaly used Albanian territoryasa 
launching pad for its invasion ofGrecce. Thisisa rather absurd situation, since this same law.with Italy, the 
rcal aggrcssor, docs not cxist anymorc. Dcspitc the fact that Albarih) und Grcccc signcd a Fricm.lship und 
Cooperation Treaty in 1996, the Stale of W ar rcnıains valid. One of tlıc cxplanutions is tlıc "'Canı problem··. 
Keeping the status of this Law unchanged, Greece preempts any possible court cases by people of Cam 
descent in search of their lost property. The Cams were ethnically cl eansed from Northern Greece during the 
Second World W ar. 
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Albania's compleie dependence on Yugoslavia and paved away for an eventnal union of 
the two countries. 
After Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union, Albania abandoned its former 
ally and entered into the Soviet sphere of influence. During the Soviet-Alhanian 
honeymoon, a number of large-scale investments and reforms were undertaken in order to 
preserve the legitimacy of the regime. 
In the fifties, Hoxha broke off relations with the USSR in order to start a new love 
affair with China. This new relationship provided the last dose of oxygen for the Albanian 
economy. By the seventies, the regime opted for the complete isolation of the country, 
thus ensuring i ts economic collapse. The campaign to co lleetivize the remnants of private 
property only hastened the process.Albania' s relations with the West had remained frozen 
since 1945. The USA and other Wcstcrn couııtrics rcfuscd to rccognize the clcctioııs of2"0 
December ı 945 and thus they coıısidered the communist govemment that emerged from 
these elections as i!Jegitimate. 
Threats from outside, and especially from neighbors, who historically harbored 
territorial claims and coııceived projects for splitting up Albaniaıı territories, were also 
frozen during the Cold W ar. Up uııtil the fall of communisın in ı 992, Albaııia's tragically 
absurd isolation was a shield agaiııst outside threats. National Security Strategy was based 
eııtirely on the military dimension and the country's economy was designed entirely to 
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serve such polici~s. 117 However, it is hard to assert that the country' s sıirvival was a 
tribute to i ts defense potential, as this potential did not amount to much, regardless of the 
high !eve ls of militarization. The militarization of the economy and society was a way for 
Hoxha's clique to solidify their grip on power and achieve internal unity in the face of an 
imaginary enemy, hardly an incentive for genuine preparations against an imaginary 
foreign aggressor. Although Albania never faced any real threats of foreign aggressions 
during Hoxha' s entire communist rule, Hoxha himself continuously amplified imaginary 
threats and created extemal enemies simply for the purposes of domestic politics. 
As the Cold W ar ended and Albania emerged from communism, the country was 
faced with the task ofreformulating its security. But almost 100 years from the time ofits 
creation, the state risked war with Yugoslavia over the issue of Kosovo, white it always 
had problematic relations with Greece. The main security concem for Albania became its 
relations with neighboring countries, in the first place relations with Yugoslavia, because 
of the Kosovo question and the problem of the Albanians in the other Repub!ics of the 
Federation. 
4.1.1. The Emergence of a Modern State 
Obviously, international recognition for the new Albanian state in 1913 did not 
mean that the new state functioned efficiently from the domestic perspective. The creation 
of a new, centralized bureaucracy and the production ofpublic goods were .no easy tasks 
to achieve.The great power' s decision to lea':e half of the territories of Ottoman Albania 
117 Biberaj, p.69. 
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' outside the borders of the new state foreshadowed the fact that, while recognized as a state 
de jure, Albania's chances of becoming a viable state were rather slim. This becomes 
clearer when we look at the vital economic importance of the territories that were not 
included within the new state. Thus, the traditional, natural trend of the present-day 
northem regions of Albania has been to develop trade and other economic ties with 
Kosovo and, especially the Gjakova Highlands. Armstrong, the Private secretary of Prince 
Wied that the great powers namedas king of Albania in 1914118 wrote in his memoirs: 
"In 1913 Albania was divided in half and was left without some of i ts major cities. 
Some purely Albanian cities such as Gjakova, Prizren, Dibra and Struga were 
given to Serbia and Montenegro. The mountaineers of northem and Northeastem 
Albania were cut of from their traditional markets and civilizations. 
Recently, the view that "size does not matter" when determining the viability of a 
state, has become quite strong. However, in the case of Albania the problem does not lie 
with the country' s size, but with the fact that the new borders interrupted the natural 
existence and way oflife of the nation. Also, the territorial division of Albanian lands, the 
existence of strong Albanian minorities in the neighboring countries, and the objectives of 
the latter to further aggrandize themselves at the expense of the Albanian state created a 
number of problems domestically in the struggle to build a viable state. 
Every Albanian administration in the past one hundred years has faced two 
simultaneous challenges: preserving the territorial integrity of the country and imposing 
the will of the state throughout this territory. 
IIR Amıstrong, Albania 19/4 Tlıe six monflı Kingdam ( Tirana: Albanian Institute for lntemational Studies 
2004, ), p, 16. 
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After the declaration of independence in ı 9 ı 2, the Albanians created !heir fırst 
government, The Vlora Government, which was relatively short-lived. Headed by Isınail 
bey Qemali, this administration failed to achieve international recognition and to 
monopolize power and iınpose its will throughout Albanian lands. However, the fırst real 
test for the new Albanian s ta te was faced by the administration of Prince Wied. The great 
powers nam ed Prince W i ed as king of the Aıbanians. The king arrived in Durres in March 
1914 but he was forced to leave the country six ınonths later due to domestic and external 
pressures. Only a few months after the king's ascendance to the throne, an anarchist 
pcasant ınovcnıcnt known as the IIIOI'<'IIIent '!f'11axhi Qa111il. staıicd an arıncd insurrcction 
designed to bring the Ottoınans back in Albania. In the meantime, Greek troops in the 
South and Montenegrin and Serbian troops in the North prcventcd the new rcgiıne from 
extending its reach throughout the country. Finally, the outbreak of World War I 
coınpleted the failure of the king to fulfıll his duties. 
The next adıninistration was born during the Congress of Lushnja in 1920. ln 
December of the same year Albania was accepted in the League of Nations, thus 
consolidating its international recognition as an independent country. The great powers 
were unable to achieve a consensus on the international borders of the new state, but in 
ı921, after a few ıninor changes on its northern borders, Albania's. 1913 borders were 
recognized. These borders have remained static to this day. However, despite the de jure 
recognition, the state barely existed de facto on the domestic scene. Albanian society 
reınained largely agrarian, with profound regional differences. While it is true that 
religious differences were not crucial in reinforcing the divisions that plagued Albanian 
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society, the Catholic community in the North was quite sensitive towards a possible 
domination from the quasi-feudal Muslim bey class. 119 Nonetheless, the anti-government 
rebellions of the time were sparked by the attempts of the central administration in Tirana 
to ex~end i ts reach in the country' s remote regions rather than due to religious differences. 
The infamous "Republic of Mirdita" created in the Mirdita region in 1921 is one of the 
most famous of these movements .In the very same year, parliamentary life started with 
deputies being elected from two recently formed political parties. This was the first 
attempt at political pluralism in Albania, and despite the fact that the parties or the 
framework in which they competed fe11 far below their Westem equivalents; their birth 
signaled new foundations on which to start the process of state building. 
The modem Albanian state started emerged only under the govemance of King 
Zog120• Ahmet Zog, the man that came to dominate Albanian politics so completely for 
fifteen years, came to power in 1924 with Yugoslav support. Throughout this period, Zog 
pursued a pragmatic foreign policy towards the country' s neighbors and especially 
towards Italy. This a11owed him to consolidate his power base intemally, while keeping 
security concems more or less under control. 
From the domestic perspective, Ahmet Zog's statesmanship !ed to solid 
foundations for the modem Albanian state. President Zog, and Jater King Zog I, was able 
to impose state control throughout the territory of the state, sometimes through violent 
119 For more information on religion and national identity. see Albert Doja, The Politics of Religion in the 
Reconstruction of Identity: The Albanian Situation,( Tirana : Albanian Institute for International Studies, 
2001) 
120 Ahmed Zog became PrimeMinister of Albania in 1924. 
71 
means but mostly diplomatically. Respect for the law increased a great dea!, especially in 
the traditionally problematic areas of the North. Zog's administration passed a number of 
vital laws that dealt with great social problems such as blood feuds. The law also 
regulated the private possession of weapons. During this period, for the fırst time Albania 
possessed a govermnent bureaucracy shaped according to W estern models. Of course, this 
does not mean that the administration functioned as effıciently as its Western counterparts, 
yet its performance was greatly improved vis-iı-vis the pre-Zog era. The govermnent 
achieved a monopoly on the use of force. The gendarmerie, whose duty it was to ensure 
internal order, was modeled and trained by retired British officers that turned it into a 
respectable force. 121 
King Zog introduced the fırst centralized state in Albanian history. He started 
building a national network of roads that was essential not only for security reasons, but 
also for the econoınic development of the country's often-isolated regions. This enhanced 
internal communications, and startcd to promote the uııilicalion of the couııtry. Thus, the 
state was ab le to penetrate from the center to the periphery, uniting regions that, up to that 
point, had developed independently of each other. Despite the country's very limited 
means, the budget started supporting the creation of schools and hospitals thus making the 
state presence felt beyond the simple instruments of violence, such .as the gendarnıerie. 
Finally, reforms in education and less-effectively, in agriculture, helped reinforce state 
power in the eyes of its subjects. After the year 1925, Albania eınbarked upon a slow 
process of state-induced industrialization. 
121 For a belter understanding of King Zog's attempts' to build a modern Albanian state, see Bernd Ficher, 
King Zog and the Strugglefor Stability in Albania.( Tirana- Dudaj, /999) 
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However, despite these successes, the state building process advanced very slowly. 
The main reasons for this ınay be found in the Albanian reality prcvalcnt at the time. An 
overwhelmingly agrarian population was naturally hesitant to accept a strong, centralized 
state. The divisions plaguing Albanian society and its elites were too strong to be dealt 
with effcctively within such a short period of time. According to Benıci Fichcr, Zog 
himself, on whose hands power was concentrated, pessessed "a limited education, 
tendeney to intrigue, the inability to attract in his staffable men." 122 
The almost proverbial poverty of the population and the alısence of economic 
development and urbanization also prolonged the process of state building. An historical 
account of Albanian economic development shows three persistent continuities from the 
creation of the Albania state to the post-communist state. First, poverty and subsistence 
economies at household level have made a poor tax-base for state building. Second, the 
demands of modemization and state building have conditioned heavy dependence on 
extemal capital. Third, persisiing economic disparities between different regions of the 
country have showed no signs of amelioration. 123 
The international context also plays a ınajor role in the state building process. 
The danger of foreign intervention never really dissipated. Usually, the history of nation-
states shows that the danger of a foreign intervention has positive effects on the doınestic 
122 Bemd Fischer, King Zog and the Strugg!efor Stabi!ity in A!bania,( London: Hurst & Cornpany, 2004), 
f;~~ichael Kaser "Economic Continuitics in Albanii's Turbuleni History" Europe·Asia Studies 
No4(200!): p. 629. 
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politics of the state through the rally-around-the-flag effect and the strengthening of the 
state. This did not happen in Albania's case, where the elites often allied themselves with 
foreign powers in their fight for domestic political supremacy. Despite the fact that 
Albania had a constitution, 124 governance was centered on clan-based alliances and rnany 
vital institutions such as the judiciary, defense, and fınances were in the hands of persons 
that had no formal relationship to these institutions. 
4.1.2 The Communist Legacy 
Let us returu to the defınition of the term 'state' using the ideal type defınition of 
Joel Migdal - a defınition that is based on the Weberian formula - as an organization, 
composed of numerous agenci es !ed and coordinated by the state leadership ( executive 
authority that has the ability or authority to make and implement binding rules for all the 
people as well as the parameters of role-making for other social organization in a given 
territory, using force if necessary to have its way). 125 If we accept this definition, it 
becoınes impossible to argue that a real Albanian state did exist at any time during the 
Second World W ar. As a matter of fact, in this period the Albanian state experienced a 
'segmented existence', since at no time was it able to bring all of the regions under 
centralized control. Who!e regions remained outside its reach, while state penetration in 
society reınained weak. Since the population saw the ltalian and later German-sponsored 
governments as illegitimate, the whole government machinery quickly caıne to a 
standstill. After the Axis victories in the Balkans in 1941, the first ethnic Albanian state 
124 Between 1914 and 1939, Albania adoptcJ fivc constitulions: The fırst one was claboratcd by the 
International Commission of Control after the reeognition of the eountry's independence. One important 
constitutional change to be noted is the one of 1928 when Albania was dcclared a Monarehy. This allowed 
the new King Zog to have absolutc power. 
125 Migdal, p. 60. 
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caıne into being. ' Its borders corresponded with the ethnic distribution of the Albanian 
nation. 126 For the fırst time, Kosovo, northwestern Macedonia and a part of N orthem 
Greece were included within the borders of the Albanian state. Forrnally, this state 
continued to exist until Iate 1944, but in practical terrns it did not function norrnally. 
It certainly is cynical to look for positive effects in the military occupation of a 
country by another. Undoubtedly, the overall effect of both World W ars on Albania was a 
slowing down of the state building process. In its efforts to find an arrangement that 
would bring about peace, stability and growth, Albania tried three different political 
orders withiıı twenty years and all of them collapscd undcr tlıc wcight of weak 
bureaucracies, fınancial difficulties and corruption.127 However, it is a!so true that the 
building of new roads and the improvement of existing ones made for the benefıt of the 
occupying powers did improve comrnunication between the regions and their ties to the 
centers of power. Steps were taken to modernize the couııtry's infrastructure and develop 
i ts industry. However, if we use the W eberian delinition of the state on the fifty years of 
the coınmunist period we may say that the Albaııian state existed in a complete and 
palpable manııer. But, as we have already mentioned, such a defıııitioıı is not suffıcient for 
our purposes because it does not deterrnine the streııgth or weakness of a state. 
As the comınunist regiıne started disintegratiııg in 1990, Albania .exhibited the 
typical characteristics of a weak state. However, in order to understand the reasons for the 
weakness of the post-comrnuııist Albanian state, we have to iııvestigate the dyııaınics of 
126 Bemd Fischer, Albania at W ar 1939-1945 ( Londop: Hurst & Company , 1 999), p. 68. 
127 Eno Trimcev, Democracy lntel!ectuals and the State (Tirana: Albanian Institute for International Studies 
,2005), p.98. 
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state building under the comınunist regime as the longest and qualitatively different period 
of continuity in the existence of independent Albania. 
What were the features of the state in the comınunist era? W as the state weak or 
strong? The answers to these questions must be based on strong theoretical analysis that 
provides some understanding to the following: Can a dietatarial and autarchic regime 
build a strong state? If an autocratic regime can only build a weak state, does this imply 
that a state may be strong only in a liberal regime? 
With the creation of the League of Nations after the First World W ar, nationalism 
and the right to self-determination came to be considered as stabilizing factors for the 
unstable regions. Since the Wilsonian vision did not transiate into stronger, more stable 
states, can we make the derivation that liberal democracy may be considered a 
destabilizing factor? 
Let us returu to the Albanian state during the comınunist era. At a first glance, the 
state at the time seemed to be strong. !ts presence was powerfully felt iiı all of the 
country' s regions and i ts authority was unquestionable. The bureaucracy functioned from 
the center to the periphery quite effectively. The citizens obeyed state laws to the point 
that even now some people reıneınber the peace and security of the time with nostalgia. 
But from the functioning coınınunist state that was present in the moşt remote 
areas of the country, Albanians were faced ;vith a state that could function and deliver 
pub!ic services sporadically at best. From 1993 on, in newspapers and among common 
people, the complaint that the state had become deadweight unable to enforce its own laws 
became widespread. The recent memory of a "strong state" that could enforce its will 
irrespective of social opposition made the post communist state seem even weaker by 
comparison. 128 During the communist regime, it was unthinkable for people to attack 
state institutions or steal weapons from mi!itary depots as they did in 1997. In Hobawm's 
terrns, the issue of the future existence of the state as an institution relates to i ts ability to 
adapt and function according to popular expectations. Given the memory of a functioning 
. communist state, this issue becomes particularly diffıcu!t for the future of the Albanian 
state. 129 
According to most or the criteria wc uscd to deline a stroııg statc such as the 
ınonopoly of the use of force, state presence from the center to the periphery, state 
penetration in society, and the citizens observation of state laws, Albania may be 
classified as a strong state. However, here we have not included one of the most essential 
functions of the modem state, which is the obligation to provide public goods. The 
weakness of this type of strong states becomes apparent when we consider the capacity of 
the state to plan and implement policy, and more importantly to provide public goods. Let 
us investigate the internal workings of the coınmunist state in ord er to .fınd the foundations 
of i ts legitiınacy. The Albanian state seemed to perform strongly and palpably throughout 
its territory. The question arises: What was the basis of this strong perfonnance? The 
1
" Clarisa De W al, Mbijetesa Shqiperia nen postkomunizem ( Tiranıi: Albanian Institute for International 
Studies 2005 ), p. 12. .. . 
129 Quoted by De W al, Mbijetesa Shqiperia nen postkomunizem ( Tirana: Albanian Institute for 
International Studies 2005 ), p. 9. 
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answer is violenc'e. Direct or indirect, physical, moral or psychological, violence was 
sanctioned by constitutionallaw and if the degree ofrepression and terror was not enough, 
the arbitrary use of power was also another !ega! way for the authorities to carry out their 
will. The seeret police that went so far as to dictate to people what they thought was free 
to use its powers arbitrarily. 
The strong state concept in its most simple-minded form is connected with the 
state' s military or coercive capacities. "The increase of state power is often seen as an 
increase in arbitrariness, that is as an increase in despotism seen as something hostile to 
civilliberties. This always has been a terrible mistake," says John Halland who reminds us 
of the advice of Tocqueville who wamed that "the attempt to control could lead to 
sterility, to a low total sum of power within a social forrnation. Real strength comes from 
a politics ofreciprocal consent."130 
States exist due to the need of citizens for security, education, health services, and 
economic opportunities including the !ega! framework of order, a judicial system and 
public goods. At a fırst glance, the communist regime was able to ensure security and 
public order for its citizens. However, if we look deeper into the mechanisms of the 
communist state machinery, it becomes clear that a person was physically endangered on 
a daily basis. According to govemment statistics, erime remained at miniınallevel but in 
Albania it was the govemment machinery that was the perpetrator of tremendous 
130 See Hali.J.John, The retw·n of the State at http://www.ssrc.omseptll/cssays/hall. 
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crimes. 13 1 The s'tate with i ts oınnipotent institutions of violence constituted the real 
danger to the individual. 
Behind the propaganda of successes in the realms of education and health the 
reality was an extreme backwardness in both fields. The alleged success remained within 
the boundaries of the eradication of illiteracy and the creation of health institutions 
throughout state territory. But, health and education services could not even pretend to 
keep abreast the technological achievements of the times because of the extremely 
backward economic base of the country. In ı987, infant death rate in Albania according to 
Westem sources was 44 percent according to official sources it was 28.2 percent-while in 
certain regions of the country itjumped to over 60 percent In the same year, in Europe the 
mean infant death ra te was ı ı percent. 132 
From the economic perspective, the Albanian state failed completely. The 
govemment' s infamous five-year plans, with their ~xcessive emphasis on heavy industry, 
failcd rcpcatcdly to aclıicvc thcir objcctivcs wlıilc tlıcir sidc c!Tccts included l'riglıtli.ıl 
environınental damages. 133 The main ineome source for the state budget was agriculture. 
In ı 970, bread constituted the staple diet for the population, while per capita ineome -
131 According to offıcial statistics, the number of pcoplc pcrsccuted by the rcgiınc was morc thmı half rı 
million. This includcs prisoncrs, cxilcs, shot or disappcarcU pcoplc. . 
132 Roberto Morozzo Della Rocca, Albania le Radici de/la CJ·isi, ( Roma: Angelo Guerini e Associati SpA, 
1997), p.126. 
133 One example is the monstrous stccl plant in Elbas.an. about 50 kilometers fronı Tirana. This giga:ntic 
plani caused huge economic damage by sucking in yearly loans while danıaging the environment through 
pollution. 
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according to öfficial Tirana- was only US$750. This sum comes closer to Angola's US$ 
610 than toitaly's US$ 15,120.134 
The process of !and collectivization coupled with the elimination of any type of 
public propcrty causcd cnorınous econonıic harm. 135 Even in the most remote villages, 
peasants were incarcerated for maintaining a cow or goat intheir dwellings.The system of 
comrnunication also remained in its infantile stages. It is true that Albania inherited a 
grossly inadequate road infrastructure after World War IL Hoxha was interested in 
improving comrnunication between different regions in order to keep a tighter hold on the 
country, and some improvements were made particularly in railway-construction where 
the regime inherited a small and non-functional infrastructure. 136 
The centralized economy came to a standstili in the seventies when the complete 
isolation of Albanla began. After a brief honeymoon with Yugoslavia after the Second 
World W ar, Hoxha broke off ties with Tito and turned the country into a Soviet satelli te. 
After Klıruschev's denunciation of Stalin, Albania sided with China during the Sino-
Soviet conflict. These ideologkal alliances helped the Albanian economy by providing 
investments and new technologies. The political break with China signified the end of the 
oxygen supply for the Albanian economy. 
ıı• Della Rocca, p.132. 
135 Bl endi Kajsiu, Al do Bumçi and Albert Rak ipi, Albania a weak democracy a weak state(Tiraniı: Albanian 
Institute for International Studies, 2002), p.38. 
136 For a more complete survey of the transportation and communication inffastructure from. the First World 
W ar to the end of the communist regime, see Stavfo Skendi, East- Central Europe under communist: 
Albania, (New York: Atlantic Press, 1 957) 
80 
When consldering the post-coınınunist state building process, the coınınunist past 
becomes important when considering the fact that citizen loyalty to the government was 
ensured not due to the citizens' faith töwards its institutions but due to their fear of the 
state and its coercive powers. In Albania, the state was identified with the coınınunist 
regime. It was to be expected that the state would be blamed for the extreme poverty and 
persecution. Thus, the citizens' refusal to o bey state laws in the first post-communist 
decade may be viewed as an attempt to free themselves from the evils that the central 
authority had rained on them for a period of fifty years. Today the Albanians have a low 
degree of trust in the judiciary because they have never experienced a judicial system that 
functions purely on the basis of state laws. In the coınınunist period, the judicial system 
was but one of the links in a chain of terror institutions. The judiciary was reduced to a 
tool in the hands of the executive. 
In Albania the state was identified with the Party of Labor. 137 In Albania, as in 
other communist countries, there were two types of bureaucracies coexisting with each 
other. The first one, normal for any kind of state and the party bureaucracy that acted as a 
complete duplicate of the government machinery. Thus, paraUel to the different levels of 
the executive bureaucracy, there were the different levels of party apparatchiks recruited 
mostly from the working and peasanı classes. As a matter of fact, this second bureaucracy 
overruled the first one. This inheritance has created a problem for post-coınınunist 
Albania where every party in power has staffed the state bureaucracy with its own 
supporters. Thus, a change in power from one party to another is accompanied with a 
137 Ivan Krastcv ,The injlexibility Trap Frustrated Sodeties Weak Stutes and Demucracy _,the State qf 
Denıocracy in tlıe Balkans ( Sofıa: Center for Liberal Strategies,2001), p.J 15. 
complete rebuilding of state institutions where bureaucratic appointments are made on a 
political basis. 
While the state was identified with the party, the party itself was wholly identified 
with its leader Enver Hoxha. The reigns of power were tirmly concentrated on his 
hands. 138 While in pluralist Albania there are certain constitutional limits on the 
concentration of power, the individuals at the top of the political apex have tried very hard 
to concentrate power in their own hands. 
Religious institutions also prcscntcd a problem. In Albania, three diffcrcnt 
religions coexist though this religious divide does not affect social cohesion much. 139 
Even during the Ottoman period, Albanians were generally indifferent towards religion. 
In 1967, during the heady days of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, religion was outlawed 
and religious institutions were physically demolished or they were converted to sport 
halis, warehouses ete. 
To the factors of total insulation of the country, extreme economic backwardness, 
the absence of cultural and scientific opportunities were added the outlawing of religion 
and the loss of the right to faith. This had unprecedented destructive effects on Albanian 
society. Communism tried to build a new type of human beinglcitizen that official 
propaganda named "the new man". This hybrid embodied the Marxİst-Leninist ideals and 
138 Since the end of the Second World W ar until the sixties, Hoxhawas Party Chaim1an, Prime Minister, 
Interi or Minister and Foreign Minister at the same time. 
139 Albert Doja, The Politics of Religion in the Reconstruction of ldentity: The Albanian Situation,( Tirana : 
Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2001), p.34 
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' he was free of religious superstitions, material or carnal desires and any other of the 
'vices' of the capitalisı world. The inevitable ilissolution of moral principles build by 
tradition and national pride and self-respect proved extremely harmful to society. All the 
values that Albanians historically held dear became croöked under the Marxist prism. 
The process of state making was not based on a parall el process of na tion building. 
In Albania, nationalism was jettisoned in favor of proletarian internationalism. An 
Albanian communist took pride in his internationalİst rather than Albanian outlook. 
Despite some improvements, the country' s urbanization remained in critically low levels. 
Balkan societies as agricultural societies generally lack cohesiveness, but iu Albania's 
case the class struggle 140 increased the gulfs that separated different segments of society. 
4.2. STATE BUILDING IN POST COMMUNIST ERA 
Ten years after the end of the Cold War, almost all the Balkans141 has been 
transformed, one way or another, into an international protectorate. At first, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina became a protectorate in 1995 after a destructive war. Macedonia and 
Albania have become half-protectorates due to the strong influehce of the international 
comınunity in their internal affairs. The defense of the Macedonian state during the ann ed 
dashes there becaıne an obligation of the international coınınunity despite the fact that no 
formal international agreeınent was signed to this effect. The influence of the international 
140 Not only did Hoxha's regime amplify the imaginary danger to mitional security coming from ·abroad, but 
it also created an imaginary internal enemy. This allowed the regime to periodically undertake internal 
p,urges in the name of"vigilance against the domestic enemy." 
41 After the. Bosnian W ar, the international conımunity started to replacc the ternı "Balkans" with "South 
Eastern Europe" in an attempt to get away from the negative connotations that the fornıer ternı had taken. 
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coınmunity grew in the realm of domestic politics as well. From the very begiıining it was 
clear that the deployment of United Nations troops for monitoring Macedonia's borders 
carried implications beyond the preservation of the country's territorial integrity. 142 Also, 
in 2002, after the start of the arrned conflict between · ethnic Albanians and goveınment 
security forces, Macedonia deepened its dependence on the international coınmunity. 
NATO's military presence is seen as vitally important by its political elites irrespective of 
their ethnicity.143 Finally, the EU and other institutions such as the OSCE and the Council 
of Europe carry enorrnous weight in the formulation and implementation of domestic 
policies. 
After NATO' s military intervention in Yugoslavia, Kosovo has become an offıcial 
protectorate of the United Nations. Moreover, even Montenegro during its flirtation with 
the idea of independence found itself under de facto international guarantees for its 
security. Six months ago, Serbia and Montenegro agreed through EU mediation to create a 
new state under EU ı,ruarantees. Presently, this state needs a large aınount of help from the 
international comınunity with all the implications that this carries for their policy-making. 
In 1992, Albania accepted the realist ınaxim that smail couııtries fıııd the guaraııtee 
of their security in alliances with more powerful countries, due to its near-zero defense 
142 The former -president Gligorov has admitted that the international military presenec in Macedonia has 
had a positive effect on the dynamics of the country's domestie politics. See Albcrt Rakipi, ''The retımı of 
Macedonian queslion," in Aldo Bumci ed, A/banians in the Balkans, ( Tirana - Albanian Institute for 
International Studies, 2002), pp.74-95 
143 As we will see, the Macedonian politieal elite held contradietory·stances towards the involvement of the 
international community, and especially NATO. At the beginning of the confliet in the spring of 2001, the 
Prinıe Minister implied that there was an "internationa! eomplot" against Macedonia. However, before the 
parliamentary elcctions ofSeptember 16th, 2002, it was the same government that requestedan extension of 
NATO's mandate in the country. 
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' capabilities. Thus, the government handed over defense and security matters to the 
international community. The presence and role of the international community in Albania 
grew quickly starting with the assistance of international fınancial institutions such as the 
IMF and the World Band and eniminating in 1997 with an international force headed by 
Italy whose unoffıcial mission was to help restore internal security. 
At present, it seems that the 'international protectorate' phenomenon constitutes a 
natural trend in the Balkans. According to Henry Kissinger, the US is playing the same 
role that the long-gone Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires have played in the past.144 
Urst Altermatt agrees when he states that in the Balkans peace becomes possible only 
when a great power plays the role of the referee between the antagonistic ethnicities and 
religions. According to him, this role has been played in the beginning by the Ottoman 
Empire, than the Austro-Hungariaıi Empire and other European powers. After the Second 
World W ar, it was the Soviets and Tito that became the guardians of peace, while in 1995 
this role was taken over by the Aınericans. 145 
It does not take a very thorough un derstanding of history to prove that peace in the 
Balkans has been guaranteed by the powers of the time. Nevertheless, it is important to 
look at the way the international system has evolved through time and the role that the 
Balkans hasplayedin the great powers' Weltpolitik. 
144 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001.), p. 
168. 
145 Urs Altermatt, Etnocializmi ne Europe.( Tirana: Phoenix , Shtepia e Librit dhe e Komunikimit, 2002.), 
p.124 or see German edition Urs Altermatt, Dan Fanal von Sarajevo. Etlınonationalisnıus in Europa 
Verlag( Zurich: Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 1996), p.127. 
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With the end of the Cold War, there has been a fundamental change in the system 
dynamics as far as the Balkans are concerned. The Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian 
empires ensured order and stability in the area by militarily occupying the peninsula, 
integraling it in !heir respective empires and oppressing any attempt by Balkan nations to 
build independent states. Communism, if we consider it an imperial power due to its 
homogeneity, ensured peace by freezing the nation-state building process. At present, the 
international community is assisting the restart of this process. However, there seems to be 
a consensus around the fatalisı approach that there can be no peace and stability in the 
Balkans unless an imperial power is interested in enforcing it. The religious and ethnic 
problems seem to be too overwhelming to be solved by Balkan states alone. This logic 
implies that only nation-states may be strong enough to manage their affairs successfully, 
and since the map of the Balkans resembles the leopard' skin this is practically 
impossible. The state building process will be accompanied by endless conflicts, unless 
peace is imposed by outside parties.Obviously, the state building dynamic differs in 
different Balkan states. However, the idea that statt:s where different cultures, ethnicities 
and religions coexist will be unable to achieve internal stability and growth is often an a 
priori conclusion. lt is true that the state building process prcsents more challenges in 
multiethnic states. This statement is particularly true in the Balkans considering the 
historicallcgacy of war and hatred aıııongst its nations. Mu st wc look for the <:X planation 
of weak and often failed states in the ethnic mix of their population? For reasons that will 
be explained below, we will look beyond this traditional paradigm in order to isoiate the 
factors that briııg about the weak state phcııonıeııoıı. Albaııia is the best illustratioıı for the 
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' reasons of our search beyond the ethnic paradignı since it ıs a nation stiıte whose 
population belongs by and large to only one ethnicity. 146 
In almost all the Balkan states that have ended up in offıcial or unoffıcial 
international protectorates, the process has culminated with a military intervention in the 
part of the international community. This is true for Albania as well despite the uniethnic 
nature of i ts population. 
All the Balkan states, including Albania, embarked on a new state building process 
after the end of the Cold War. What nature did this process take in the ex-Yugoslav 
republics? Did their political elites returu to the nationalisı standards after fifty years of 
forced silence under Tito' s reign? Remembering Peter Lukas' maxim that nationalism is 
the only populist political religion, 147 we may understand that the pull towards this 'new' 
creed was almost irresistible. Even more so when liberal principles offered the possibility 
to freely choose the forbidden road. In 1990, almost all the ex-Yugoslav republics were 
embracing nationalism in order to pursue their territorial ambitions while intemally they 
w ere, at the very least, paying !ip service to liberal democratic principles in the building of 
their domestic institutions.148 The study of this dua! approach has certain theoretical 
iınplications such as: is it possible for two antagonistic ideologies !ike nationalism and 
liberal deınocracy to coexist successfıılly? 
146 Albania has a Greek minority (2%), a Slav minority (0.8%) and a Roma community, CIA World Fact 
book, 1998. 
147 Urs Altermatt, p. 78. 
148 Al do Bumci, Macedonia and the Albanians: The Co~ı!ines qf Ethnic Conjlict ( Tirana-Al hanian Institute 
for International Studies, 2001 ), p.32 
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' In the case of Albania, the communist regime created a number of historical 
myths, as was the case usually in the Balkans. However, at no point did the regime build 
i ts propaganda on the main concept of nationalism-in the words of Altermatt- the idea that 
the nation represents a natural unit. In practical terms, this would mean the unifıcation of 
all Albanian territories in the Balkans in a single state. During the comrnunist era, Kosovo 
or the other Albanian territories in Yugoslavia were never mentioned in school textbooks 
. or offıcial propaganda. Neither were they a targel of state policy. Instead, proletarian 
intemationalism was practically sanctifıed. A professor of the University of Prishtina 
remembers that in the seventies Albanians spoke incessantly about their "Chinese 
brothers" while they hardly mentioned the Kosovo Albanians. ı 49 Thus, after the fall of 
communism, Albanians were presented with a dilemma: Should they embrace nationalism 
as their political ideology in order to build an ethnically cl ean state? Fifteen. years later, 
we know the answer. It is a resounding "no". However, the juxtaposition of the two 
different experiences becomes necessary in order to answer the question: Why did 
countries that wholeheartedly embraced nationalism and countries that wholeheartedly 
rejected it end up as weak states? Why did both case studies end up with potentially 
explosive conflicts that may threaten European security? 
Analyzing the developments in the Balkans also opens up new insights on the 
debate on the retum of nationalism ı 50 as an ideology at a time when liberal democracy 
was considered to be triuınphant by most academics. ısı 
149 The communist regime adopted extremely harsh punitive measures towards Kosovo Albanians that 
crossed the border to Albania. Moreover, Kosovo Albanians that lived in Albania were under the constant 
surveillanee of the seeret polic:e, and a great number of them ended up su ffering prison ternıs or exile. 
150 Urs Alıcrnıatt, p. 124. 
4.3. IN SEARCH OF LEGITIMACY 
Ten years after the fall of communism Albanla is a weak state. The degree of its 
weakness has varied throughout the decade. During the transition from the oldto the new 
regime in ı 99 ı- ı 992, state institutions by and large stopped fulfilling the ir functions. 
There were no internal conflicts, but occasional bursts of anarchy provoked hardly any 
response by the state. The communist regime had coınpletely lost i ts legitiınacy. The state 
tried to win back its hold on power by a cluııısy use of forcc that did not work. Except for 
the seeret service, the other institutions sharing the state ınonopoly on violence, the police 
and the arıny, chose a neutral stance or tried to stop the violence. After the free elections 
of 1992, the new dcınocratic governıncnt startcd a process of stabilization that by 1995 
seemed to have succeeded. However, in 1997 the state imploded losing control of the 
whole country except for parts of Tirana. Presently, it has been able to reestablish its 
control throughout its territory with international assistance. If we define 'security' 
beyond the narrow sense of physical security, than the citizens of Albania do not have 
security. Despite being protected by law, property rights and other fundamental freedoıns 
are abused by the judiciary. 
151 Fukuyama, p. 167. 
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' The . system does not fıınction well because of pervading corruption and the 
politicization of state bureaucracy. The erime rate has varied according to the weakness 
of the state. Blood feuds, based on the Canon of Leke Dukagjini, have reappeared in the 
North of the country as a sign of distrust on the ability of the state to impose law and 
order. ısı Nepotism and politically oriented appointments have created a bureaucracy that 
is professionally incapable and wholly corrupt. Tax collection, the main indicator of a 
reasonably competent state, is still a problem. According to offıcial statistics; over ninety 
percent of the population in Vlora and Shkodra, two main cities, do not pay their 
electricity bills. The state has failed to provide society with some of its most immediale 
needs such as energy and water supply. Economic opportunities are few and far between. 
A large proportion of the labor force has emigrated to Greece ı 53 or ltaly and other Westem 
countries. ParaUel with the massive migration waves for security or economic reasons, 
the country is also facing with "brain drain"ı 54 phenomenon. According to empirical 
studies on the brain drain, Albania has the highest rate in South East- Europe with the 
possible exception of Bosnia and Serbia which have gone through dilapidating wars in the 
last decade. Up to 1998, 35,8 percent of graduate degree professors had emigrated. The 
University of Tirana alone has lost some 40 percent of its academic staff of which 90 
percent are under 40 years old. ı 55 The reason for this migration is not simply to be found 
in the lack of opportunities. The absence of fair coınpetition and the arrogant disregard for 
values contribute to it as well. The state does not offer bureaucratic placeınents to the 
152 It is important to point now that the modem version of the bloodfeud phenomenon is a crude corruption 
of the provisions of the Canon of Leke Dukagjini. 
153 There are no reliable statistics on the Albanians that work in Greece since the majority cross the border 
illegally. 
154 The term "Brain Drain" was first coined by the Royal Society of London to deseribe the outflow of 
scientist and technologists to the United States and Caı:ıada in the 1950s. 
155 Eno Trimcev, Albanian Brain Drain Turning the Tide ( Tirana: Albanian Institute for International 
Studies, 2005), p. 21. 
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most deserving cahdidates but to members of the political clan in power. Or, sometimes, 
job placements are decided in favor of the candidate that is willing to pay the highest 
bribe. The psychosis of migration as the only way to assure one's survival is stili 
prevalent. The country' s recurring instability and the resulting absence of faith in the 
future continue to fuel this trend. As in a number of other Balkan countries, the "state 
capture" phenomenon remains a clear and present danger. This is not simply a Balkan 
phenomenon. But, its dynamics do vary from country to country. 
From the security perspective, environmental concems have reached a critica! 
!eve!. During the communist era, environmental problems were mitigated sornewhat by 
the strong degree ofpublic order. These problems sprung from the outdated technology of 
great industrial plants and even the implementation of statements of the type "Let us tum 
the hills and mountains into agricultural !and." However, after the fal! of communism, 
people profıted from the wcakncss of the statc and causcd heavy damage to the 
environınent for econoınic profıt. 
The fal! of communism as an ideology and as an economic model-and Albania had 
adoptcd a purely Stalinisı one- brought about the full or the cocrcivc statc ınachiııcry and 
ınarked a severe drain on state legitimacy. As a matter of fact, the regime started to lose its 
legitimacy slowly but surely since the fıfties although the process really picked up its pace 
in the regiıne's last decade after the coınplete isolation of the country. At the begiııning, it 
based its legitimacy on the pcasants who ınade up the overwhelming majority of the 
population and were extreınely poor. At the beginning, reforms in agriculture and 
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education and initial iınprovements in health care increased the state's legitiınacy. At the 
end of World W ar II, Albania was econoınically, culturally and politically backward. The 
country had undertaken no refonns in agriculture, which was its more important economic 
sector. At the end of the Second World W ar, the coınriıunist regime gradually started the 
process of collectivization in the industrial sector fırst and, after the mid sixties, in 
agriculture. 156 Between the end of 1945 and the end of 1950 the share of industrial 
production from private enterprises fell from 83% to 3 %. Against this background, even 
minimal advances in the quality of daily life increased the state 's legitiınacy. Moreover, 
the fact that the comınunists were identifıed as the ones that most ably fought the Nazi 
invaders defınitely helped. 
These good foundations of legitiınacy w ere gradually lost as a result of the gradual 
failure of the economic and political system until in 1990 the regime had lost any 
persuasive reason to stay in power. 
W ith the victory of the fırst opposition party in 1992, the state won back a large 
degree of legitimacy. This legitiınacy was based on moral reasons even more strongly 
than on the electoral results. The comınunists were the ones that the population identifıed 
as guilty for its extreme poverty. Many of the refonns undertaken by the fırst non-
communist govemınent provided another imınediate source of legitiınacy. As a matter of 
fact, it was still too early to evaluate the success of the refonns. However, their early 
effects in a country where terror had been the glue that held the system together triggered 
156 Michael Kaser "Economic Continuities in Albania;·s Turbulcnt History" Europe~Asia Studies ,No.4, 
(2001): p. 628 
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enthusiasm among the masses. Thus, despite the fact that the state could not provide the 
services that it was obliged to, it was seen as legitimate. Human rights reforms, and the 
gradual improvement of the economy-mostly thanks to EU help were other sources of 
legitimacy. 
Another source of legitimacy for the new govermnent flowed from the economic 
and political support that the international coınmunity provided the new regime. The 
West supported the new political processes unequivocally. Thus, with the approval of the 
opposition, in 1991 Albania was accepted asa member of the Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The political elite offıcially adopted the objective of 
breaking down the barriers of isolation and bringing Albania back to the family of 
European nations. International institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) set up office in Tirana in order to assist the country's 
transition to a market economy. Despite the govermnent's rather populist legitimacy, the 
Albanian state at this time remained weak due to its inability to provide public goods and 
its alısence in the more remote areas of the country. What is more, given the lack of 
resources and bureaucratic tradition, it was quite possible that after a short period of 
consolidation due to favorable circumstances the state would weaken again. Look:ing 
back at the fırst post-communist decade, we may conclude that the state' s inability to 
increase or ev en preserve i ts existing legitimacy remains the main cause of i ts weakness. 
Y3 
. 
Almost all the post-communist govemments 157 have suffered a "legitimacy crisis" 
which has meant that the Albanian state has been seen as illegitimate by large segments of 
its population. This legitimacy loss has caused a cycle of recurring internal crises, of 
which the 1997 implosion was the most challenging. It is im portant to make a distinction 
between the concepts 'govemment' and 'state.' At a fırst glance, the two concepts are 
synonyıııous. Howcvcr, if wc dcfiııc 'govcrnmcııt' as rcprcscııtativc of the political 
grouping that has eamed the mandate to govem through free elections or violence, the two 
concepts acquire different ıneanings. For example, in a liberal deınocracy a governınent 
ınay lose its ınandate through elections, while the state as a set of institutions and rules 
continues to exist undisturbed. Even in an authoritarian regiıne where govemance has 
been eamed and lost through violence, despite the fact that soıne of the states institutions 
ınay cease to work briefly, the state itself continues to exist. A state is not the offices of 
the priıne ıninister, president, or cabinet ministers. The state is the daily tradition of its 
citizens. 
The loss of state legitimacy starts with the loss of govemment legitimacy. In a 
state where the govemment is viewed as illegitimate, state institutions becoıiıe less able to 
dotheir work. The identifıcation of the govemment with the state has serious implications 
for weak states especially during transitory periods from one regiıne to another.As we will 
see later in more detail, in Albania and Macedonia the creation of a new governınent as a 
result of ınore or less free elections, has been accompanied by the rebuilding of the state 
157 From the point of vicw of the proccdurcs of the turnover of power, the only govcrnmcnt that t'l"ıay be 
considered as legitimate was the fırst anti-communisi governnıent that came to power through the free 
elections of March 22"', 1992. 
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' through the creation of a new bureaucracy loyal to the party in power.Two are the main 
causes of loss of legitimacy: 
1- Weak economic performance that de(eriorates in complete failure (as was the case in 
1997 in Albania); 158 
2- A lack of regime accountability as Daniel Byman and Stephen van Evera termed 
it. "Regimes that are not accountable to their populations have less incentive to 
serve their public well, so they serve them poorly. Incompetence and corruption 
are their hallmarks. They often cannot be removed from power peacefully, thus 
often compelling their opponents to resort to force. 159 
During a transition period, govemınenis tend to lose their accountability due to the 
deformation of the institutional procedures through which they come to power and the 
absence of procedures that make !hem transpareni to the public and !heir political 
opponents. A combination of these two causes may lead to a weak institutional 
performance and, in the worst-case scenario, to a 'perfect failure' as was the case of 
Albania during the 1997 crisis. Moreover, the failure to win back the lost legitimacy may 
bring about social unrest with potentially grave implications for national security. 
Let us investigate the dynaınics and implications of the loss of legitimacy as a 
result of poor economic performance. However, we have to keep in mind t1ıat this factor is 
158 Gene Ruli, "Albania: The weakness of the State" in Wim van Meurs, ed, Prospect and Risks Beyand EU 
En/m·gement Southeastern Europe: Weak states and Strong International Support ( Leske + Budrich, 
orladen,2003): p.l54 . 
15 Daniel Byman and Stephen Van Evera, "Why they fight: Hypotheses on the causes of contemporary 
Deadly Conflict", Security Studies 7, no 3 ( 1998 ): p. 32. 
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closely related to t'ııe other factor oflegitimacy loss: regime accountability. As a matter of 
fact, loss oflegitimacy starts with the absence or loss of govemment accountability. 
In 1990 the Albanian economy hit what we can safely call 'ground zero'. The tasks of any 
new govemment were so complex that they could discourage even the bravest souls. Sali 
Berisha (Albanian President, 1992-1997) remembers a meeting with French President 
Chirac only a few months after being elected the president of the poorest country in 
Europe: 
"After speaking to him about the country's economic situation, the wasteland left 
behind by the communist regime, the absence of infrastructure, the primitive 
technology, the deplorable situation in the healthcare system, and the absence of 
even staple foods, 1 started preseniing to him with soıne enthusiasm the reforms 
thal we had to uııd~..~rı:ıkı..· iıı ordı..·r to hegiıı the rdıtıildiııg pnH.:c:-::-;. 1 lowcvcr. 
Chirac interrupted my enthusiasın witlı the question: Are you not afraid of being 
President ofa country in Albania's situation?"160 
In 1992, one could notice a number of factors that threatened the country with 
complete economic collapse: 
First, the "cconoınic invcntory" that the country inhcritcd in 1992 was rich only in 
its poverty across the board: agriculture, the most iınportant ecoııoınic sector, was in 
disarray with uncertaiııty over the future of the public agricultural !and and primitive 
technology. The heavy iııdustry had stopped producing anything of value in the last 
twenty years and had become a heavy burden on the state budget. Road and 
160 A conversation with the ex-President of Albania Sali Berisha. Mr. Berisha was elected President of 
Albania after the victory of the Democratic Party in the elections of March 22"', 1 992. 
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communications i~frastructure was thoroughly backward in a country where private cars 
were prohibited by law and only a fraction of the population owned telephones. 
Second, the old communist regime had stifled any type of private or individual 
initiative. The state controlled all economic property, communication media and political 
debate. Not only was it responsible for the security and defense of its citizens, but it also 
undertook to secure them job placements, education, and healthcare. The state even 
controlled the mavement of its citizens within the country. Thus, the individual had 
become completely dependent on the state. This mentality coupled with ignorance about 
the new system and its values, promised to create a real problem for the new state. 
Moreover, citizens' ignorance about the market system created unjustifiably high 
expectations. 
Third, the creation of a new economic system and the process of rebuilding state 
institutions had to take place simultaneously. A new government bureaucracy was needed 
to take over the new functions of the state. Ten years ago, the task of institution building 
was taken very lightly. It was supposed that the new state would spring up naturally on 
the ashes of the old one and the goodwill ofits citizens. 161 
Fourth, the beginning of economic reforms in Albania in 1992 coincided with the 
start of the bloody Yugoslav conflict. This impacted negatively the success of the refonns 
161 A similar mentality plagued all the countries that jettisoned communism in ı 989 as well. But, within a 
few months it became obvious that the most challenging task in these countries was the buildingofthe new 
post-communist order rather than the victory over communism. Leaviiıg Russia -the obvious example aside-
even the Central European countries !ike Hungary, Pol~nd and the Czech Republic 'suffered' from nostalgia 
for the good old days ofpeace and ordcr. The euphoria of the revolution and the high expcctations that most 
people harbored towards the new regime were the main factors for this phenomenon. 
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in two way~. First, the start of the Yugoslav wars made communication between the 
countries of the region very diffıcult and, more importantly it scared away many potential 
investors. Second, ata time when the economy should have been the main concem of the 
Albanian government, the danger of a war with Yugoslavia (Serbia) over Kosovo diverted 
government energies away from domestic problems. 
Fifth, the political elite that cam e to power in 1992 lacked any policy-making 
experience and, despite the fact that large segments of its members were educated in the 
W est, it was by and large formed in a dictatorial system. This had left deep imprints in the 
mentality of the new elite, which tended to be exclusionary, authoritarian, and non-
democratic in practice though not in form. 
The first challenge for the democratic government that emerged from the March 
1 992 elections was to arrest the rapid economic deterioration that had paralyzed most 
aspects of social and economic life. 162 A number of immediate reforms such as price 
liberalization, fıscal reforms and the beginning of privatization process aimed to break the 
vicious cycle of deteriorating economic parameters. They were successful to a degree. At 
the same time, a considerable aınmınt of intcrnııtional hclp in food and clothing scrvcd to 
cover the immediale needs of the population. After a number of structural refonns that 
included the privatization of agricultural !and, dwellings, and smail and medium-sized 
enterprises and the creation of a !ega! fraıncwork vital for the bcginniııg of a market 
economy, came the fırst encouraging sigııs of ınacroeconomic success. The West greeted 
162 For a bctter undcrstanding of Albania's cconomic ~ situation bcfore the transition period, see "Aibania: 
From Isolation Toward Reform" (lMFOccasional Paper No 98, IMF, Washington D.C Septenıbcr !992) 
98 
' Albania's early successes warmly. The IMF and the WB presented Albania asa shinning 
example of a successful nation in transition. In 1993 the real GDP growth rate was ll 
percent, in 1995 it was 13.3 percent and in 1996 it was 9.! percent Y early inflation fell 
from 250 percent in 1991 to single digit numbets by 1995.However, in 1997 as 
developments in Albania were being applauded by the international fınancial institutions, 
the conntry was engulfed by a heavy economic erisis triggered by the bankruptey of the 
pyramid schemes. 
In Albania, an informal market existed since 1990-199!. Mainly foreign exchange 
dealers and companies taking deposits and making loans made it up. According to Chris 
Jarvis, these companies were illegal because they were not licensed by the state. There is 
no evidence of the deposit rates that these companies offered to their clients. However, 
local authorities and foreign observers, including the IMF, considered these companies as 
benign and indeed making an important contribution to economic growth. Given the 
manifest defıciencies of the fonnal banks, these companies were probably the best 
intermediaries for savings in Albania and the investment they funded among the most 
profıtable. At the same time, other companies appeared that started borrowing by offering 
very attractive interest rates of up to 5 percent monthly. More importantly, these 
companies were neither investing nor lending to companies with palpable investınent 
opportunitics. Their numbers started multiplying until, by 1996, 16 such companies 
operated in the informal Albanian market. Five of these pyramid schemes held the 
majority of the savings of Albanian citizens. 
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In 1996, ılimost all of these companies, such as V efa, Gjallica, and Kamberi 
increased their interest rates from 4-5 percent to 6-10 percent. In the second half of 1996, 
Xhaferri- one of the pyramid schemes that together with Populli had accumulated the 
savings of 2 million investors - increased its interest rates to almost 50 percent calling on 
the investors that it would triple their money deposits within three months. In response, 
the other pyramid schemes increased their interest rates to similar levels. According to 
Jervis, pyramid schemes are similar to the Ponzi model where the latest investors pay off 
those that have invested fırst. Approximately 1,600,000 citizens, almost half of the 
population, had deposited their savings in these pyramid schemes. In the words of Carlos 
Elbirt, head of the World Bank' s Resident Office in Tirana, investing in these schemes 
became ovemight a national sport in Albania.163 In 1997, the invested sum reached a 
staggering US$ 1.2 billion or over 50 percent of the country's GOP. These funds included 
the remittances of about 400,000 Albanians working abroad mainly in Greece and ltaly. 
Although ılıere is no clear evidence, ılıere is a suspicion of a possible connection between 
the pyramid schemes and fınancial criınes such as m on ey laundering. What were the 
reasons that brought about this economic catastrophe? 
According to Jarvis, one of the main causes for the start of the 'pyramid schemes 
phenomenon' was "the inadcquacy of the forınal fınancial system."""' Despitc the 
reforms undertaken in the 1992-1997 intcrval, the fıscal system in Albania suffered from 
severe distortion.However, the defects of the fıscal system do not explain the who le story. 
Another reason is the fact that the state as a phenoınenon appeared in the Albanian scene 
163 Carlos Elbirt, Albania under the shadow of the pyrqnıids, at httr://www.worldbank.org. 
164 Ch ri s Jarvis, The rise and fal/ of the pyramid schenıes in Albania, IMF Working Paper, WP 99/98, IMF 
1999.),p.17. 
100 
before the beginnings of industry, free ınarkets and their regulatory pressures. However, 
we stili do not have a complete understanding of the reasons of Albania's econoınic 
catastrophc in ı 996- ı 997 that causcd the fa ll of slatc iııstitutioııs w ith in a Icw wccks. 
Citizens blamed the govemıneni for the loss of their investments. State institutions were 
paralyzed by the fury of the masses, the state lost the legitimacy of the use of force, and 
the country was engulfed by anarchy soon aftcr the start of mass protests in some of its 
main cities. A study of the dynamic of the events of 1997 shows that economic and 
historical factors alone cannot explain the collapse of the state. The main reasons must be 
looked for in the perforınance of state institutions. It is these institutions that proved to be 
weak and, moreover, their politicallegitimacy squandered. 
From an economic perspective, even without the pyramid schemes crisis, state 
legitimacy was weak. In the timeframe 1992-1996, Albania's economy was unable to 
supply the tax base necessary for the provision of public goods. Thus, s ince the state was 
unable to fulfıll its obligations, it remained weak. Other reasons, which go beyond !oss of 
economic legitimacy, explain the 1997 collapse. Potentially, weak states may implode 
completely. According to George Sorenson, some countries may be less developed 
economically, but they are not weak states (although they may exhibit some elements of 
weak statehood). On the other hand, not all economically underdeveloped states are weak 
in political institutional terıns as demonstrated by China or Egypt. 165 Albania is a typical 
case study of a weak state in econoınic and political- institutional tenns. The reasons for 
165 Georg Sorensen, Changes in Statehood: The transformatian of International Re/ations, (London-
Pa1grave, 2001), p. 86. 
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the 1997 failure, and to a lesser extent for the present failure as well, must be looked for in 
the weak development of i ts institutions and the low !eve! of legitimacy that they enjoy. 
4.3.1.Democracy and State Building 
In 1990, the process of state building in Albania was entering a new phase. As we 
have already seen, if we consider the country' s early communist and pre-communist 
tradition, and the absence of an efficient economy, this process could not be easy. 
However, theoretically it is supposed to be easier than the same process in post-colonial 
states, which make up the majority of the community of weak or failed states. According 
to Georg Sorensen, the reasons for this are found in the legacy of colonialism and the 
cultural, ethnic and religious divisions that plague their societies. 166 
Albania has a uniethnic society that is not beset by cultural divisions. Even though 
the Albanians have eınbraced three differcnt religions, there are no actual religious-based 
social chasıns. Traditionally, the different religions have coexisted peacefully. Having 
built their identity on secular grounds, Albanians have never identified themselves closely 
with religious faith. From this point of view, the on-going state building process in the 
post-coınınunist cra was supposcd to be a grcat dea! casier than in Maccdonia where 
different ethnic, cultural and re!igious groups have to coexist and participate in nation 
building. 
166 Sorcnscn, p.184. 
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' According to Alltennmat (2000) and Sorensen (2001 ), a state may not be 
considered a nation-state merely on the basis of the existence of a single homogenous 
ethnic group. If most strong states happen to be nation-states, it does not mean that a 
common ethnicity and culture is enough to achieve this success. Even if they do not 
represent a single group, societies of strong states exhibit a remarkably high sense of 
cohesion. On the other hand, Balkan socicties, even when unietlnıic, tend to lack 
cohesiveness. More specifically, Albanian socicty has bccn doubly isolated and divided. 
First, due to the policy of isolation followcd by the coınımınist regiıne, economic, political 
and even simple social links with other countries have been alınost non-existent. Offıcial 
propaganda constantly propagatcd the cxistcncc of an cmincnt danger from abroad. This 
danger usually consisted of a coalition of eneıny states whose aims ranged from the 
penetration of bourgeoisie ideologies in the country to the military overthröw of the 
regiıne. But, despite the iınaginary external tlıreat and the constant attenıpts at mobilizing 
Albanian society in response to this "threat", cohesiveness was not achieved. Second, the 
isolation and divisions within Albanian society have had deeply negative effects. The 
categories "us" (the Albanians) and "theın" (the multitude of foreign enemies) was 
applied to the doınestic scene as well. According to offıcial propaganda, doınestic enemies 
were ınore dangerous than the foreign ones. The constant tension and divisions that 
ensued caused a long-term chasm in Albanian society. 
The relative lack of industrial development that slowed down the processes of 
urbanization and modernization contributed negatively as well. The Comınunist state took 
over all industrial and coınınercial enterprises, asserting a monopoly in both domestic and 
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foreign trade in accordance with the Stalinisı economic model, Albania's economic plan 
emphasized the rapid development of heavy industry over agriculture and a light 
industry167 In 1990, over 60 percent of the population lived in villages, usually leading a 
rather isolated lifestyle. The state-nation relationship in strong states encompasses the 
relationship between society and state and vice versa, with its duties, obligations and 
rights and privileges. In the Balkans, and particularly in Albania, the idea of a state with 
its rights and obligations has not taken firm root yet. Traditionally, the individual has 
obeyed the state only due to fear. The state never hesitated to make use of its monopoly of 
violence in order to impose its will on the individual. 
The absence of cohesion in Balkan societies coupled with the weak society-state 
relationship and the backward agrarian economies have slowed down the state building 
process and the strengthening of the respective states. To the general low degree of 
legitimacy that these states normally enjoy, we ınust add the loss of political legitimacy 
that the post-coınınunist regiınes suffered in the last decade of the twentieth century. 
After 1990, the new regiınes' political legitimacy and accountability had to be 
based on the principles of liberal deınocracy since alınost all Balkan states embraced 
liberal deınocracy as the new organizing ideology. The legitiınacy of the new post-
communist goverııınents depended on their ability to obey the rules and fulfill the 
obligations pertaining to a deınocratic rcginıc. "Lcgitimacy in 1991 flows not from the 
!ıı? Elcz Bibcraj, Albania in Transition tlıe Rocky Uuad,to democracy, (New York: WcslvicwPrcss, I<J9~). 
p.21 
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barrel of gun but 'from the will of people"168 wrote US Secretary of State James Baker 
after the failure of the coup d' etat in the USSR It was thought that the creation of 
democratic systeıns of govemance in the Balkans would restore the state' legitiınacy lost 
in the last years of coınınunisın, and it would open up the way to econoınic development 
• 
and political emancipation.Furtherrnore, the transforrnation of coınmunist, authoritarian 
regiınes to liberal deınocracies was a vital investınent for ınaintaining peace and order 
between the different Balkan countries. 
In 1990, the legitiınacy of the eınerging regiınes was being based on deınocracy, 
since deınocracy "is beginning to be seen as the sine qua non for validaling govemance ... " 
and "it is not mcrcly the law of a particular sttıtc. lt is also bccomiııg a rcquircmcııt of 
international law, applicable to all and implemented by all through global standards ... " 169 
A decade later, all Balkan states are wcak, and oftcn non-functional, dcınocracics. The 
failure to build a functional democratic system is one of the main causes for the weakness 
of Balkan states such as Macedonia and Albania. 
4.3.2 Albanian Dcmocracy- a zcro su m gamc 
The first immediate reason for the govemment's loss ofpolitical legitimacy stands 
in its failure to organize free and fair elections. In Albania, the Iradition of free elections 
168 Thomas Franch, "The Emerging Right to Demecratic Govemancc", The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 86, 1992): p. 46. 
169 Thomas Franch, p. 47. 
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with multiple candidates and different political parties came to a tragic end in 1945.170• 
The war' s victors manipulated those elections and as a consequence the candidates of the 
Coınmunist Party, who ran under the banner of the National-Liberation Front, won a 
landsiide victory.171 hnmediately afterwards, the regime undertook a ınassive campaign of 
repression and terror against the liberal opposition that was just appearing in the Albanian 
political scene. In 1946, a number of leaders of the opposition, men that stood in the 
forefront of the struggle for democracy, were arrested and shot or suffered long prison 
terms. Since then, elections were proof of the tragic absurdity that made up the political 
realities of the time in Albania. They were organized every four years in order to 'elect' 
candidates for the members of the unicamerallegislature, without any altemative political 
parties - their creation was considered to be a 'betrayal of the Fatherland' - or even 
altemative candidates militating within the party in power. Obviously, the candidates of 
the Democratic Front, a front organization for the Comınunist Party, won repeatedly with 
fantastic results such as 99.99% of votes cast. On the other hand, almost 100 percent of 
voters would routinely participate in the elections. Any citizen that dared not to vote was 
immediately labeled an "enemy". 
Such was the background with which Albania went to the first multi-party polls.172 
Candidates from the first opposition party to be fonned in Albania, the Deınocratic Party 
170 The US and other Westem govemments refused to recognize the govemment that emerged out ofthese 
clections bccausc of the rcfusal of the Albanian Communist Party to hold free and fair multiparty elections. 
171 The APC was not yet a legal political subject. 
172 The first pluralist parliamentary elections in Albania werc heldin March 31" 1991. Although the 
Albanian Labor Party (the Communist Party) remained in power, the elections foretold fundamental changes 
in Albanian society and politics. The Democratic Part.y, the first opposition force in the communist regime 
in Albania had w on sweeping victories in the major cities of the country. The elimale of radical changes 
that had already taken place in the former communist East forbade similar transformations in Albania. In 
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(DP), together with the candidates of a few sınaHer parties, ran against the candidates of 
the Party afLabor (the Communist Party). 
The electoral process took place in an anarchic atmosphere with sporadic acts of 
violence. The goverııment tried to use violence in order to intimidate its citizens, while 
opposition candidates were often prevented from campaigning by the seeret police. 
Episodes of violence, though often isolated, engulfed even a number of the main cities. 
Three opposition supporters were kilJed in the city of Shkodra during an electoral 
meeting. The opposition parties denounced the manipulation and they were very close to 
rejecting the elections' fina! results. The govemment's attempts to manipulate the fırst 
multiparty elections produced two dilemmas that were critica! for Albania' s future. First, 
would future goverııments have the willingness to, or even be capable of organizing free 
and fair elections? Second, would any future transfer of power happen peacefully? Would 
the losers gracefully accept the decision of the electorate? Unfortunately, even today the 
answer to these questions is not uııcquivocally positive. 
Exccpt for the fırst post-coınınuııist governıneııt that eaınc to power duc to the 
opposition's victory in the elections of 22"d March 1992, all the govemments of the last 
deeade have suffered from a erisis of legitimacy origiııating from the controversial 
eleetaral proeesses through which they came to power. The 1992 cleetions were the only 
uneontested parliaıııentary clcctions in Albania, during the last ten years. Howcver, they 
were not representative of the eleetaral proecsses that took plaee later 011, sinee they 
less than a year the country embarkcd on early elections that brought to power the Democratic Party 
replacing the communists who had been ruling the country for al most half a century. 
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brought about a regime change rather than a change in government. Since then, the history 
of parliamentary elections has becoıne a history of the loser always contesting the 
results. 173 S ince 1992, there has been no case - except the municipal elections of 26'ıı June 
1992 and the constitutional referendum of 1994174- ofa transfer of power through free and 
fair elections. Thus, the country' s stability has suffered, state institutions have been 
progressively weakened, and after the controversial elections of 1996, they collapsed and 
the country was engulfed by anarchy. 
The transition model goes soıne way towards explaining soıne of the probleıns 
with the new democratic system being build in Albania. However, according to a study 
by the Albanian Institute for International Studies, ınanipulated elections and violent 
power transfers cannot be explained simply by the diffıculties presented by the transition 
process. 175 Many of the phenomena Albania's democratization has been going through 
173 In May 26'h 1996 parliamentary elections were held. This was the first of the many tesıs the fragile 
Albanian democracy would fail. The Socialisı Party (the former Communist Party) the major opposition 
party at the time along with some other sma11er parties, such as the Democratic Alliance and the Social-
democratic party walked out of the electoral process in its concluding phase, condemning it as an electoral 
charade. The socialists and !heir allies did not recognize the election results and boycotted the parliament 
that resulted from these elcctions. The parliarncntary clcctions of Junc 291h 1997, hcld undcr cxtraordinary 
conditions brought to power the Socialisı Party and its sma11er allies, the Social Democrats, Democratic 
Alliance, the Party for Human Rights. The Democratic Party di d not recognize these elections as free and 
fair. In October 1" 2000 periodic local elections were held. Local government was in the hands of the 
Democratic Party at the time. The candidates of the Socialisı Party won these elections. The Democratic 
Party did not recognize the results of these elections, daiming that the electoral process had been 
manipulated and calling on its wining candidates to boycott municipal and commune councils. In June 24fu 
2001 parliamentary elections were held in a very confrontational political climate. This was the second test, 
after that of 1996, in which domestic actors had to show whether they were capable to conduct electoral 
processes that would be accepted by a11 the parti es involved. The opposition, united in the .coalition for 
Victory, denounced the June 24'h parliamentary election results, daiming that the process had been 
manipulated. Consequently the opposition set as a precondition for its entry into parliarnent the retum of 
those seats that itconsiders stolen by the Socialisı Party. · 
174 Municipal elections were held on June 26th 1992, four months after the parliamentary elections that 
brought DP to power. Despite the fact that the results confırmed a·notable increase in support for SP, the 
DP govemment recognized the results. Furthermore, the opposition victory in the constitutional referendum 
ofNovember 1994 were recognized as well. .. 
175 Blendi Kajsiu, Aldo Bumci, and Albert Rakipi Albania a Weak Democracy, a Weak State. ( Tirana: 
Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2002), p. 27. 
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can no longer be considered transitional. Weak of failing institutions, eroding legitimacy 
of political institutions, distrust of political parties... can no longer be considered 
temporary distortion or symptoms of transitions toward democracy. 176 It is true that the 
holding of multiparty elections is a necessary but not a suffıcient condition for a system to 
be called 'democratic'. As previous research has shown, it is very difficult to build a 
timetioning democracy without a sound economy and a strong civil society. However, 
analyzing the reasons behind the failure to conduct free and fair elections will provide us 
with abasic understanding of the weaknesses of Albanian democracy. 
The failure to hold free elections and the violence and anarchy that has often been 
a part of Albanian electoral processes have changed !he nature and the extent of the 
international comrnunity's involvement. Domestically, Albanian democracy may be 
defined as 'contested democracy'. On the other hand, from the point of view of the role of 
the international community in it, Albanian deınocracy may bj: defıned as a 'negotiated 
deınocracy'. The reasons behind the present situation li e behind the fact that Albanian 
democracy has been bui lt and practiced in zero-su m game terms. 
The formula that has been usedin policy fonuulation and iınplementation has been 
"seljlother", rather than "both/and". The political elite has chosen to proınote the social 
chasın in good vs. evi! or, in local terms, democrat vs. conımwıist, as the way to political 
triumph. Both political caınps have tried to convince the electorate that they represent the 
good, while the other side represeııts evi!. 
176 Blcndi Kqjsiu Al hanian Democrati=atimı in Search nf AccoımtahWry cd. Eno Trinıccv ( Tinına: 
Albanian Institute 1()1' lııtcrnalion:.ıl Studiı.:s. 2005). p.IJ. 
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The extremely polarized Albanian political scene has been and continues to be 
dominated by two political parties: the Demecratic Party (DP) and the Socialisı Party 
(SP). A number of sınaller parties exist as well, but they behave as the satellites of one or 
the other major parties, largely depending on the latter's largesse for their existence.177 
The polarization of Albaııiaıı politics is large Iy bascd on the idcological "baggagc" of the 
social divisions of the communist era. However, despite the fact that those social divisions 
have bccn projcctcd iııto the pn;scnt, other factors influcncc the preseni polarization as 
well. The fact that political elites have tried hard to promote this divisiveness into the 
electoral masses for their own political gains, they have been largely unable to polarize 
Albanian society and divide it into two bitterly opposed enemy camps. The conflict in 
Albania has remained within the realm of the political elites and a smail number of their 
militants without being transformed into a social conflict. W ith the DP victory in 1992, 
the society was highly polarized and the need for reconciliation was stronger than ever. It 
is quite possible that the landsiide DP victory was achieved thanks to the opposition's 
motto: "together in suffering and guilt". But, despite such a promising beginning, the new 
elite slowly distanced itself from the slogan "oppositionists but brothers", formu!ating its 
strategies in "win/lose" terms. 
177 Some ofthese satellite parties around DP are the National Front, the Legality Party and the Republican 
Party. On the other hand, the SP sateliile parti es are the Social Democratic Party, the Agnirian Party and the 
Party of National Unity. As a matter of fact, the Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Alliance Party 
have tended to cooperate with whichever of the two big parti es was in power. All of the sateilitc parti es 
have been unable to secure their own parliamentary seats. lnstead, they have always profıted from DP or SP 
largesse. Only in the last parliamentary elections the ll.eformed Democratic Party, a break-away party from 
the larger DP. won 6 percent of the nntioııal votc lhııs hcconıing the first pmiy to win parliamcntary scats on 
its own mcrits. 
ı ı o 
' The struggle to win elections through any means possible is based on the "winner 
takes all" principle. Also, the holding of elections after the country passed some great 
erisis meant that the winning party secured an absolu te majority (two thirds or more) of 
seats in parliament. Such a complete control of the legislature has translated into total 
domination of state institutions and the bureaucracy by the party in power. With this 
mentality, even if it would win 49 percent of the seats, an Albanian opposition party 
would be completely sidelined from the country' s political processes. It has no said in the 
decision-making process and sometimes, its cadres are persecuted. It is absent from 
policy-making discussions, and its access to public media is severely limited. And, the 
last ten years have shown that the governing party may use state institutions that by law 
are supposed to be depoliticized (the courts, police and the seeret service) against the 
opposition. Albanian political parties function on "either/or", "self /other" and not "both/ 
and" principles, which are part of the zero-sum game strategy. The political party in 
power applies these principles in the building of state institutions and in policy 
formulation and implementation processes. 
The post-communist state has represented only a part of society. This is one of the 
main characteristics of weak states, be they nation-states as in the Albanian case, or 
multinational states as in the case of Macedonia. 178 In Albania, the state represents that 
part of society that is fonnally tied to the party in power through ideology and party 
membership. In practice, this part of society remains united through clan ties more than 
political belief. 
mı See Albcrt Rakipi, .. Wcak Statc - New Dynamics of Sccurity", Romanian Journal qf International 
Studies, Yol. 4, ( 1999.): p. 75 
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The multiple personuel changes that have occurred in state bureaucracy during the 
SP period in power constitute a clear example. Despite the fact that the party had 
overwhelming control of the legislature, it changed Prime Minisıers several times a 
process that was accompanied with extensive new appointments in the cabinet and 
government departments.179 The Albanian state is primarily identifıed with the 
Government. This has legitimized the changes in bureaucratic personuel every time the 
government is changed. As a result, state bureaucracy has been extremely politicized. The 
state is also identifıed with the party in power. Thus, when a party comes to power, it 
reshapes the state appointing its party members in the armed forces, police, seeret 
services, Foreign Service, tiscal administration, customs, and even in the universities and 
other acadeınic institutions. Political appointments are also practiced in the justice system 
and the courts of alllevels. 180 In this way the governing party ensures a complete control 
of the state, while unwittingly guaranteeing the state's weakness since every time there is 
a power transfer i ts institutions have to be rebuilt from the ground up. In this way, with the 
triumph of the party-state formula, the state building process in post-communist Albania 
resembles the same process during the comınunist regiıne. Thus, the Albanian state 
179 Even during the short-livcd socialisı administration of Primo Minister Majko one of the fırst orders of 
business was the replacement of most of the rcgional police chiefs. When another socialisı leader, Nano, 
became Prime Ministcr, the bureaucracy was staffed with his supporters although the existing bureaucrats 
werc sodalist appointees as well. 
180 When the first opposition party in Albania, the Democratie Party, came to power in 1992, many 
rep!aeements w ere made in the state institutions. The changes affected mostly the political directors of the 
institutions, and even though a certain number of experts rernained in the new institutions, there occurred 
unmotivated or politically motivated dismissal of experts. Later on when the Socialisı Party-'the fomıer 
communist Party of Labor-came to power in 1997, it undertook a new campaign of dismissals in public 
administration for political motivations which !ed in tum to the further weakening of institutions, in panic 
and lack of job secuıity. A number of experts in state institutions resigned voluntarily from work for this 
very reason. 
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reseınbles a private fiefdoın controlled by a single ınan or political group. Whenever this 
ınan or group of men loses control, the new group reınakes the state in the way it sits fit. 
4.4. THE CRISIS OF 1997: FROM STATE WEAKNESS TO STATE 
COLLAPSE. 
The 1997 erisis ınay be analyzed from a number of different perspectives.181 For 
exaınple, soınetiınes it has been interpreted as part of the traditional Nortl1-South conflict. 
The hypothesis on which this explanation is based, states that the Northem and Southem 
regions of Albania have been traditionally divided on cultural, linguistic and ideological 
terms. More iınmediately, the North supported the right-wing DP while the South 
supported the left-wing SP.182 In ınore traditional terms, the social chasın is based on 
cultural, linguistic and religious differences. 
The existence of real differences between these two regions ınade it all too easy 
for some analysts to prescribe to the N orth-South thesis. However, this explanation does 
not stand. Despite the fact that the dynamic of the crisis, inciurling the iriternational 
military intervention, suggests that the events unfolding in Albania's cities were escalating 
towards a Civil W ar, there was never any real danger of aN orth-South conflict. It is true 
that there are differences in terms of language and urbanization between the two regions. 
Religious differences in Albania exist only in nominal terms, while in reality they do not 
have an iınpact on social development. 
181 Other interpretations have been given as well. For example, the conspiracy theorists believe that the 
1997 erisis was caused by foreign powers intent on overthrowing Berisha's government. 
182 See Roberto Morozzo Della Rocca, A/bania: le Radici de/la O·isi,( Rome: Angelo Guerini e Associati 
SpA, 1997), p.235. 
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From the religious standpoint, Albania defınitely is the typical example of multi-
religious society183 They become even less important when looked at from the North-
South perspective. In both regions, the three religions have coexisted peacefully and thus, 
it becomes very hard to pinpoint any geographical divisions in terms of faith. Muslims 
make up the majority of the population in both regions. In terms of the Christian faith, 
traditionally Catholics have been concentrated in the North and Orthodox in the South, but 
in modem times the situation has become more 'confused' due to internal migration, 
intermarriages, and voluntary conversions. Although one would have expected a religious 
dimension to Albanian conflicts in the post communist era, neither in ı 991 n or in ı 997 
was there any discemible religious element in the social unrest. 184 The structure of 
Albanian society seems to guarantee the peaceful coexistence between religious groups in 
the country. 185 
The ideological divisions too are highly exaggerated despite the fact that there has 
bccn morc support for DP in the North whilc the South has tcndcu to support the SP. 
However, DP support has concentrated in the city of Shkodra, whiclı is well known for its 
unti-coıııınunist l'cclings, whilc support iıı the other citics has v:ıricd grc:ıtly. i\ Iso, the liıct 
that in Shkodra the Muslim, Catlıolic and, to a !esser extent Ortlıodox religions coexist 
peacefully in wlıat is a miniature Albania, slıows the fallacy of the religious divisiveness 
ıx3 Prior to world W ar ll, about sevcnty percent of Albanians wcrc Muslims, twcnty percent Eastcrn 
Orthodox and teen percent Roman catholic. "Since the second World W ar, no reliable census based on the 
religious denemination of individuals has taken place. See Tonin Gjuraj "A Stable Ecumenkal Model? 
Ho w religion Might Seeome a Politicallssue in Albania" East European Quaıterly, vol.34 lssue i,( 2000) : 
p,.34. 
84 Miranda Vicker and James Pcttifer, Albania: From 4-narc/ıy to Balkan !dentity (London: Hurst& 
Company, 1997), p.l 07. 
185 Gjuraj ,p.27 
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argument. 186Indeed, the 1997 implosion caused a number of victims but, excluding the 
five seeret service eınployees that died in direct confrontation with anned rebels, the other 
deaths were caused simply by the anarchy, the sudden wide availability of weapons, 
accidents and other criınes. There was no frontal or guerrilla war, and thus !here was no 
Civil W ar. 
The 1997 erisis gives us a good opportunity to find out what a state is and what a 
state should be beyond- in Barry Buzan's terıns- holding a seat in the United Nations. 187 
As such, siınilar to a number of other Balkan states, post-communist Albania exhibits 
some characteristics of post-colonial states, such as "a captured autonoıny" based on weak 
administrative and institutional structures, rule based on coercion rather than rule of law, 
low level of state legitimacy, world market dependence, and structural heterogeneity and 
an underdeveloped national economy. 188 The reasons that caused the 1997 erisis must be 
looked for in the weak performance of state institutions and loss of state legitimacy. A 
number of signals indicated that Albania' s President Sali Berisha and the govermnent 
controlled by his Demecratic Party had embarked on an increasingly authoritarian course. 
This was evidenced particularly by the conduct of parliamentary elections of 26 May and 
2 June 1996.189 
ıı:: 6 See Aldo Bumci, Debating National security cd. Albcrt Rak ipi, (Tirana: A1banian Iııstitutc for 
International Studies, 2004), p. 89. 
'" Buzan, p. 74. 
1
" George Sorensen, The Transformatian ~f the State Beyand the Myth of Retreat ( New York: Palgrave, 
2004), p.l 74. 
189 Ettore Greco "International Reactions to the Albanian Crisis ", Security Dialogue , vol 29(2) ( I 998): p. 
203. 
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White the 'primary the roots of the erisis were political, other canses lay in the 
weakly developed market econoıny. Normal econoınic growth had almost coıne to a 
standstili due to the explosive growth ofpyramid schemes ina country where there was no 
trust in the embryonic banking structures. Nine pyraınid schemes stepped in the credit 
vacuuın and were rapidly embraced by an inexperienced population eager for quick 
profit.190 Their simultaneous collapse in early 1997 triggered a popnlar uprising and the 
country slid into anarchy. 191 
The modem state represents a specific stage in the development of human society. 
The state exists beyond its institutions and bureaucracy through a solid and complex 
relationship with society. The state cannot exist solely through its coercive institutions. In 
the coınmunist era, which makes up the longest period of existence of the Albanian state, 
not only did the state fail to create a solid relationship with society, but the relationship, 
such as it was, was a very conflictual one. Loyalty to the state was based on fear and 
coercion, and not on faith. Social institutions remained in a primitive state of 
development. Not only did they fail to develop, but also they became defonned in their 
mandate or they were even outlawed, as was the case wi th the country' s religious 
institutions. The communists un di d the country' s old social fabric but failed to replace it 
with a new, healthy one of the ir own making. 
Seen from the po int of view of the sta:te-society relationship, the 1997 erisis was a 
failure of the institutions of the state. They reınain weak, and their ability to pressure or 
"
0 Derek Haii"Aibania in Europe: Condcmned to the l'priphery or Beyand" Geopolitics, Vol. 6, lssuc 1 
(2001) : p. 628. 
191 Greco, p. 204. 
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lobby policymakers effectively remain almost nonexistent. Albania entered the 1997 erisis 
as if it was a celebration. In what may be cal! ed 'collective dementia' people hurried to 
invest their money in the pyramid scheınes. They saw their savings grow quickly, whi!e 
they were living the 'capitalisı dreaın' iri the country' s bars and restaurants. Getting rich 
quickly and without working was the new rage. Bu Iate 1996 an estiınated 70 per cent of 
A1banian faıni1ies had committed their savings to these schemes for returns of up to 50 
percent per month 192 
Civil society institutions failed to do anything about the coming disaster. The 
leaders of the religious communities did not mention a word about the danger ahead; 
indeed the managers of the pyraınid schemes were often present in re1igious ceremonies. 
The academic coınmunity was silent too. The 'independent' media kept broadcasting or 
pub1ishing the paid advertisements that called on citizens to invest their money in the 
"get-rich-quick" schemes. Economically weak and highly partisan, the media was stili far 
from achieving any rea1 independence from other actors. 
Although there were no warnings from any domestic forces about the looming 
fınancial disaster, several statements by international institutions and especially from 
fınancial institutions alerted the Albaniaıı govemment about the · dangers of pyramid 
schemes. In 1996 the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund repeatedly wamed 
that shadow economy activities and the evidently fraudulent "pyraınid" ınoney making 
192 C.Eibirt" Albania under the Shadow of the Pyramids", Transition 8/5, (1997): p.9. 
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schemes, ... cou!Ö jeopardize Albania's economic future and its overall stability as 
well.ı9ı 
More arguments may be found on the weak state of Albanian economy, and 
especially the lack of meaningful reforms in the fıscal system. However, the main canses 
of the ı 997 erisis were political. The ı 997 implosion meant the failure of the frail 
Albanian democracy that was bom in ı 992. The citizen protests were triggered by the 
bankruptey of the Ponzi schemes, but they quickly turned into an armed rebellion on the 
state and its institutions. In the meantime, the state had lost its right to the use of force 
due to the fact that the already-weak legitimacy it possessed was completely eaten away 
by the indifference of its institutions towards the schemes. When DP came to power in 
ı 992, the legitimacy enjoyed by the govemment and by the new post-communist state was 
powerful. Despite the fact that this !eve! was impossible to maintain due to painful 
economic refonns undertaken by the Berisha administration, the govemment and the state 
continued to be viewed as legitimate. By 1995, the success of the administration's reforms 
was tangible. Within a small period of time, Albania was able to pierce through the 
extreme isolation inherited by communism. In 1995, what used to be the most isolated 
country in the world, was a member of OSCE, the European Council, and the fırst 
member of NATO' s Partnership for Peace initiative. Good relations with European 
countries and the EU helped the govemment as an important source of legitimacy. At least 
as impoıtant was the wholehearted support the administration received from the USA? 
American support for the Albanian governınent was based on the progress of the reforıns 
193 Ettore Greco "International Reactions to the Albani~n Crisis ", Security Diaiogue, vol 29(2) ( 1 998): p. 
203. 
ı ı 8 
' but also on the strategic importance of Albania, which was ready to o ffer NA TO and the 
US all the support they needed in a region that was becoming increasingly problematic. 
However, after the 1996 elections the govemıneni quickly started losing its legitimacy. 
After the 1997 crisis, another theory arose according to which the extent of the DP 
victory in those elections was positively influenced by the operation of the pyramid 
schemes. According to a poll commissioned by the US Information Agency, and 
overwhelming majority of Albanians, 86 percent, said the economy was better, while 75 
percent had a favorable opinion of Berisha. 194 However, the democratic electoral process 
·.' 
suffered a great setback. The socialisı opposition and its minor allies boycotted the 
process in its closing stages, claiming that the government had manipulated the elections. 
According to the international observers "32 articles out of 79 dealing with the pre-
election period and Election Day were violated". 195• The opposition did not recognize the 
election results and the authority of the new institution. The SP and its allies boycotted 
the parliament and the "political warfare" that was supposed to take place within an 
institutional framework spilled out in the street. Since 1996, parliamentary boycott 
becaıne the rule rather than the exception in Albania. 
194 US Jnfonnation Agency, Office of Research and Media Reaction, Albanian Public Broadly Positive on 
Economy. (Washington, D.C.), M-74-96, 2 April 1996 quoted in Elez Biberal, Albania in Transition, 
Westview Press, 1998, p. 280. 
195 
"Observation of the parliamentary clections heldin the Republic of Albania: May 26 and Junc 2, 1996." 
Office for Democratic lnstitutions and Human Rights: 
http:/ /www .osce.org/odihr/documents/reports/election _ reports/al/alb J. 2 .php3 
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The goverıllnent's legitimacy loss picked up the pace even more when it became 
clear that international support, and especially US support, was weakening. The American 
Embassy in Tirana boycotted the inaugural session of the newly elected legislature. 196 
The election problems were compounded by the bankruptey of the pyramid schemes. The 
govemment was undeniably guilty of not stopping them from operating in time. The 
opposition joined the protesters aeeusing the govemment not only for its failure to aet 
against the bogus companies, but also for stealing the citizens' savings. 197• While 
proclaiming itself as not responsible for the "pyramidal fiasco", the opposition had been 
absolutely silent about the problem, failing to wam the citizens and patiently waiting for 
their eventnal bankruptey hoping to use the inevitable popnlar diseontent to come back to 
power.198 
As a result of the total failure of i ts politieal elites, the country was engulfed in 
senseless violenee and anarchy. The opposition, by uniting with the protestors, was 
identified with a number of eriminal gangs that profited from the anarehy and ended up 
eontrolling large swathes of territory. This eost the socialist administration that eame out 
of the 1997 parliamentary eleetions, more than a few problems beeause it had to share 
power with these armed gangs that had helped propel it to power. 
196 According to Gabriel Partos and Fron Nozi The severing of - US - special links with Berisha 
Administration had been made easier for Washington by the dec!ine in Albania's strategic importance 
fo!lowing the Dayton pcacc accord on Bosnia Hcrzcgoviııa ... and the danger of a sp ili-over of the conflict 
from Bosnia to Kosovo appeared to be rceeding. Besidcs, the Clinton Administration was deterınincd to 
build up democratie institutions in Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia as a way of boistering 
peaee. lt wanted to use Albania as an example of its tough approach to countrics that were tuming away 
from the dcmocratic path .. See Gabricl Partos Allumia: Cm{/lict Preventhm and Crisis A1qnagc.'1Ju!nt 
Working Papcrs, Ciao Columbia international AtTaircs on line http://Www.ciaonct.org/wps. 
Se alsa Fron Nozi .. Washington Goes Socialist", London- W ar Report, No.53 August 1997), p.l2. 
197 A parliamentary commission appointed aftcr the 1997 erisis to investigate the pyramidc schemcs did not 
bring l()rw:ırd :ıny ııı-ool'lo sııbsl:ıııtiate !his l'laiıu. 
l'J~ The Prcsidcnt of one of the SP sateli i tc parti es owncd one the "Xhafcrri .. pyramiJ schcınc. 
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The DP govemıneni declared an "emergency situation" and attempted to win back 
i ts control and legitimacy by the use of force against the protestors. Sali Berisha, Albanian 
Presidentat the time, says: 
"W e had started a political process for solving the situation and the use of force 
was aimed towards the criminal elements. This is the reason why I called on the 
SP to divorce itselffrom its armed wing."199 
From the very beginning, the use of force in ord er to rcimpose govemıneni control 
seemed destined to fail since large numbers of policy and arıny units had deserted and 
handed over to the rebels depots full of weapons and ammunition.Thus, almost all state 
institutions collapsed. Their disintegration created a security dilenıma for all citizens. The 
state ceased to exist, and society seemed to resemble Thomas Hobbes "natural state" 
model.Although there was no territorial conflict, - neither north vs. south, nor civil or 
religious war - basic human security was endangered, control of state territory and 
borders disintegrated, and the state lost the legitimacy necessary for the use of force. 
Instead, it invited an intenıational force, which had no clear understanding of the conflict, 
to restore order. 
4.5. INSIDE THE BOX 
The modem political discourse on weak states seems to spring a trap for any 
researchcr that tackles it. When one thinks that he has achicvcd a wcll-roundcd and 
insightful explanation of the problem, he discovers that his conclusions are widely known 
199 lntcrview with former Albanian Prcsidcnt Sali Bcrisha. 
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' to the public. Thus, saying that Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro are 
weak states is equivalent to saying- quoting Cehov- that "horses eat grass." 
W e have used legitimacy as the necessary criteria for defining "weak states". The 
degree of legitimacy a state enjoys is positively related to the impact it makes on the 
everyday life of i ts citizens, the degree to which the "state" idea has become an accepted 
Iradition and the degree to which the governing elites and state institutions are accepted by 
the population. W e have mentioncd that lcgitimacy may be achicvcd through proccdurcs 
andfor results. But, despite an improvement of our theoretical framework, we have not 
said mu ch more than "the Volga flows in the Caspic Sea" w hi ch, according to Cehov, is 
not saying much. 
Also, it is clear to many that most states in non-industrial societies, with backward 
economies and primitive technologies are classified as 'weak'. These states have failed to 
provide the most basic services to their citizens, such as security, education, health care, 
anda basic infrastructure. For example, in the case of Albania, the weakness of the state is 
obvious when we consider that it fails to provide its citizens with a regular supply of 
energy and water. All of these parameters may be used to classify states as 'weak' or 
'strong'. But, although we have identified the weak state, we have made no attempt to 
understand how this type of state functions. Ivan Krastev says that "state weakness is !ike 
an elephant: you do not know exactly what it is, but you are sure that when you see it you 
will recognize it".200 W e must try to get away from the elephant metaphor, because it isa 
200 Ivan Krastev, Tlıe Jnjlexibility Trap, Frustrated Socfeties, Weak States, and Democracy( Sofla: Center for 
Liberal Strategies, 2002), p.14 
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' . trap where all political discourse on the weak state ends up. Let us look inside the box. 
What is a "nonnal situation" !ike in a weak state? What is the order provided by a weak 
state if there is any? 
In 1991, parts of the Albanian state collapsed temporarily. Anarchy engulfed the 
countryside and some of the cities, which meant that the state practically ceased to exist. 
In 1997, the Albanian state ceased to exist for a second time, and Albanian society 
reverted to something !ike the Robbesian "natural state" where the nonnal stai:e of things 
was "a war of every man against every man." In the interval between these two 
implosions, Albania was a failed rather than just a weak state. Obviously, if there is 
anarchy, even if it is only sporadi c, there is a lack of order. But, looking beyond the power 
vacuum moments, what is orderin a fuııctioning weak state? Free of Law ( versus Rule of 
Law)- the orderthat prevails in weak states: 
"Freedom Works" was directed to US secretary of State James Baker more than to the one 
h undred thousand Albanians in Scanderbeg Square in 199!. In no other case in the old 
Eastern Bl oc has there been such a spectacular enthusiasm for a high offıcial of the United 
States government. In fact, Albanians were celebrating their newly found freedom, and the 
United States was a vivid syınbol of this freedom. A decade later, even the most cursory 
look at Albanian society shows that there has been a great misunderstanding of the word 
"freedom". 
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More ofteh than not, freedom has been identified with freedam ji·om law. In 1991-
1992, this misunderstanding triumphed in Albania for three reasons. First, there was the 
fifty year long total absence of freedom. Second, the law was identifıed closely with the 
previous regime that had abused it for its own benefits. Liberty from communism was 
conceptualised as freedom from all law. Last but not least, this misunderstanding occurred 
because state institutions were weak and often non-functional. It seemed as if everyone 
was completely unconstrained in their actions. F amilies were building or enlargening their 
dwellings at will, economic enterprises were being started without-legal permission or 
registration and companies were embarking on illegal constructioiı projects. Individuals 
and firms were stealing energy and water from the public distribution systems. Nobody 
lclt obligcd to pay taxcs. 
Man felt free ffom legal constraints. This situation prevailed between the 1991-
1992 and 1997 eri ses. During the erises periods, the dynamics of the citizen/state rapport 
and vice versa show a different and more prob1ematic reality. The power vacuum that 
occurred during the 1991-1992 and 1997 erises is not the only factor that prohibited the 
ji·ee of law rclationship from be ing transformed in to rule <il law. This bccomcs obvious if 
we recall the changes of the free of law relationship in the times of a functioııing central 
authority. 
Thus, analyzing the state making process in post-comınunist Albania, we notice 
that the re la tionship of the individual with the law remained ji-ee of law irrespective of the 
presence or not of a functioning central authority. As already mentioned, Albanian 
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' political partics coııtinucd to opcratc w i thin the .fi"ee r!f'law mcııtality. Thcrc is no rcal 
differeııce between a citizen that, feeling free of the burden of law, steals energy from the 
public electricity grid and the arbitrary decision of a prime minister that hires and fıres 
people at his leisure despite the existence of laws that regulate public adıninistration 
employment. The citizen bchavcs with public property as if it was his privatc propcrty, 
while the statesınan treats the state as if it is his own pie that is to be divided among his 
supporters, with whoın he is related by political belief or, ınore often, clan ties. Always in 
the name of reform, the authorities have waged repeated crusades on state bureaucracy. 
W i thin the space of two months in a govemıneni that lasted no longer than four months, 
the Priıne Minister Pandeli Majko overhauled the entire persoıınel of police regional 
chiefs and most of the police commissanat chiefs.Z01 .Thus, while the free of law 
relationship reaches its high point in times of erisis and anarchy, even during a "normal" 
period in a weak state the "free of law" relationship dominates although it remains a 
privilege of only part of the comınunity. 
Rules of corruption and capture of the state in peaceful times, when there are no 
erises and power vacuums, the "free of law" relationship is a privilege of only a part of 
society. From a political perspective, this privilege is reserved to the party in power and 
especially a particular clan-based faction within it. From an economic perspective a part 
of society is privileged by taking part in the privatization process, thus eaming the right to 
develop business enterprises. Often, the resul! is monopolies in paıiicular economic fıelds. 
Members of the goveming oligarchy or their close friends and relations become private 
201 Ilir Gjoni, "Cieansing the Aegean Stables: Corrupti~n in Albaııia Disrupts Demecratic Development and 
underrnine quality oflife", Mediterranean Quarterly, Sunımer 2002): p.13. 
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owners of the privatized public property. They control the division of the privatization pie 
and the handing out of contracts. The new monopolies often asphyxiate domestic 
production. Thus, although due to its Mediterranean climate Albania can harvest 
vegetables three times a year, she ends up importing tomatoes, vegetables and other 
agricultural products from Macedonia that does not have such a favorable climate. This 
occurs because the businessmen that operate in this market pay no import taxes and dues, 
and o ffer these products to the domestic market cheaper than domestic · producers. 
Monopolies created in the oil and gas markets have built formidable barriers to market 
entrance, thus keeping prices artifıcially high. 
Following the "free of law" dynamic to its logical conclusion, in weak states we 
see that this law breeds Rule of Corruption. In Albania, where corruption has become a 
way of life, this phenomenon has permeated all facets of public life. Now oorruption 
defınes political culture. Patients have to pay for public healthcare services, while erime 
suspects have to pay off lawyers and judges. Bribes are paid to ensure a place in the 
public administration or a service from it such as getting a passport. Drivers and motorists 
often have to pay traffic policemen a "penalty" even when they have not broken any 
traffic rules. According to the World Bank, 7 percent of the fırıns' turnover in Albania is 
paid as bribes. Everyone is forced to pay bribes, thus seemingiy creating a tragicomic 
vicious circle in which everyone is a loser and a winner since the poticeınan has to pay off 
the physician, the physician has to pay offthe policeınan, and both oftlıeın have to pay off 
the judge or whoınever public official they require a service from. Howevcr, this is not 
true sin ce the majority of people do not h old a public office, and these people are the real 
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' losers. This kind of corruption is identifıed as administrative corruption, that is "when the 
implementation of !aws and ru!es is influenced by bribes to public offıcials (i.e. to gain 
licenses, remove customs barriers, or win public procurement contracts. 202 Thus, 
corruption is the privilege of members of the public administration. In a different !eve!, 
corruption has a direct infinence on the functioning of state institutions and policy 
fonuulation and iınplementation from the govcrning elite. 
This type of corruption has resulted in the creation of a special type ofgoveming 
elite that, due to its coınposition, wc will call Quasiınodo Oligarchy. The Quasimodo 
Oligarchy includes politicians that are united fırst and foreıncıst on a clan ınembership 
basis. Political ideologies are important, but a Quasimodo oligarchy may ineJude 
politicians of the enemy camp who are ne:vertheless meınbers of the clan. Entrepreneurs 
that manage business enterprises yet are intiınately connected to the clan that has political 
power are part of the oligarch as well. A fourth category of this type of oligarchy are a 
different kind of businessmen, that hand out contracts, and parts of the privatization pie to 
the third category under the orders of their political bosses. Within this oligarchy, we 
notice a fıfth category of people: the bodyguards. The bodyguard phenoınenon is unique 
to Albania. Politicians, legislators and senior officials almost all have bodyguards who 
practically execute personnet policies. They can hire and fire customs offıcers, police 
commissioners, and other offıcials according to their liking, albeit with the blessing of 
their "boss" .2°3 
202 World Bank Anticorruption in transitions- contribution to the policy debate, (World Bank 2000), p.46. 
203 Gjoni, p. 37. 
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Analyzing' corruption from the security perspective, there is some evidence to 
count corruption as a security threat. This understanding of corruption has not been 
dominant in local discourse and policy making bodies at the national !eve!, but mainly at 
the !eve! of international institutions which presently are assisting the state-building 
process in a number countries in transitions. Y et, corruption and organized erime do not 
constitute a threat per se but a symptom or consequence of weak institutions and the lack 
of a state-building ethos in the bureaucracy, judiciary, healthcare and in other forms of 
state-sponsored vertical hierarchies. 204 
The consolidation of this type of oligarchy may bring about the "state capture" 
phenomenon - the ability of powerful individuals or firms to influence the formulation of 
laws or govemrnents policies to their own advantage"205 • The w arning signs are already 
visibi e in Albania, while they have become predominant in Macedonia w hi ch, according 
to the International Crisis Group, presents a "hybrid" case, that is "full state capture 
together with administrative coercion". 
Such an environment creates favorable conditions for the iı1dependent 
development of organized erime. For example, in Albania a number of local drug 
traffıckers, part of a larger international organization, tried to ereale · their own political 
party and, failing that, atteınpted to buy off politicians aiıning at the coınplete capture of 
the state. Organized erime ınay try to become part of the goverııing oligarchy in order to 
204 Eno Trimccv, Local Government and Corruption: tlte L'ase ofA!bania { Tirana: Albaniun lıı::;titutc !Or 
International Studies, 2006),p.l7. . 
::os International Crisis Group, A1acedonia 's ?ublic See ret: Ho w corruption Drags the Country Down, 
Report No 133, 14 August 2002. 
12H 
start the process 'of criminalization of politics. But, even without the intervention of 
organized erime, the consolidation of a corrupt oligarchy may bring about the complete 
collapse of the political system and iliegitimale the procedures that legitimate power in a 
democracy: free elections. Thus, in Albania elections may not be won fairly, but bought 
by politicians and their businessmen supporters who than use the state solely for the 
advancement of there own interests. Furthermore, the degradation of the "free of law" 
relationship may gradually bring about a dangerous phenomenon for national security. 
That is: 
- The creation of parall el institutions; 
- The nıotives behind the development of paraUel institutions in weak states must be 
found in the failurc to transform the "frcı.ı ol' law" rclationslıip into a "nılc ol' law" 
relationship. 
The trend towards paraUel institutions has been obvious in post-communist 
Albania. Opposition partics-and being an oppositioıı party in Albaııia means that you are 
excluded completely from policymaking - have even celebrated Independence Day 
separately from the s ta te-organize d celebrations. S ince 1997, the two political parti es have 
celebrated all offıcial celebrations including religious ceremonies, separately. This 
symbolic rejection of "the state of the other", may lead to the creation of paraUel 
institutions. Thus, the DP controlled Public Order Ministry accused SP that it had formed 
armed groups aiming at the disruption of the elections of 26 May 1996. The opposition 
did not reject the charge, answering that it had taken measures to prevent potice 
interference in the election process. Thus, the poliee was identifıed as the anned wing of 
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the party in power rather than a depoliticized state institution. Since 1997, the sodalist. 
administration has leveled repeated accusations on the opposition, accusing it of creating 
paraUel institutions. On the other hand, in weak multiethnic states such as in Macedonia, 
paraUel institutions maybe more visible. The ethnic group that is not represented in state 
institutions considers the creation of paraUel institutions as a preventive, self-defense 
measure. However, this may bring about a c!ash between the two ethnic groups and, in a 
worst-case scenario, the break-up of the state. 
The last question we will have to answer is: looking inside the box, what is the 
behavior of the rest of society toward the governing oligarchy. Keeping in mind that 
theoretically the state has to provide public goods, what is the relationship that the state 
has build with its citizens? The modern state's main function is to build a !ega! framework 
and a judicial system to adıninister it. In weak states such as Albania, the judicial system 
is usually a tool of the executive reflecting its comınunist past. The communist regime 
transformed the judiciary in a tool of the executive or, more precisely, in a tool of the 
goveming oligarchy. Institutionally this was done by abolishing the Department of Justice 
and the institution of the defense attorney. In post-communist Albania, despite the fact 
that Jegally all the necessary justice institutions reflect the Western model, the judiciary 
functions as an extreınely politicized and corrupt institution. 
In Albania, the failure of the state goes beyond this, since it has been unable to 
ensure society even reliable energy and water supplies.206 Thus, the state has hardly any 
206 A country with rich water and hydro cnergy rcserves, in the last ten years Albania has bcen immcrscd into 
a tlccp water <ınd cncrgy supply eri sis. 
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' impact on the majority of society. This great gap between society and state becomes 
clearer when we look at voters' participation in elections. Although other variables 
infinence voter' participation, the failure of the state is the main reason for the low 
election tumouts (sometimes less than 50 percent) that have characterized elections in the 
last five years. This is the reason that Hyden coined weak states such as Albania balloon 
states suspended in the air with no firm connections to their underlying societies.2°7 
207 Hydcn 1983, quoted in Gcorg Sorcnscn, Changes in Statehood. The tran~formation qf lntemational 
Relations,( London- Palgrave, 2001), p. 85. 
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CHAPTERS 
MACEDONIA, ANA TION STATE INA MULTIETHNIC SOCIETY 
5.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Macedonian question made its debut on the international scene by the end of 
the nineteenth century as an integral part of the larger Eastem question. 208 However, the 
debate surraunding it goes back as far as the antiquity ?09 While the Macedonian question 
has existed for a long time, there has been no Macedonian state in the way we understand 
that concept today. Until the Balkan Wars of the early twentieth century, Macedonia has 
existed only as a geographical concept, part of different empires, starting from the Roman 
one and ending with the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, this is very s imilar to that of 
the other Balkan peoples, but the iınportant difference is that Macedonia did not have its 
own sovereign state after the Ottoman deınise. The national ınoveınent in "Geographic 
Macedonia" di d not lead to an independent state as it di d for the other Balkan nations. The 
Krucevo Republic, bom out of a bloody anti-Otternan insurrection, lasted only two 
ınonths. The republic and the insurrection that lead to it has been ınythologized and has 
208 Elisabeth Barker "The origin of the Macedonian Dispute", in James Pettifer ed, The New Macedonian 
Question, (London: Palgr ave, 2001), p.3 
209 Kyril Drezov " Macedonian ldentity: an Overview, of the Major Claims" in James Pettifer The New 
Macedonian Question, (London: Pal gr av e, 2001 ), p. 48 
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' provided the moral and emotional ground for Macedonian nationalism. They are not a 
record of the beginnings ofa modem Macedonian state.210 
W ith the end of the First Balkan W ar, Macedonia was "liberated" from Ottoman 
occupation but a Macedonian state failed to materialize. The end of the Second Balkan 
W ar found it divided between Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. And, after the end of the 
Second World W ar the fırst Macedonian Govemment was established in 1 94 7, but the 
new republic, proclaimed in 2 August 1944, was only one of the six republics that made 
up the Yugoslav Federation. This is the constitutional arrangement that started the 
Macedonian state. Although de jure Macedonia was not an independent state, modem 
statehood started to develop precisely at this time. The international recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia sealed the fate of the Yugoslav Federation that was already weak. 
However, Macedonia and Bosnia were less interested in independent statehood because of 
a number of reasons. First, they were ınuch poorer than either Croatia or Slovenia. 
Second, the ethnic make-up of the two republics made theın reseınble a ıniniature 
Balkans. Third, both republics, and especially Macedonia, were dependent on the 
integrated econoıny of the federation. Last but not least, an independent Macedonia would 
awaken the old rivalries of its ncighbors, cspccially Grcecc and Bulgaria and potcntially 
Albania. lt was this reality that forced President Gligorov, in cooperation with President 
Izetbegovic of Bosnia, to try to save some sort of a federal arrangeınent between the six 
rcpublics. Thus, Kiro Gligorov and /\lia lzctlıcgovic ınci in Sanıjcvo and agrccd that the 
preservation of the Yugoslav Federation was their overriding aim.Z 11 This occurred only 
210 Barkcr, p. !6. 
211 James Pcttifcr The New Macedonian Queslion, (LonJon: P:.ılgravc, 2001 ), p.137. 
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five days after the Macedonian Parliament approved the Declaration of Independence and 
established a platform for talks on the cöntinued existence of the Federation. Despite the 
support that these internal attempts received from outside powers (especially the US 
Govemment), it became clear that with the independence-minded Slovenia and Croatia 
and Serbia's nationalisı backlash, the Yugoslav family was in its deaılı roes. All the 
suınınits of the republican leaders, where the Slovenes and the Croats insisted on a 
coınplctc dissolution of the Federation, and Serbia and Montenegro with lukewarın 
Macedonian and Bosnian support, insisted on a new "deınocratic federation", failed one 
after another. The last suınmit in Sarajevo in June'91 rejected the Gligorov-Izetbegovic 
proposal that aimed to transform Yugoslavian into a commonwealth of sovereign 
Republics. The only option left to Macedonia (and Bosnia) was independence. Despite 
the obvious dangers and uncertainty of the road ahead, it was obviously safer than the 
status quo. 
After a referendum held in September 1991, on November 17'h the Macedonian 
Parliament approved the new constitution that declared Macedonia an independent and 
sovereign state. International recognition was postponed due to the procedures put in 
place by the European Community (with the Badinter Commission) and later on it was 
vetoed by Greece212 which protested against the name and the flag of the new state. 
However, from this point in time Macedonia started to function de facto as an independent 
state, thus becoming one of the youngest states to com e out of the aslı es of the Communist 
empıre. 
212 For a comprehensive analysis of the Greek positions on Macedonian questions see Evangclos Kofos 
"Greek Policy considerations over FYROM independence and recognition" in The New Macedonian 
Question, ed. James Pettifer (London: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 226-263. 
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' 5.1.1. The Macedonian National Question 
In order to understand the on-going state building process in Macedonia, we must 
have an understanding of the "Macedonian National Question". Its beginnings and its 
post World War II transformation have a direct impact on today's Balkan security 
problematique. The defınition of Macedonia as "fundamentally a transition area both 
physically and culturally" of Hey Louis Kostancik stands out among other defınitions.213 
There is an important element within such a concise defınition that needs to be understood 
in order to comprehend the conflictuality of the area. This element is the fact that 
"Macedonia is a region and not a nationality and most of all a region with a mind boggling 
number of nationalities."214 
According to Stavrianos, the people inhabiting Macedonia near the Bulgarian, 
Greek and Serbian borders could be classifıed more as Bulgarian, Greek and Serb 
respectively. The rest of the population, with the exception of distinctive minorities !ike 
the Turkish, Vlachs and Albanians could be considered Macedonian. These Macedonians 
have a characteristic dialect and culture that justifıes their classifıcation in a special South 
Slav category.215 
Another iınportant stumbling bloc has been the geographical defınition of 
Macedonia. The most consensual defınition of Geographic Macedonia has been also the 
most inclusive one, consisting of Aegean Macedonia in N orthem Greece, Pirin Macedonia 
213 1-lucy Lotiis Kostancik. Ph. D. d issertation preseni cd in ('la re k University in l 947 and quolı?d by George 
Prcvclakis in "Wcstcrıı Europc and the Balkans" Scctlrity Dialoguc ,vol,4,1991): p.24. 
214Vanni Cappclli,, "The Macedonian Question again", Washington Quarterly, vol.2 1, lssuc 3,.(1 998):30 
215 L.S. Stavrianos, Tlıe Balkans since 1453.( London: Hurst & Company, 2000), p. 617. 
in Southwestem Bulgaria and Vardar Macedonia, which is the present day FYROM. Due 
to its strategic importance- all the major roads north south and west east cross this region-
geographic Macedonia has enticed small and big powers from antiquity to the arrival of 
the Turks in the 14'h century. Yet the "Macedonian Question" appeared fırst during the 
demise of the Ottoman status quo. The retreat of the Ottoman Empire at the tum of 
twentieth century created a vacuum in these territories. 
lt seems that the Maccdonian question appcarcd in its full coınplexity .in the Saint 
Stephen Treaty (March 3'd 1878 ufter the defeat of Turkey by Russiu). The treuty guve 
birtlı to Greater Bulgaria that included alınost the entire Ottoınan Macedonia. The Great 
Powers, and especially Great Britain and Austro-Hungary, that viewed the treaty as an 
enlargement of the Russiun sp here of influence, dictuted unother treuty, that of Berlin 
which, under the guidance of Bismarck, resulted in a much sınaller Bulguria. 
At the same time, the vacuuın left by the Ottoınan retreat created the necessary 
space for the development of Balkan nationalisıns that were in the ınaking, while also 
giving rise to the security dilemına for each of theın. In the anxious uttempts to control 
these territories both during the Balkan Wars and during the First World War, an 
autonoınous Macedonia was not viewed as a viable option. According to an international 
comınission for the Balkans set up iınınediately after the Second Balkan War to 
investigate the causes of conflict in the region "there is no political future in the near 
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future (for the region) and in particnlar .in the case of Macedonia."216 Thus, after the 
Balkan Wars and the First World War, the territories of what came to be known as 
geographic Macedonia were divided among Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, 51%, 39% and 
10% respectively. 
The conflict over the Macedonian question was sustained by these states until the 
end of the Second World W ar. The end of the Second W or! d W ar marks a qualitative shift 
in the Macedonian question. The part that was given to Serbia developed as an entity of i ts 
own. The Albanian territories of present day Southwestem Macedonia w ere left out of the 
Albanian State recognized by the London Conference. Therefore, to the existing rivalty 
among Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria over Macedonia was added, at least theoretically, the 
rivalry and the potential conflict between the Albanians and the Slavo-Macedonians. This 
conflict could be twofold, fırst within Macedonia as well as the potential conflict between 
Albania and the Federal Yugoslav Republic. 
In the new post WWII dynaınics Tito applied a new strategy in order to control 
Macedonia. First he recognized the existence of a Macedonian nation entitled to a state of 
its own-a republic within the Yugoslav Federation, combining thus the idea of the 
Macedonian nation with that of the Macedonian state. W ith the founding of Yugoslav 
Macedonia cam e the creation of Macedonian Slav nationality possessing its own officially 
216 Carncgie Endowıııcnt for ıntcrııationuı Pcacc, iiıe Ol/ı er Balkan Wars,u ı 9 ı 3 Carncgie Endowıııent 
inquiry in retrospect with a new "lntroduction and Reflection on the Prescnt Conflict" by George F. Kenan 
(Washington D.C Library of Congress .1993),p .6X. 
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recognized language, culture and institutions. 217 In his strategy Tito applied the ideas of 
Jovan Cvijic who in order to challenge the idea that Macedonians were a Bulgarian 
ethnicity put forth the thesis that the slavo-Macedonians were a separate ethnicity neither 
Greek, nor Bulgarian or Serbian. 
In the aftermath of WWII, the old Greek-Serbian-Bulgarian rivalries would fade 
away and the Macedonian question was transformed at its very core. For the fırst time 
since the appearance of the Macedonian question, a separate entity - a state within the 
Yugoslav Federation - was taking shape. Since than, the Macedonian question would 
develop between Albanians and Macedonians. Despite this new profıle, the Macedonian 
qucstion has not bccn completcly free of old rivalries and interventions from powcrs 
outside of the region. 
5.2. THE TRANSFORMA TION OF MACEDONIAN QUESTION 
By the end of World W ar II the Maccdonian question was teınporarily forgotten. 
For the fırst time in the twentieth century, Macedonia was not a dangerous component for 
Balkan security. This did not ınean that it was solved.m All the disputes that had created 
it, and cspccially the "contcstcd nation"210 charactcr of the Maccdoııian pcoplc (national 
217 Duncan M. Pcrry H Maccdonia: A Balkan Problem anda European Dilcnınıa'' International Relations, 
Vol.l No.25,( 1 992): p.36. 
21
' Up to the end ofWWI!, Serbia considered the part of Macedonia given to it after the Balkan Wars sinıply 
as Southem Serbia. After the War, this changed and Macedonia eamed rcpublican statuS within the 
Yugoslav federation. 
219 The Greeks consider ancient Macedonians to be simply a Greek tribc. Bulgarians considcr thcm sinıply 
as Bulgarians. Finally, until WWI!, Serbs considered Macedonians to be Serbs and they called Yugoslav 
Macedonia as South Serbia. For more details see Elisabcth Barker, 'The origin of the Macedonian dispute, 
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identity, langUage, culture) and territory. (traditionally contested by Greece, Serbia, 
Bulgaria and, aftcr WWII, Albania)220 rcınaincd vcry ınuclı on the tablc. This tcınporary 
arehiving of the issue was a result of two factots. First, communist Yugoslavia froze any 
discussion of the Macedonian question and, consequently, any potential conflicts as well. 
The part of Macedonia that was given to Serbia started to develop as a rcpublic within 
Tito's Yugoslav Federation. This policy autoınatically neutralizcd any Scrb dcsigns on 
Macedonia. Secondly, the Cold W ar itself acted as a freezer of national questions in the 
Balkans and other regions. Thus, potential Greek or Bulgarian designs were frozen as 
well. As for the danger presented by Albania, that was practically zero. Although Tito 
broke the promise of creating a single Albanian republic in tlıe Balkans, Tirana continued 
i ts honeymoon with Belgrade un til 1948. Hoxha declared in the Paris Peace Conference 
that Albania had not territorial designs on Yugoslavia. As a matter of fact, until 1948, 
Albania was voluntarily striving to unite with Yugoslavia.221 
Historically Albania has been seen as the mother country for Albanians in the 
Balkans but it has never forrııulated irredentist policies or actions. Even after the breale 
with Yugoslavia, Albania reınaincd strictly ncutral in its stance towards Kosovo and 
Macedonia. Being a sınall country and a chronically weak state, Albania was permanently 
concemed with its survival in a very unstable region. This would be a Realist reading of 
Albanian foreign policy in the Ballkans. Y et, it is interesting to note that s ince the 
"and Kyril Drezov, "Macedonian identity," in The New Macedonian Question, ed., James Pettifer 
(London: Palgrave, 2001), p.J45. 
220 See Elez Biberaj " The Albanian National Question the Challcnges of Autonomy, lndependence, and 
Separatism" in Nichael Mandelbaum, ed. The New European Diaspora National Minorities and Conjlict in 
Eastern Europe, (New York- Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2000), pp. 214-289. 
221 After the W ar, within two years Albania had signcd a number of ccoııomic agrecıncnts w ith Yugoslavia 
that included a custorns union and steps towards a commen currency. 
139 
Macedonian qm;stion resurfaced in the post cold war era, Albania did not carry out any 
aggressive actions towards the Albanian-inhabited territories of westem Macedonia not 
because it was weak vis-a-vis Macedonia but because it was not willing to pursue such 
policies. Even after the break with Yugoslavia, Albania remained strictly neutral in its 
stance towards Kosovo and Macedonia.222 
While the Cold W ar helped freeze Balkan rivalries over Macedonia, the political 
nature of the Yugoslav regime imposed peace between Albanians and Macedonians within 
the Macedonian Republic. Although Tito's regime did not lack liberal aspects, from the 
po int of view of national matters it was very authoritarian. This explains why although the 
Albanians were completely excluded from the state building process - indeed, during the 
Rankovic era, they were treated brutally and their rights were drastically curtailed - there 
was no massive etlınic-based moveınent to oppose the regiıne. 
5.3. THE END OF THE COLD W AR AND THE REEMERGCNE OF 
MACEDONIAN QUESTION 
During the dissolution of Yugoslavia, "the retum of the Macedonian Question" 
was one of the most dangerous issucs that could rcplicatc the tragcdics of the fırst dccade 
of the twentieth century. The post-Cold War situation resembled in many ways the 
withdrawal of the Ottoman Eınpire from the Balkans; a power vacuum had been created at 
the end of the Cold W ar and nationalism was on the risc. Thcrcforc, old rivalrics over 
Macedonia could reappear on the Balkan sceııe. These old rivalries could involve 
222 See Al do Bum ci Macedonia and the Albanians: The C01~{lnes <?f Ethnic C'o1rflict ( Tirana-Allıani an 
Institute for International Studies, 2001), pp.34-38 
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' Yugoslavia-Serbia,223 Greece 224and Bulgaria225• In view of the large Albanian population 
in Macedonia, in territories that were cut off from Albania during the Balkan W ars, it was 
quite conceivable that Macedonia could fınd itself surrounded by föur belligereni 
countries.226 Since the break-up of Yugoslavia was accompanied by political pluralism 
and multiparty elections, it was enlirely possible that another front would open up within 
the larger Macedonian Qucstion. Albaniaııs in Maccdonia creatcd thcii' own political 
parti es in ı 99 ı-199:2. Suddcııly, the futurc of Maccdoııia as an iııdcpcııclcııt s ta tc or a 
republic within a refom1ed Yugoslav Federation was also institutioııally clependent on the 
will of the Albanians that pretended to be 40 percent of the population. Thus, not only did 
the end of the Cold War anel the break up ofYugoslavia bring about a regeneration of the 
old rivalries between Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and theoretically Albania, but they also 
created a new dimension of the Macedonian Question: what woulcl be the impact of 
Albanian-Macedonian relations in the new state building process?227 
In 1991, both dimensions of the Macedonian question proved to be crucially 
important for the state building process. First, the future of Macedonia became very 
uncertain with the retum of the old rivalries. Although neither Bulgaria nor Greece openly 
223 For a Serbian point ofview see N ina Dobrkovic" Yugoslavia and Macedonia in the years 1991-6: 
from Brotherhood to Neighborhood" in The New Macedonian Question, ed. James Pettifer, (London: Palgr 
ave, 2001), pp.79- 96. 
224 For a Greek point of view see Evangolos Ko fos " Greck Policy considerations over FYROM 
lndependcncc and recognition" in The New Macedonian Question, ed. James Pettifer, (London: Paı-grave, 
2001), pp. 226-263. 
225 Fof a Bulgarian point of view see Milcna Mahon "The Macedonian Qucstion in Bulgaria", Nations 
and Nationalism 4(3) (! 998): pp.389-407 
226 Sofia Clement" Fomıer Yugoslav Macedonia, the regional settiııg and European Security: towards 
Balkan Stability" in The New Macedonian Question, ed. James Pettifer (London: Pal gr ave, 2001 ), p.187. 
227 James Pcttifer "The Albanians in Wcstem Macedonia after FYROM lndependence" in James Petifcr, 
ed. The New Macedonian Question, ed. James Pettifer (London: Pal gr ave, 2001 ), p.32. 
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advocated for their old positions, their policies deeply endangered the further existence of 
the Macedonian State. Let us look at the reaction of Macedonia's neighbors to its 
independence. We know that Macedonia was the only Yugoslav republic that achieved 
independence without bloodshed in 1991. This small republic gained even the 
"consensus" of Milosevic in i ts way towards independence since the latter di d not put up a 
fight. 
lt seems that Milosevic accepted the Macedonian independence for a variety of 
reasons. Perhaps he was too "busy" with the other republics: Slovenia, Croatia, and 
especially Bosnia. Another important reason could have been the fact that an independent 
Macedonia would inevitably be a weak state and given its large Albanian presence, an 
alliance and even a future union with Serbia could not be ruled out. Although Serbia did 
not resort to the use of force, it openly displayed its opposition to the Macedonian move as 
well as its desire to win back Macedonia. Besides public demands to open up the southem 
front (Kosovo and Macedonia) Serbia also relied on the Serbian minority in Macedonia 
(30 000 according to Skopje and 300 000 according to Belgrade) who influenced by the 
political cliınate in Serbia asked for a referendum on joining the Yugoslav Federal 
Republic. Although Belgrade did not react militarily, it neither recognized nor clearly 
opposed the Macedonian independence. Serbian president Slobodan Milocevic was 
visibly reluctant to offer Macedonia explicit assurance of i ts territorial integrity. Further 
Serbia did not extent fonnal diplomatic recognition to Macedonia until April 18, 1996.m 
"' Fabian Slınıidt ''Enenıics Far and Near: Maccdonia's Fragile Stability" Prob/ems qf Post-Commımism vol 
45. 199X): p.27. 
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This ıneant that' if Macedonia could not survive on its own the union with the Federal 
Yugoslavia reınained a viable option. 
Un til the end of 1995, Ruınp Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) viewed the 
Macedonian border ınerely as adıninistrative, rather than as an international one. At the 
same time Belgrade in order to underınine the existence of the newly independent 
Macedonia either started or supported diploınatic ınoves to this purpose. During the spring 
of 1991, bilateral talks on Macedonia between Serbia and Greece, and Serbia and Bulgaria 
were held that resulted on joint stateıncnts that "only Serbs, Bulgarians and Grecks li ve in 
Macedonia", i.e., there was ho "Macedonian nation".229 Greece on its part declined to 
recognize Macedoııia, conditioniııg its rccognition of the new statc wltlı the change of ils 
name. In a sim i lar move to that of Scrbia, Grcccc tricd to mobilize similar stances agaiııst 
an independent Macedonia. According to ex-President Gligorov, Serbia and Greece often 
conıbined their efforts against an independent Macedonia. 
"W e have closcly followcu the Grcck intcrcsts agaiııst the cxistcııcc of an 
independent Macedonia. Micotaqis initiated a meeting of the countries that 
were signatorics of the Bucharcst agrccıncnt in ordcr to discuss the futurc of 
Macedonia. There have been two or three attempts, one coming directly from 
Milosevic and another from Jovic, suggesting to us that for the sake of Balkan 
peace and a prosperous future we need to create the Athens-Skopje-Belgrade 
axis.''230 
Bulgaria, who had traditionally viewed Macedonia as Westem Bulgaria, altlıouglı 
ın ınany cases it joined Serbian and Greek initiatives, recognized the new state of 
Macedonia, but not a Macedonian nation. lt seeıns that Bulgaria viewed an independent 
Macedonia as a "buffer state" against Serbia. The only neighbor that recognized the 
229 Bumci, p.37. 
230
, All the Apocalyptic Scenarios, Skopje- Center for Strategic Research and Documentation ( 2000 ), p.6 
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' independence of Macedonia unconditionally was Albania despite the prevailing belief that 
this country was very interested in the dissolution of Macedonia. In fact, Albania broke 
the Greek blockade against Macedonia securing an alternative corridor to the collapsing 
Macedonian econoıny. 
The Albanian stance could, to a certain extent, be also attributed to realpolitik 
considerations. Albania viewed Macedonia as a buffer zone against Serbia and Greece, 
two countries whose relations with Albania were not too friendly.231 However, there were 
two other factors that influenced Albania's policy. First, different from the ex-Yugoslav 
republics, in Albania the fall of comınunism did not bring about a resurgence of 
nationalisı feelings for that which Albanians have historically called the "unsolved 
Albanian question." In Albania, no political party or governınent has been able to 
mobilize society by appealing to its nationalisı consciousness. Second, the capabilities of 
the country to back up a ınore aggressive policy were alınost zero. The country's 
development was entirely dependent on foreign aid and thus the Albanian governınent 
supported Western policies on Macedonia wholeheartedly. 
5.4. THE MORPHOLOGY OF NA TION STATE BUILDING 
Macedonia represents one of the rare cases in history where state building and 
nation building start from the same point in time. Thus, it eludes the historical paradigı11 in 
which the state is created before nation building has begnn or vi ce versa, mature national 
:m Bibcraj, Elcz, Albania in Transition: Tlıe Rocky road to Dcmocrct(l',( New York~ \Vcstvicw Press, 199R), 
p.68. 
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' consciousness has led to a state as a hometand for the nation. For example, the creation of 
Germany and Italy in 1861 and 1870 was based on the national identity ofa people united 
by common language and culture that were different from surraunding peoples' languages 
and cultures. Moreover, the statehood of these two ıiations was facilitated by small states 
(Prussia and Piedmont) that !ed the quest for the formation of a national consciousness 
and statehood. On the other hand, Macedonia is a rare example of a case study where 
components of the nation and territory are claiıned by i ts neighbors. 
Ottoman Macedonia was made up of a number of different identities. Largely 
considered as a transit area, the people living in it claimed Greek, Bulgarian or Serbian 
national identities. S ince most of the rural masses of the population had not yet developed 
a defınite national identity for many observers of that period, this rural Macedonia was 
therefore malleable and could accept any of the three dominant Balkan National identities 
based on Orthodoxy (Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian).232 
Until the cnd of WWII, gcographic Maccdonia rcnıaincd a transit arca carvcd up 
between its neighbors, where different identities clashed with each other. Once the 
Maccdonian Rcpublic was recognized us a component of the Yugoslav Federation, the 
only part of Macedonia that started developing i ts national and state building processes 
was the part that was handed to Serbia after the Balkan Wars. 
232
, George Prevelakis, "'The Return of the Macedonian Qucstion", in The Changing Shape o.ftlıe Balkans, 
H. Cartcr and T. Norris, cds,( Londonl996), p.l40 
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In the history of national state building, cases where the territory and the national identity 
( ethnicity, language, culture) are contested and claimed by other nations are hard to fınd. 
The creation and existence of such a state has always been questioned and, ınore often 
than not, the most probable option for Macedonia has been a division between its 
neighbors.233 Kiro Gligorov the fırst President of FYROM explained the diffıculties that 
the extemal environment and the claims of its neighbors presented for the nation state 
building process. 
"A state was bom which in a way came up as an "illegitiınate child". Everybody 
believed that the Macedonian issue after the Balkan wars of 1913 had been 
definitely resolved and that according to the Bucharest Agreement everybody had 
a right to the territory that they had adjoined, to call the Macedonian people its 
own. This is what happened with Greece Bulgaria and Albania. In Serbia in the 
Kingdoru of Yugoslavia they acted identically, declaring us to be Southem Serbs, 
with no rights to create, something that would signify some kind of cultural mark 
of our people"234 
Although the Macedonian state idea has been present much earlier, (the IMRO 
movement) i ts projection in reality was diffıcult because of the ethnic mix of Macedonia 
and the challenge to i ts national identity by i ts neighbors. Thus, Tito' s policy of 
combining the Macedonian state idea with the idea of a Macedonian nation was bascd on 
an attempt to create a Macedonian national identity. In this context, a Macedonian 
iconography and a Macedonian Autocephalous Orthodox Church were established.235 The 
selection of the Bitola-V el es dialect as the foundation of a Macedonian language was 
aimed at making that language different from Bulgarian. A Macedonian literature was 
233 One suchoption was rebom after the end of the Cold W ar and the demise of the Yugosla~ Federation 
and, more recently, during the conflict between the National Libenition Army and Macedonian govemıneni 
forces in 2001. 
234 Eleonora Karanfılovska All the Apocaf.ıptic Scenarios, lnterview with Fonner President Gligorov. 
Center for Strategie Research and Documentation, April 2000), p. 5. 
235 Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia refused to reeognize The Macedonian Autocephalous Ortlıodox Church 
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' 
created and Macedonian history was rewritten in order to strengtlıen national identity. The 
authorities championed the establishment of the Republic of Macedol)ia as a "fina! 
settlement of the Macedonian National Question."236 Thus, while Yugoslavia seemed to 
achieve its aims, Greece aıid Bulgaria remained discontented "prisoners" of the new 
realities of the Cold W ar. 
It seemed as if the process of nation state building was anchored in its traditional 
ideology: nationalism. However, Macedonian nationalism was created and controlled by 
Belgrade. The development of a Macedonian national identity was the only way to bring 
about a Macedonian entity. But, Tito's "Brastvo i Jedinstvo" (Brotherhood and Unity) 
policies aimed at creating a Yugoslav identity and thus swept under the rug all national 
question including the Macedortian one. It was on these shaky foundations that a 
Macedonian state was created as one of the six republics of the Yugos!av Federation. 
From the donıestic perspective the entire nation state building was based on the 
ethnic concept, which, in the case of multiethnic Macedonia, was contested by different 
neighbors. For about a half century Macedonia existed as a nation state while its 
population was very muclı cthııically nıixcd. Other than the Albaııian cthnic group of 22 
percent according to the last Macedonian Goveınment census (although according to 
Albaııians, their proportion is much lıigher) other ethnic groups such as Serbs, Roma, 
236Jens Reuter'" Policy and Econoıny in Maccdonia/' in James Pctifcr, cd. The Nc•w Macedonian Question, 
ed. James Pettifer (London: Palgrave, 2001 ), p.36 . 
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' Muslim (Torbesh) and Turks li ve in the country. 237 The roots of the present Macedonian 
conflict are found exactly in the morphology of the nation state building process that 
started to be implemented after WWII. Now, Macedonia has come back to the 
fundamentals of this process by declaring that its objective is "to create a nation of 
citizens"238 after five decades ofbasing its state building processona solely ethnic basis. 
For a long time, the "turtle shell" of the Yugoslav state preserved the nation state 
building process in Macedonia. However, its fall in 1990 uncovered the fearful gap 
between the two main ethnic groups: Macedonians and Albanians. In the midst of 
Macedonian enthusiasm for the independence of the new state, there existed the real 
possibility of a possible violent comeback of the national questions that boiled under the 
surface. 
In the case of Macedonia - but also in Bosnia - ethnic resentments were just as 
deep and whose viability as a state was also suspect. A lack of confidence in their 
statehood, which Macedonia and Bosnia shared from the outset, had united their 
Presidents in a last-ditch effort to save some sort of Yugoslav federation or 
Confederation239 
237 Hugh Poulton, The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conjlict, (London: Minority Rights Publications, 
ı 99 ı), p.56. . 
238 Ljubomir Frchkovski "All the Apoca/yptic Scenarios," (Skopje- Center for Strategic Research and 
Documentation. April 2000), p.4 1. 
239 Dana Allin, Nato 's Balkan /ntenentions, ( London Institute of Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper 
No.347,2002), p.24. 
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5.5. ALBANIAN AND MACEDONIANS BIDLDING A SECURITY 
DILEMMA 
The post-WWII accommodation of the Macedonian Question as a republic: within 
the Yugoslav Federation gave renewed vigor to the state building process. This process 
was helped by the frozen histoncal rivalries of Greece and Bulgaria. On the.other hami, 
Serbia, who viewed the new Republic as i ts own creation and dependent on it- until ı 990 
the Macedonian economy was the weakest of all Yugoslav republics and it was 
completely dependent on the Yugoslav market - was happy with the status quo. 
Macedonia's moves towards independence in 1991 were viewed asa betrayal. The mood 
prevalent in Serbia at the time was that Macedonia could not get its independence since 
the status that it already enjoyed was simply a gift of Yugoslavia and especially Serbia. 
From the economic point of view, the development of infrastructure and industry 
also helped the state building process. The liberal elements in Tito's regime created 
enough scope for economic development. Although i ts economy was the poorest of all 
Yugoslav republics - although it was better off than Kosovo - Macedonia was 
incomparably better off than Albania.However, state making dynaınics of that time in 
Macedonia were responsible for the creation of its modern security dileınına. Not only 
was the nation-state building process unablc to unitc Maccdoııia's disparatc cthııic groups, 
but also it actually exasperated the long-tern1 gap between theın. The geographic division 
of the country along etlınic lines facilitates this. Albanians li ve mainly in the Western part, 
along the border with Kosovo and Albania. Both coınınunities converge in Skopje, the 
capital of Macedonia, where the population is roughly divided in two nuınerically equal 
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ethnic groups. Historically, the two groups have coexisted relatively peacefully thanks to 
Yugoslav policies and the protective ideological shell provided by Tito's regime. Violent 
clashes were rare and far between. The fırst one occurred in 1 960 after the fall of 
Rankovic and the second one occurred in 1981 after Tito's death. In the fırst case, 
Albanians requested to unite their lands with Kosovo in an attempt to create a seventh 
Yugoslav republic. On the other hand, the 1981 demonstrations were but an appendage to 
the clashes that were occurring in Kosovo.These clashes proved that, despite the relative 
calm, discontent was raging under the surface and it would explode on the fırst 
opportunity possible. The state building process had created a parallel security dilemma 
for the Albanian ethnicity in Macedonia. 
From the very beginning, the Republic ofMacedonia began to function asa nation 
state within Federal Yugoslavia although a substantial part ofits population was Albanian. 
"S ta te and party institutions all reflected and were part of the na tion building process."240 
Albanians were Ieft out of the decision-making processes in the republic and were viewed 
as second-class citizens. The representation of the Albanian population in the Communist 
League ofMacedonia and in the state administration was insignifıcant. In 1959 Albanians 
and Turks put together represented 2,29 % of the party membership and until 1959 no 
Albanian or Turk was elected in the executive coınmittee of the Party. 241 
Albanian demands to participate in the decision making process were perceived by 
the Macedonians as undennining their control of the state institutions. Although in its 
240 Hugh Poulton, Who are the Macedonians?,( LondOJı- Hurst & Company ,2000 ), p.ll6. 
241 Blumi, lsa. "The Question ofldentity, Diplomacy and Albanians in Maccdonia", International Journal of 
Albanian Studies; http://www .albanian.coın/IJAS/vol 1 /is/art4.htnıl. 
ıso 
' constitution Macedonia was deseribed as "the state of Macedonians and of the Albanian 
and Turkish minority", Macedonian political culture treats Macedonia as a na tion state 
that does not allow for the participation of the Albanians.A syınbolic number of Albanians 
could be found in the state administration for the sake of the "brotherhood and unity" 
principle?42 
From the death of Tito in 1980 until the end of the eighties, a process of national 
consolidation was taking place within all Yugoslav Republics. For example, in Macedonia 
it meant introduction of the Macedonian language, as the only state language in the 
territory of Macedonia, unlike the previous situation when the Albanian language had a 
similar status in the parts where the majority were Albanians. The institutions for high 
education of the Albanians were curtailed and economic measures were undertaken to 
reduce the exceptionally high Albanian birth rate.243 After Macedonia's recognition as an 
independent state, this tradition was continued. Thus, after the dissolution of the old 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), Macedonia had to establish its own independent 
state institutions in the same fashion as the ex-Soviet republics had to do vis a vis the 
Soviet Union. However, in the last ten years, not only did Macedonia build institutions 
that were independent of the FR Y but they w ere bui! d independent of the will of the 
Albanians that pretend to constitute 40 percent of the popula tion. 
Although during the last decadc the Alhaııiaııs' conditions with rcgard to cducation 
and representation in the public administration were· improved as compared to the 
242 Bumçi, p.32 ~ 
243 Miıjana Ma1eska, "The Power of History and Re1igion over Human Hearts 11 , New Balican Politics Journal 
of politics Voll (2000): p. 117. 
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coınmunist era, it can be argued that the improvement came about not as a result of good 
will on the part of Macedonians, but rather due to the democratic changes that swept over 
the entire region. 
The Macedonian regime of 1992 was certainly very different from that of 
Miloscvic. The core diffcrcncc bctween the two rcgiınes is the llıct that the Scrbian state 
model operated within an authoritarian regime, whereas the Macedonian state was a poor 
imitatian of the Serbian one since Macedonia was a democracy after all, although a 
distorted one .The presence of Albanian minisıers in the cabinets provided a stark contrast 
with the cabinets during the time of Federal Yugoslavia. However, it was used to cover up 
the national character of the Macedonian state and portray it asa multi ethnic state.244 
The conflict that broke out in sp ring 2001 tore up the multi ethnic ve il of the state 
that had been constructed by Macedonian authorities and praised by the international 
coınmunity, revealing some of the inner workings of the Macedonian State. The control of 
the state, and all the security structures were in the hands of the Macedonians. The arıny, 
the police and other security forces were almost enlirely composed of Macedonians. All 
post 1992 Goverument have had some Albanian representation although generally in 
tokenistic positions often as Assistant Ministers.245 The decisions to crush the rebellion 
by force indicated that the Albanians, although present in goverument and parliament, 
244 Allıert Rakipi, "The wcak states a new dynamics of sccurity.H In .Democracy and Security, ,ed. Allıert 
Rakipi ( Tirana- Albanian Institute of International Studies , 1999): jı. ı 6. 
245 James Pettifer "The Albanians in Westem Macedonia" in. The New Macedonian Question. ed. James 
Pettifer (London: Palgrave, 2001), p. 36 
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were not being consulted or included in the decision making process. The media as well as 
other elites reflected the deep division between the two ethnic groups. 
It is diffıcult to sustain that the security dileroma between the two ethnic groups in 
Macedonia is inevitable since they represent different civi!izations, cultures and religions. 
Both ethnic groups for different reasons perceive each other as possible threats. The 
Macedonians that have built their state as a nation state perceive Albanian demands as a 
menace to their control of the state. Albanians on the other hand do not feel included in 
the state institutions and their sense of insecurity pushes them to demand autonomous 
protection. Macedonian Albanians assert that they were discriminated against in hiring for 
government jobs and that, in areas where Albanians made up 80 percent of the population, 
the Police Force is 97 per cent ethnic-Macedonian. According to Albanian Demecratic 
Party, only two out of 400 employees of the Ministry of Labour, Urban Affaires and 
Finance, were ethnic Albanians, only one in the Ministry of Culture while none were 
working in the Ministry of Foreign Affaires?46 This mentality of exclusion of Albanians 
from state institutions has created the security dileroma in today's Macedonia. 
The ethnic composition of governments and the public administrations of the fırst 
decade since independence prove that the state in Macedonia was representing only a 
segment of society. That is the basic criteria of the weakness of the Macedonian state. The 
roots of this security dilcmıııa should be souglıt in the model of the statc that continucd to 
be applied when Macedonia became independent, a model that was not very different 
246 Zidas Daskalovski "The right to re bel: The Nation Übcration Army and the Maccdonian erises of2001" 
Romanian Journal of International Studies 124 (2004): p.52. · 
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from the one in the Yugoslav Federation. While it is true that the Macedonian model of a 
multiethnic state was not the same as the Serbian one it is probably true to say that it was 
its poor imitation. The state that has beenbuilt during the last ten years in Macedonia is 
not a civil but a nation state whose future Jies in the demination of one nation over the 
others. Thus, the new state was not founded on citizenship buton nationality. The absence 
of politicallegitimacy was the number one cause of the weakness of state institutions and 
the start of anned conflict. 
5.6.DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY DILEMMA 
After the 1991 Declaration of Independence and the establisluneııt of political 
pluralism, the socio-political conditions of Albanians in Macedonia improved slowly. 
According to official Macedonian sources, Albanians enjoyed increased access to 
education and employment in the public service up to the start of the 2001 conflict. Thus, 
the percentage of Albanians in public administration increased from 3.5 percent in 1993, 
to 8.3 percent in 1997 and 10.2 percent by the time the conflict started. In education, the 
University of Skopje started enrolling more Albanian students.247 But, these fıgures alone 
may paint a distorted picture of the real inclusion of Albanians in pub!ic administration 
and employment. The eınployment and university enrollment fıgures are not compared to 
the proportion of Albanians in Macedonia. Its usefulness is comparable to the stateınent of 
the Albanian Govenunent that energy supply increased by 2.5 percent in the 1998-2002 
periods. Given the low starting base - in 1998 the Albanian State ensured 6-8 hours per 
2.
47 Civi1 Service Agency, Infromation on the Personnel Structure of the State Administratlon in Macedonia 
based on Nationality. (Skopje, July 2001 ),p. 14. 
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' day of energy supply for its citizens - the fıgure suddenly seems to illustrate failure rather 
than achievement. Arber Xhaferri, one of the main political leaders of the Albanian 
community in Macedonia, claims that only 3 percent of Albanians are employed in the 
public administration, armed forces, security structures and the justice system?48 Bul, he 
does not negate that the relative position of Albanians has improved. Offıcial fıgures are 
contested by Albanians and often by third sources as well. In some areas, the figures are 
simply catching-up with the quotas that were valid when Macedonia was a Yugoslav 
republic. Finally, the changes are occurring as a consequence of the change in the nature 
of the regime rather than because of the desire of the Macedonians to improve the 
situation. Albanians are now represented by two main po!itical parties, the Party for 
Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) which are 
partners of LSD M and IMRO. 
During the Yugoslav regime, Albanian membership in the Coınmunist Party was 
very low and it was m uc h lower in i ts leading organs. In 1981, Albanians made up only 
6.49 percent of the membership of the League of Communists as opposed to 19.3 percent 
of the membership that was made up by Serbs. At the same time, Serbs made up only 
4.88 percent of the population ofMacedonia249 or four times less than the Albanians 
During the last ten years of the existence of independent Macedonia, Albanians 
have created several political parti es but their political scene tıntil 2001 has bed dominated 
by PDP and PDA. Although Albanian political institu.tions do not have a proportional 
24
' lnterview with Arben Xhaferri, Chairnıan of The Denıocratic Party of Albanians (DPA). 
249 Hugh Poulton, The Balkans- Minprities and States in Conj/ict (London-! Minority Riglıts, Publication , 
1993), p. 85. 
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' voice in the decision-making process, their very existence within the system has improved 
the institutional standing of the Albanian comrnunity. Albanian political actions w i thin the 
framework of the Mac.edonian system have brought about positive results. So, assuming 
that progress has been made, why did an unprecedented conflict between the two 
ethnicities explode in Macedonia? The conflict that started in the spring of 2001 between 
govemrnent forces and the National Liberation Army (NLA) was an interethnic conflict 
that almost turned into Civil W ar. During the Tito era, despite the deplorable conditions in 
whlch Albanians lived especially in Rankovic' s heyday, an armed insurrection was 
unthlnkable. Does this mean that democracy acts as a destabilizing factor during the 
transition period from authoritarian to liberal democratic regimes? Superfıcially, this view 
may seeın to be correct, especially for multicthnic states. The introduction of political 
pluralisın opens up maneuvering room for oppressed ethnic groups and autoınatically 
improves the ir position vis-iı-vis the statc. Y ct at the same time, dcmocratization opcns up 
the possibility for separatist feelings to be strengthened. Previously oppressed ethnic 
groups may use thcir ncwly won brcathing space to push for morc conccssions up to and 
including the creation of a new hoıneland. In ethnically divided societies, democratization 
providcs competing groups mcans and opportunitics to mobilize against cach other that 
they never had before250 
250 Bemard Jack "Nationalism, Popular Sovereignty and the liberal demoeratic state", in T. V Paul, G, Jo/ın 
Ikenbeny and John Hall eds., The Narian State in Question (New Jersey ~Princeton University Press 
2003.), p. 30 
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Mansfıeld and Snyder have noted that the initial stage of demoeratizatioıı is 
extreınely dangerous at the initial stage. 251 Based in these coııditions other authors arg11es 
than democracy is more the problem than the answer to the probleın252 
However, eınpirical evideııce prolicd that liberal democracy provides us with the 
solution of the problem eveıı if it had a lıaııd in creating tlıcm.253 One can bring a 
modest evidence form the Macedonian case The leadership of the Albanian fıghters 
declared repeatedly that their political aim was not the division of Macedonia, but a 
Macedonian state that reflected the multiethnic nature of its population. However, there 
existed the possibility of a ınilitary escalation, a hardening of attitudes and of the 
frontlines, thus causing the de facto partitioning of the country. As a matter of fa ct, during 
the confrontation between the NLA and the Macedonian arıny, the frontlines roughly 
divided the territory of Macedonia along ethnic lines. The conflict caıne very close to 
escalating into a Civil War where the fıghting would have crossed into areas such as 
Skopje, where the ethnicities lived together and boundaries were impossible to be 
determined. However, even a cursory look at the Ohrid Agreeınent that brought an end to 
the internal conflict between Albanians and the Macedonian govemınent illustrates the 
idea of deınocracy as a solution to competing nationalisıns. The fraınework agreement 
outlines the ways in which hostilities will cease, the political status of Albanians will be 
strengthened, cultural and language issues of Albanians will be siılved and the 
251 See Edward Mansfıeld and Jack Snyder," Dcmocratization and the Danger of W ar,"' International 
Security, 20, (1995.): p.134. 
252 Donald Horowitz," self-Deteiınination: Politics, Philosophy, and law" in lan Shapiro and Will 
Kymlicka,eds, Ethnicity and Group Rights, (New York: New York University Press,l997), p.451 
253 Bemard Jack "Nationalism, Popular Sovereignty ~nd the liberal democratic state", in T. V Paul, G, John 
/kenbeny and John Hall eds., The Nation State in Question (New Jersey -Princeton University Press 
2003.), p. 31 
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decentralization ~f government will be carried out254- all of them the basic components of 
functioning liberal democracy. 
An arrned insurrection by an ethnic group in a multiethnic state does not mean 
necessarily an attempt at dividing the state in two separate entities. Even when arrned 
movements do not aim to divide the country, their very presence may escalate the 
situation so that an eventual division becomes inevitable. However, the argument that the 
democratization process serves as a destabilizing factor because ethnic groups use 
democratic freedoms in order to advance their political objectives is flawed. Not all 
countries that respect democratic freedoms are functional liberal democracies. The 
situation in multiethnic countries is particularly complex and often problematic. A 
democratic system in transition may open up possibilities for increased representation of 
all etbnic groups in the decision-making process. However, a democratic system may be 
used for the marginalization of etbnic groups as well. As Daniel Byman and Stephen Van 
Evera have pointed out ıninorities ınight fıght because they fear that majority rule would 
install in power a perrnanent elected majority that allows the ıninority no voice in decision 
making.255 
According to soıne of the criteria used to evaluate a deınocratic system, Maccdonia 
appears to be a fragile democracy but with ever healthier institutions, especially in the 
justice system and the freedom and independence of the ınedia. Moreover, all 
254 Pctar Atanasov .. The Progrcss of the Ohrid Process' in Maccdonia"ln, Post- CoJ!flict Relwhilitatiou 
eds, Jean-Jacques de Dardc1, Gustav Gustenau P1amcn Pantcv, ( Yiena and Sofıa 2006), pp. 179-194 
255 See Danic1 Byman and Stephen Van Evera, "Why they fıght? Hypotheses on the causes of Contemporary 
Dcad1y Conflict", Security Studies 7. No.3, Spring ( 1 99R), p.32. 
15~ 
' Macedoniaıı political parties that have come to power in the last ten years have decided to 
build a coalition with Albaııian political parties and have included them in the 
govemment. Thus, Branko Cervenkovski's LSD governedin coalition with PDP between 
1992 and 1998 and Georgievski's IMRO-DPMNE governed with the DPA of Arben 
Xhaferri, the most popular Albaııian politiciaıı in Macedonia, between 1998 and 2002.256 
Except for the 1990 parliamentary elections whiclı did not provide a clear majority and the 
governmcnt was madc up of tcclıııocrats somc of whom wcrc Albanians, in all other 
elections it was possiblc for the Maccdonian parties to govern by theınselves or in alliance 
with sınaller Macedonian parties. Thus, the Macedoniaıı-Albaniaıı governing alliances 
were a result of the good will of the winning Macedonian parties rather than a reality 
enforced by election results. They were perceived as a way to preserve peace and 
coexistence between the two communities. Tlıese alliances, especially in the fırst years 
after Macedonia's independence, have been crucial in preserving peace ata time when the 
country was faced with a number of erises such as the Yugoslav wars and the dangers they 
created for Macedonian security and the Greek blockade. Undoubtedly, the Albanian 
presence in govemment !owered tensions and eased Macedonia' s security concerns. It is 
also responsible for the improvements that occurred in Albanian participation in state 
institutions. 
However, these alliances have largely been used as window-dressing in order to 
hide the uniethnic character of the new Macedonian state. Although with i ts benefıts, the 
256 Afler the 2002 post-erisis elections, a new party, the Union for Democratic Integration (UDI)was invited 
to govern with the Macedonian LSD which won the e]ections. UDI is Jed by the ex-political leader of the 
National Liberation Army, Ali Ahmeti. The UDI victory within the Albanian community showed the extent 
to w hi ch support for the o Ider Albanian political elite has eroded. 
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alliances between the Macedonian and Albanian politica! elites have deeply distorted the 
democratic system. The Macedonian elite has been willing to share with Albanians only 
cabinet posts,257 but not the state itself. Its main institutions are largely directed and. 
staffed by Macedonians. Albanians have not had enough clout in parliament in order to 
strengthen this al!iance throughout state institutions. Their presence in governrnent has 
been simply a gift of Macedonian goodwill. But, the percentage of Albanian seats in 
parliament would have been greater if the Macedonian authorities had not distorted the 
rules of democracy. Thus, the number of Albanian MP in the Macedonian parliament 
would have been greater had it not been for the gerrymandering on part of the Macedonian 
authorities. The number of voters in the Albanian constituencies was almost 1.5 times 
greater than that of the Macedonian constituencies. 258 
In conclusion, although Albanians in post-independence Macedonia have govemed 
together with the Macedonian elites, their voice has barely been heard in the decision 
making process. Consequently, the situation today resembles very much the time of Tito 
when Albanians had neither political parti es nor representation in the leading organs of the 
LCY. The reasons for the defeat of both mainstream Albanian parties PDP and PDA lie 
exactly in their failure to convert co-govemance into a greater acceptance of the Albanians 
by the state. 
:!!l'lEvcn iıı lhı.! lalCSt govcrning al!i:.ıncc, t\Jbaııhuıs have bt.:Cil givcıı ~,;;.ıbiııı:t seat s ur tl SCCt~ndary impuri<IHCC 
such as the M inistry of Labor and Social Work and the M inistry of Agriculture. 
258 Albert Rakipi, The Return of the Maccdonian Question, in Aldo Bumci, ed, "Aibanians in the Balkans",( 
Tirana- Al hanian Institute for International Studies, 2001 .), p. 16 
ır.o 
' In order not to fall in this "trap" of the Macedonian democratic system, a "trap" 
that may continue to exist for as Jong as Macedonians enjoy complete parliamentary 
supremacy, the Albanian political parties have requested "partner nation" status for the 
Albanian ethnic group in Macedonia. This would increase Albanian input in the decision 
making process and would transform the Macedonian state from its present nation-state 
character to a civil state. The present decision making procedures resemble Albania's, 
although Albania is a nation state. In the last decade, the political opposition has had no 
input in the decision-making process and state institutions have been built by the 
goveming party. The difference between the two states stands on the fact that while the 
foundation used for the state building process in Macedonia is ethnicity, in Albania it is 
political or clan membership.This phenomenon has forced the siıbgroup that is excluded 
from real participation in the system to take action outside state iııstitutions by creatiııg 
parallel institutions or by using armed force in order to change the nature of these 
institutions. Therefore, conflicts tend to be solved outside the institutiona:l fraınework, 
often through violence and armed clashes, as was the case in the spring of 2001 in 
Macedonia. 
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CHAPTER 6 
WEAK STATES' FOREIGN POLICY 
Do weak states really have a foreign policy? A long time ago Thucydides said, 
"the strong dowhat they can and the weak suffer what they must259." Modem history has 
not really challenged the observations of Thucydides that foreign policies of the weak are 
governed by the foreign policies of the strong. However, can this rather desperate reality 
lead to the conclusion that weak states do not need foreign policy? The powerlessness of 
the weaker states does not prevent them from entering into relations with other states. 
Even though they may not be capable of making any impact on the conduct of the bigger 
Powers towards them, weak states still try to awaken the interest of these powers, to be 
under the protection, or at least, secure neutrality. 260 On the other hand, again in a real 
world where power determines, it can be said that the big powers too sometimes fınd they 
need the weak states. For instance, during the Cold W ar, with a division into two opposing 
blocs, any attempt of a state, irrespective of its strength, to make the transition from the 
line-up in one bloc to the line-up in the other, never failed to be the focus of attention of 
both superpowers. Ev en more so in a 'liberal world' in terms of the changes introduced by 
international institutions, the vote of a weak state is just as valuable and equal to the vote 
'
59 Quoted from Michael Handel Weak States in the l11ternationa/ System ( London- Frank Cass, 1990), 
e·3 
•
60 Buzan,p.137. 
162 
' or veto of the Big Powers. In this chapter we will strive to provide an answer to the 
question: What does foreign policy do for weak states? What is the behavior of weak 
states in the international rea/m? By providing the answers to the above questions, the 
aim is to give a theoretical view of weak states' foreign policy, in order to facilitate our 
discussion on the role such international institutions as the EU and NA TO could play in 
making weak states stronger. 
6.1. FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY 
Certainly this theoretical ground on weak state foreign policy does not attempt to 
test whether or not the driving force behind the weak states foreign policy is the search for 
security, but how through foreign policy the weak states can contribute to increase their 
security. George Modelski defınes foreign policy as "the system of activities evolved by 
comrnunities for changing the behavior of other states and for adjusting their own 
activities to the international enviroıunent".261 Traditionally this international environment 
has ıneant other states and thcir foreign policy. Foreign policy is rather more broadly 
conceived these days than in early part of twenty century. Now econoınic interactions and 
notjust those bctwccıı states, have beı.:uıııe a ııı:ıjur features ur l'ureigıı pulic/''2 
According to the realist school of International Relations, the primary goal of 
foreign policy is to cıısure state survivul, to prcscrve the tcrritorial integrity of the statc, 
but also to defcııd and dcvclop capacities so that the state itself decides on i ts own fate. 
261 Quoted from Charles W.Kegley, JR and Eugene R. Wittkopf World Politics, Trend and Transformatian 
(New York-Bedford/St .Martin's, 2001) ,p. 54 
262 Michael Nicholson International Relations (London- Palgrave, 2002), p.22. 
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' The international system has no world govemment that can supervise order between states 
via its own mechanisms. However, the Realist account of international relations 
deterınines that insecurity and fear are standing features of international relations, 
irrespective of whether the states are big or smail, powerful or weak. For the realists' 
security is the fundamental interest. Waltz says that in anarchy , security is the highest 
end. Only if survival is assured can states safely seek other such goals as tranquility, profit 
and power263 .For realists, the history of international relations is the history of the Great 
Powers. And if for the Great Powers, security is the primary interest, then, even mo re so 
for the middle sized and naturally the sınaller states, the need to guarantee survival is 
undoubtedly primary. 
The other school of International Relations theories, Liberalism, also views 
national security as an important state goal. At fırst glance, it appears there is a difference, 
for instance, between the neo-realists and the neo-liherals in relation to national security 
as the neo-realists stress security as the top priority, while the neo-liherals believe that 
states devote more attention to economic welfare. But for both schools of thought, the 
international system is anarchic. However, contrary to the thinking of the realists, neo-
liberals think that the anarchical structure of the international system could be reforıned 
through the creation of global institutions. 
263 w ı a tz,p.JIS. 
Stephen Krasner also says, along these tines, "all states share the same minimalist objectives ofpİ·cscrving 
territorial and political integrity. According to Raymond Aron "politics, insofar as it concems.relations 
among states seems to signify simply the survival ofst~tes canfronting the potential threats crcated by the 
existence of other status." Quoted in Joseph Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World 
Politics,".(l998), p. ı 6. 
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According to realists thinkers anarchy has two principal consequences. First, there is little 
room for trust among states. Second, each state must guarantee its own survival since no 
other actor will provide its security.On the opposite end, institutional liberals such as 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye claim that the high !eve! of institutionalization 
significantly dirninishes the effects of anarchy. 
However, from the security perspective it is clear, that by excluding the big 
powers, which make up the category of "the strong," all the other states are incapable of 
guaranteeing their protection on their own. Subsequently, all states, minus the Great 
Powers are obliged to rely on other factors and resources to increase their power, with the 
aim of coping with potential dangers. According to Michael HandeJ264 there are two 
sources of strength: internal and external (Foreign Policy). The internal elements of the 
strength or weakness of a state, according to him, are: geographical data, the area of the 
territory and the nature of the frontiers, material data, for instance the absence or the 
presence of natural resources and industrial capacity (technological development and 
capital) human resources such as the size of the population, ethnic homogeneity and 
social integration ( cohesion and unity) national character and moral e. 
Another component is organizational capabilities such as the structure and the 
stability of political institutions, administrative capabilities, the quality of canımand and 
ınilitary preparedness, the quality of diplomacy and capacity for adoption. While the 
extemal sources of strength are relatioııs with other states .realized through foreign policy. 
The total strength of a state is a combinati~n of these available sources of strength. 
264 Handcl, p. 119. 
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However, Handel suggests that the external sources of strength available are more crucial 
for the weak states and constitute a relatively greater part of the total strength than in the 
case of Great Powers 265 
Although the object of Handel's analysis is the weak state in an international 
perspective, it is obvious that his conclusions on the sources of strength, are, in general, 
valid also for those states that are wcak from the internal pcrspcctivc. lt is uniınaginablc 
that a weak state, from the viewpoint of dornestic capacities, could be strong in 
international policy. In this sense, for all states, minus the Great Powers, foreign policy is 
crucial and constitutes a relatively major part of the overall strength, and automatically, 
this is truc of states that are wcak according to our delinition of statc wcakncss. But, 
irrespective of the conclusion that foreign policy is almost the determining factor also for 
the category of states that are the objective of our discussion, in order to explain and 
understand their foreign policy behavior, it is important to observe what influence the 
domestic 'factors of weakness' have. Although the very division between 'home and 
abroad', domestic and foreign, inside and outside has been brought into question266 our 
argument rest on the proposition that the interp!ay of domestic factors has a direct effect 
on the behavior of weak states in the international arena. 
For our analysis, for a state to be weak or strong from the domestit perspective, 
such elements as geographical data, material data and, partially, human resources which 
Handel defines as internal resources making a state strong from the international 
'"H d 1 . • an c,p.125. 
266 See Christopher Hill, The C/ıanging Politics of Foreign Policy ( London- Palgrave, 2003), pp.! -23. 
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perspective, are not indispensably necessary. For instance, take the case of Switzer!and 
and Albania. Obviously, such components as size of population, territory, national 
resources, and ethnic homogeneity, do not play any first hand role for these states to be 
classified weak or strong from the internal perspective. It is a known fact that Switzerland 
is classified as a strong state, in terms of capacities and effectiveness in domestic realm, 
while Albania, is a typical weak state although both these countries are almost the same 
size in territory and population, and Albania appears even more favored in terms of 
ethnicity, being almost ethnically pure. On the other hand, froın the international 
perspective, both these states are weak. However, to explain and comprehend behavior in 
the foreign policy of Albania, we will see what other factors play a role besides size of 
population, territory or ethnic homogeneity. More concretely, what threatens weak states 
and how do they solve these threats through foreign policy? 
6.2 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF WEAK ST ATE BEHA VIOR 
Handel suggests that it is not always easy in reality to draw a line between strength 
and weakness of a state-from the international perspective. And there is not a satisfactory 
defınition of weak or powerful states, again from the international perspective, so he 
proposes two ideal types of states: weak and strong. This division is not very helpful to 
observe conduct in the foreign policy of the states defined as weak, from the domestic 
perspective. However, within this division, general features of the conduct of states 
defined as weak can be observed from the internal perspective. 
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The general division itself into weak and strong, suggest that weak states in the domestic 
perspective are the fırst that should be grouped in the category: "weak" vis-iı-vis the 
"strong" category which includes states perceived as having the status ofbig powers. 
By excluding the big powers, the rest of the states constitute a very b road category which 
could include micro states, tiny states, small powers, middle powers or otherwise all states 
minus the Great Powers. Although not in every case, the behavior of a sub-category is the 
same as the behavior of another category. Within the "weak" division, there are obviously 
many common features. 
Jeanne Hel67 says that research on small states behavior coincided with that on 
the behavior of small states, which, she claims, are also valid for weak states. According 
to her, small states tend to: 
Exhibit a low !eve! of participation in world affairs, address a narrow scope, of foreign 
policy issues, limit their behavior to their imrnediate geographic arena, employ diplomatic 
and economic foreign policy instruments, as opposed to military instruınents, eınphasize 
international principlcs, international Law and other "ınorally ıninded" idcals, seeuro 
multinational agreeınents and join multinational institutions whenever possible, choose 
neutral positions, rely on superpowers for protection, partnerships, and resourees, aiın to 
cooperate and to avoid conflict with others, spend a disproportionate aınouıil of foreign 
policy resources on ensuring physical and political security and survival. 269 
As the majority of states today are smal! the above features are, to a certain extent, 
valid for all categories of states min us the big powers- irrespective of how and from w hi ch 
viewpoint we defıne them. These features are also valid for the object of oiır study: states 
that are weak from the viewpoint of capacities in domestic politics.However, irrespective 
267 Jeanne Hey, Smail States in World Politics (London: Boulder, 2003), p. 45 
268 . Hey, p.4. 
269 Hey, pp 4-7 
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of a general trend of behavior which all states reflect, minus the Big Powers, there exist 
differences which could be fundamental. Especially when we analyze states defıned as 
weak in relation to the !eve! of the implementation of internal policies, domestic capacities 
and public goods which they should o ffer the citizens. · As the ultimately aim of Foreign 
policy is strictly security270 the almost coınpletely different agenda of security control 
and doıninate the behavior in foreign policy .More concretely, do Luxeınbourg and 
Albania have the same behavior in foreign policy? Both these states are smail, both 
could be classifıed in the "weak" group, vis-it-vis the "strong" group which includes the 
big powers. Luxembourg is a strong state in the domestic realm, in other words a state that 
functions properly and is effective vis-it-vis its citizens, whilst Albania, on the other hand, 
is a weak state in the domestic realın with weak institutions. What relevance does this 
difference have in behavior in foreign policy? 
6.3 THE SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT AGENDA OF WEAK 
STATES 
As far as traditional security threats are concemed, the conduct of weak states in 
foreign policy does not, in general, appear to differ from that of smail states. According to 
Handel/71 the general trend for all states that are far from the status of the bigger powers 
from a systeınic perspective is the search for alliances fonnal or informal to be ab! e to 
address security threats. As a matter of fact, this is a traditional instruınent of addressing 
security concems-mostly threats from other countries. 
27° Karen Smith, The making of EV Foreign Policy.( London- Palgrave 2004), pp.J-17 
271 Handel, p.267 
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Given the traditlonal perceptions of insecurity, alliances with other states were seen as a 
means. of augmenting one's strength in the international system while decreasing the 
number of potential foes. But, as Buzan argues, with the end of the Cold W ar the domestic 
level of security became more prominent even in international relations because of the 
problems of internal instability.272 Alliances with other countries cannot bring law and 
order within weak states. That is, alliances cannot increase a weak state's security in the 
way it has been traditionally conceived. As we have already mentioned, weak states are 
often, but not necessarily, small states. Consequently, the behavior of weak states in the 
international realm is similar, but not identical to the behavior of small states that are 
weak powers from the point of view of hard security. In this regard, the expectations :;ıre 
the same: weak states and small states use foreign policy in order to ensure their security 
against threats from outside. 
The two main streams oflnternational Relations theories - Liberalism and Realism 
-differ only in the way these states use their foreign policy. According to realism, weak 
states aim to ally theınselves with strong states within a subsystem or, if they are lucky, 
with strong states in the international system. On the other hand, liberals argue that weak 
states look for their security by seeking to gain membership in international organizations, 
such as the League of Nations or the United Nations. Meınberslıip in these organizations 
gives theın a voice in international affaires that exceeds their actual power. Also, they 
272 Barry Suzan Ol c Waer Regions and Po w ers, the Structure of International Sccurity (Cambridge-
University Press, 2003), p.I45 
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seek to strengthen these organizations because they provide for an orderly arrangement of 
the international community and limit the maneuverability of stronger states. 273 . 
However, differently from small states that are strong in tenns of doınestic 
capacities, the internal instability of weak states may be projected on their neighbors. 
According lo Miclıucl Handel ( 1 990), w hile llıc main clıaraclcrislic of slrong powcrs is 
their military strength and their capacity to project their power on the international system, 
weak states are mainly concerned with their survival. They have difficulty in defending 
themselves against the Great and middle powers, against a coalition of weak states or even 
against a single weak state.274 
As we have already mentioned, Handel analyzes weak states from an international 
perspective. Clear!y, from this perspective all smail states are weak regardless of their 
strength in the domestic realm. But, the subject of our study, the foreign policy of weak 
states that are classifıed as such in terms of their domestic capacities, differs from 
Handel's. The foreign policy dynamics of Albania, a small and weak state in terms of 
domestic capacities, and a smail and strong state !ike Slovenia carınot be assumed to be 
identical. 
One important element that must be taken into consideration when we study the 
foreign policy of weak states is the nature of the international system. For instance, the 
behavior of weak states during the Cold W ar differs from that reflected in the period 
273 David Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd & John Redmond International Organization in world Politics ( London-
Palgrave, 2004), p.ll7 
274 Handel, p.264. 
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between the two 'World Wars and is most certainly different again in the post Cold W ar 
enviromnent. 
In general, in a multi-polar system, weak states tend to be at risk yet have some 
manenvering space. A set of circumstances of rivalry between stronger states allows them 
to choose from different foreign policy options-however, they cannot control the 
onteome of great power interaction on their own security. The case of Albania is a typical 
illustration of this argument. For example the Ambassadors Conference of the Great 
Powers of Europe supported the creation of an independent Albanian state within its 
present borders (ı 6 December ı 9 ı 2) as a compromise for the divergent approaches taken 
by the Great Powers vis-it-vis the Albanian question.275 
Y et, in different circumstances, but within the same nature of the international 
system, the Albanian state seriously found itself in jeopardy. So during the First World 
W ar, Albania became a transit route for the armies of the warring powers, including those 
of the neighboring countries, among which quite a few were planning to remain in 
occupation of the country whose existence was placed in jeopardy from the day of its 
inception. So much so, that Italy declared on 3 June 1917 "the unity and independence of 
all Albania under the aegis and protection of the Kingdoru of Italy". 276 • As we have 
mention ed in the first chapter, the nature of the international system during the Co id W ar 
allowed the weak, and in fact not only the weak states, to have very little ınaneuverability 
275 The motives behind the support that Austria-Hungary and, to a lesser extent, ltaly, gave to the creation 
of the independent Albanian state, sprung from fears ofSerbia's expansion to the Adriatic Sea. Though 
Austria-Hungary advocated the creation of Greater Albania, corresponding with territory inhabited by an 
Albanian majority with Kosovo and Westem Macedonia, Russia vehemently opposed the plan. See Stavro 
Skendi Albania East -Central Europe ımder the Coniimmists ( London : Atlantic Press, I 957), p.9 
'
76 Sk d' • en ı, p.l I. 
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, 
in foreign policy. The division of the world into two opposing blocs imposed state 
alliances vis-it-vis the two superpowers. Therefore states that did not become involved in 
the non-aligned movement belonged to either the eastem or the westem bl oc. 
The post Cold War environment is quite the contrary since it creates far more 
maneuvering space for weak states. This is a new relation of states, including weak ones, 
in which their security or lack of security is not defined by rivalry between the big powers. 
Irrespective of this, the above observations on the behavior of weak states in foreign 
policy, generally confırrn the realist account of international relations where the nature of 
internal regimes, whether liberal democratic, authoritarian or totalitarian is of relatively 
little significance. However, in the post Cold W ar environment-the nature of the internal 
regime of a state is a major delennining variable on the behavior of all states including the 
weak one in the international realm. 
In the traditional conccpt of security which regards threats to states only or al most 
from outside of the security-foreign policy relationship, all categories of states minus the 
big powers have to enter into alliances with other states to cope with the perils that could 
potentially come from abroad. Here, it is not just the states considcrcd as wcak from their 
!eve! of effectiveness and the implementation of doınestic refonns, but this category is the 
first that must be involved in such a dynamic. 
But however, in the case of the weak states there is a fundamental feature that 
should be taken into consideration in the secu,rity-foreign policy relationship. This feature 
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' is that weak states are threatened from within. Historically, a not too stnall number of new 
states w hi ch began to be registered on the world' s political map, particularly in two 
periods, such as the post-colonial period or the end of the Cold W ar and the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union, were more threatened from inside rather than from outside. In such a 
situation, the question is what role foreign policy can play to address such issues as for 
instance: control of national boundaries, cstablishmcnt of the control of the state over the 
entire territory of the country, the creation and operation of a functional !ega! system, the 
strengthening of state capacities to provide public goods !ike infrastructure, roads 
communication systems, the system of education, health ete. In general, experience 
reveals that weak states try through foreign policy to overcome the lack of political 
legitimacy, which is in fact their essential characteristic.277 It is clear that the only way to 
overcome the lack or the low level-vertical or horizontal-legitimacy78 is to build a 
functional state, something that could never be achieved outside of relations with other 
states.279 Hence the solution of the problems of security via foreign policy too, in fact is 
addressing issues, which means that actually the security agenda for weak states is a 
development agenda. 280 
6.4 THE DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR · 
According to the realist account of International Relations, all states operate in a 
similar manner to defend their interests, including foreign policy. This conclusion emerges 
from the central assumption of realists that the international system anarchicaL Alternative 
277 Kalevi Holsti, The state, war, and the State of W ar,( Cambridge University Press ), p.l 04. 
"'Holsti, p.l05. 
279 Holsti, p.l 06. 
"
0 Holsti., p.l 07. 
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theories of international relations, on the contrary, assume a role is played by other 
factors, such as domestic policies and the nature of regimes, determinants which for 
realists are of second rate importance. Due to the fact that the objective of our study is the 
observation of behavior in the foreign policies of states defıned as weak, in the domestic 
po!icies it is essential to observe, fırst and foremost, those internal factors that generally 
determine foreign policy behavior. 
From all the domestic determinants of states' foreign policy behavior - Geographic 
location, military might, econonıic powers and system of governmenr81 - it is obvious that 
in the case of weak states, only the geographic location and the system of governnıent 
could influence the formulation in a traditional sense. On the other hand, the economic 
and military weaknesses of weak states promote a foreign policy of dependency in search 
of a Big Brother that is willingto provide the weak state with these goods. Foreign policy 
becomes a strategy for spansoring the state's existence and, as such, plays a vital role in 
the state's policies. For example Albania's relations fırst with the Soviet Union and later 
on with the People's Republic of China can be interpreted as purely ideologieal. W ithout 
doubt ideology was decisive for Hoxha' s communist regime in choosing allies. However 
it could be truthfully said that Albania's economic subsistence is dedicated to the 
economic aid and programs of the Soviet Union and China respectively. This rapport of 
dependence was clearly witnessed, when after the disintegration of relations with China, 
the Albanian econoıny was in collapse. The irrelevance of ideology is further underlined 
by the constant search for Big Brothcr sponsoı·ship throughout Albania's cxistcncc 
"
1 Charles W., Kegley, International Events and the Conıparative Analysis of Foreign Policy (Colunıbia, 
South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1 975), p.l76 
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' irrespective of the internal regime: monarchical Albania found Italy, comrnunist Albania 
found Yugoslavia, the USSR and China in that order and post-comrnunist Albania has a 
foreign policy that is ful!y subservient to Western policies on the Balkan region. In the 
Balkans, Albanian foreign policy has foregone traditional strategic aims in order to win 
Western sponsorship and make up for its internal state weaknesses. 
The other detcrminant -ınilitary ıtıight - plays a similar foreign policy role. A 
weak state either refrains from ınilitary adventures or it eınbarks upon brinkınanship in a 
short-term effort to enhance its strength. Generally, foreign policy becoınes a search for 
security through dependency. In our Albanian case-study, the state never fought a single 
international war although it constantly searched for ınilitary aid. In cases where weak 
states are rnilitary regiınes, expenditures on armed forces and security are predoıninant. In 
these cases, the doınination of national expenditures for defense and security and the 
strengthening of military institutions all serve domestic policies, and even for the 
repression of opponents to the regime and to the governrnent. Moreover, these kinds of 
weak states, or other states that are involved in transition processes, national security is 
identified with securing the governrnent and also safeguarding the elite in office alone. 
However, there are also cases when even weak states manage to gain possession of 
nuclear weapons. 282 It appears a paradox that states which in some aspects are classified as 
weak, manage to gain possession of nuclear weapons-but nuclear weapons are a good 
tool for blackmail and brinkınanship in order to achieve security and foreign aid that 
mitigates internal weaknesses. 
282 For example, in the case of lndia and Pakistan, which to a lesser extent could be classified, in one way or 
another, as weak states, whose military might derives frofn the possession of nuclear weapons-and bence it 
is a determining factor in foreign policy. 
1 
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Finally, geographicallocation is a factor that could play an important role in the issues of 
security and of foreign policy of weak states. For example Albania presents one of those 
rare cases whose important geopolitical position in a volatile region has been cause for 
threats to the its political existence, while at the same time serving as casus belli for 
protection. Every strong power that has arisen in the Italian Peninsula has had the 
tendeney to expand into the Balkans by using Albania as a bridgehead. On the other hand, 
whenever a powerful state has emerged in the Balkan Peninsula, it has tended to reach the 
Adriatic cost and use Albania as a springboard for expansion to the West 283 
"' Sk endi., p.l x. 
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CHAPTER7 
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNA Tl O NAL COMMUNITY 
Historically, the weak phenonıcnon has brought alıout the iııtcrvcııtion of strong 
states, and especially the Great powers. This "mentorship" of the Great Powers towards 
weak states has occurred due to the role of the Great powers as main guarantors of global 
pcacc and security. Michael Browıı argucs that this" historical nıcntorship" of the stroııg 
states ıs required to address the regional and international dimension of the internal 
conflict.2g4 
Generally speaking the International Community has been encouraged to intervene 
for the following reasons: 
First, the security problematic that accompanies the failure of a state has been the 
main driving force behind the reaction of Great powers towards weak states; 
Second, the geo-strategic or simply economic interests of individual or a coalition 
of Great powers may have dictated such interventions; 
Third, and most recent, the reasons behind such interventions may be 
humanitarian. 
284 Michael Brown The International Dimension C!f Internal C01if1ict (London- The MIT Press, 2004), p.9 
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' W eak states are unable to fulfıll their security obligations towards their citizens. Thus, 
even when they do not implode in domestic conflicts, their weak existence becomes a 
potential threat that may escalate into a full"blown humanitarian catastrophe for their 
citizens. Other than armed conflict, these disasters include epidemics, environmental 
degradation and extreme poverty. 
Despite the lack of a direct threat on the security of other states or the international 
system, humanitarian catastrophes have powerful, indirect negative effects on security 
matters. This is particularly the case when weak states are located geograp!ıjcally close to 
important states in the international system. The Balkan Peninsula has such a correlation 
vis-a-vis Europe. 
On the other hand, it is clear those Great powers and international organizations 
have intervened to help weak states primarily when security concerns have been primal. 
Furthermore, military interventions have been quicker, more robust and have yielded more 
palpable results when the immediate national interests of at least one of the Great powers 
have dictated such actions. The cases of military interventions dictated solely by 
humanitarian concerns have been very rare (Somalia is the only one that fıts this category 
well). 
Even more rare are the cases of international intervention and assistance stemming 
from geo-strategic goals, security and economic interests and humanitarian concerns 
together .One case study that fıts this !YJ<e of category is the immediale military 
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intervention of the international community against Iraq during the Gulf W ar. The 
international community, !ed by the United States, had a direct security concern on the 
perlls of Iraqi aggrandizement in the Persian Gulf area. This concem was closely related 
to the vital economic interests on further access to Middle Eastem oil in case it fell under 
lraqi control. However, this case is not very helpful for the purposes of this essay since it 
has little to do with our area of concem: foreign interventions generated by the weak state 
phenomenon. Instead, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait constituted a clear act of aggression 
against a sovereign country. 
In the Balkans, foreign interventions and assistance, and consequently local 
dependence on such actions, have been present since the withdrawal of the Ottoman 
Empire from the region. Historically speaking, this relationship has been determined by 
the geo-strategic position of the region. The dynamics of the relationship have shown that 
the Great powers have generated problems at least as frequently as they have found 
solutions. The rapport of the region with the international system suggcsts that the Balkan 
Peninsula has generated paraHel security concems and interest dashes between the Great 
powers. 
Consequently, the Balkan security problematic is determined by the followiııg 
factors: 
First, the security or lack thereof of the Peninsula is positively related to the 
security of the European continent and thus to the security of the international system; 
Second, the Balkan states have been unable to create their own security system; 
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Third,' as a rcsult, the region has been ın constant necd of international 
attention from the sceurity perspective. 
7.1.TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
The fırst actions of the international community that have been sparked by 
something !ike the weak state phenomenon hark back to the beginning of the twentieth 
century and the League of Nations.285 These fırst experiences had nothing to do with 
sovereign weak states. Instead, the Great powers were involved in helping and tutaring 
non self-governing territories on their way to complete independence. The League of 
Nations, and later the United Nations, created the Trusteeship System as a means to this 
end. But, despite the fact that these early beginnings had nothing to do with weak states, 
the experience accumulated by the international community proved to be useful later, 
when interest on weak state interventions increased. 
The mandate of the Trusteeship System under the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, or later the UN Charter, was to assist in the formulation and implementation of 
domestic policies for the economic and cultural development of peoples that were in the 
nascent phase of nation state building. In practical terms, this ıneant that the business of 
governing was trusted to the international coınmunity. For example, in 1962-1963, with 
285 The League of Nations was formed after World W ar 1 through the Versailles Treaty. The League did 
make a powerful contribution to world peace in its fırst years. However, the absence of the United States 
and the reluctance of some other Great powers to recoıinize its authority, weakened the League although it 
continued to exist until the creation of the United Nations. 
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' the request of the Netherlands and Indonesia, the UN governed territory of Irian Java 
during its transition from Dutch to Indonesian rule.286 
Sometimes, the aim of the intervention of the League of Nations has been "the 
domestic agenda". Between 1920 and 1925, the League took over the admiıiistration of 
the German Saar region. Also, it prevented Austria' s economic collapse. Hungary 
accepted 250 million gold Crowns (about US$ 5 billion) from the League as 
"reconstruction help" in July 1924.287 In the Balkans too, the League ofNations played an 
active and irnportant role. However, its initiatives produced mixed results. 
Albania owes its creation and existence as an independent state to the decisions of 
the Great powers and the League of Nations. The decision of the Great powers (1913) to 
recogıiize the sovereignty of the new Albaıiian State was accompanied by the creatiön of 
an international cornmission of Great powers responsible for rnoıiitoring the governing of 
the new state. In a significant example of policy continuity, the international coınmunity 
dealt roughly in the same ınanner w ith the casc of Bosnia. In the lutter case, it creatcd the 
Contact Group, made up of the United States, the European powers and Russia, in order to 
formuiate a solution to the crisis. 
286 Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, "Sav ing failcd States", Foreign Policy Winter, ( vol.4, 1 993) : p.46 
287 Laura Garces, "The Lcague of Nations' prcdicament in Southcastcm Europc", World A_[fa;i·s, , Vol. 158 
(1995): p. 5. 
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During tıie administration of President Zog (1924-1928), the League of Nations 
undertook a number of initiatives to he1p Albania in i ts state building process. 288 The 
League sent advisors that proposed a number of reforms such as the restructuring of the 
armed forces and administration of finances. Some of the proposed reforms, such as the 
reduction of the size of the arnıy, werc rcfuscd by !he Albaııiaıı adnıiııistralioıı. 
Thus, starting with the League of Nations, one of the aims of the international 
community' s initiatives towards weak states has been to assist the state building process. 
However, at the time, this aim was secondary. The main purpose of the assistance of the 
League for the young and weak Balkan states was to solve the myriad of border 
demarcation problems ina clear and acceptable way to all sides. 
Due to the intense lobbying of US President Wilson, from the legal po int of view 
the League accepted the principle of self-determination. This principle was often too 
cumbersome to become a reality, especially in the Balkans. Thus, the League had no 
choice but to dea! with border disputes and minority problems.289 The nascent phase of 
that nation state building process in the area forced this type of interference by the 
international community. In other words, at the beginning of the international 
community's involvement with weak Balkan states the problems that were tackled had to 
do with the interstate relations rather than intrastale relations. Domestic conflicts 
288 A1bania was accepted in the League of Nations in 1924. A1bania's membership signifıed a negative 
response to the designs of its Balkan neighbors to divide its territories among themse1ves. 
2R9For a morc in-depth 1ook at the Lcaguc's role in solving bordcr disputcs and minoritics' issuCs, see Laura 
Garces, "The League of Nations' predicament in Soutficastcrn Europe", World Aflairs, (Summcr 1995): 
p.43. 
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remained outside' the scope of this assistance, since at the time they did not threaten the 
region' s security. 
lt was only with the beginnings of a new international organization, the United 
Nations (UN) that the attention of the international community began to shift to the state 
building processes that were occurring in weak states. In 1992, the UN General Secretary 
Boutros Boutros Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace report, expressed clearly the philosophical 
and practical concepts on which the assistance of the international community towards 
states that are unable to stand on their own must focus. This new strategy aimed to 
strengthen democratic govemance and institutions. The resources of the UN and its 
agencies, UNDP, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Program, 
United Nations International Children' Emergency Fund (UNICEF), coupled with the 
resources of other international institutions (IMF, World Bank, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, The European Bank for Reconstruction, ete) 
were focused on improving the domestic political and economic elimale in these states. 
From this point on, the international community vested itself with a new primary role: 
assisting the internal state building processes in weak states. 
Despite the similarities between the traditional and modem international 
approaches, post Cold-W ar international relations demand a greater attention and clearer 
strategy towards the weak state phenomenon for at least three factors. First, weak states 
are the main cause of wars in the international arena today. Second, the globalization of 
ccononıic rclationships and rapid technological changes has dccrcnscd the capncity of the 
' 
state to fulfill Max W eber' s eriteri on of having the legitimate monopoly of the use of 
force. 290 Last but not least, the emergence of a new face of international terrorism in the 
attacks of September ll highlighted the need to address the problem of weak states and 
state building asa security threat that had not been so obvious before.291 
Domestic armed conflicts make up the dominant paradigm in the post-Cold W ar 
period. In modern times, internal violent conflicts do not constitute a problem limited to 
the warring si des. Moreover, the daminance of such conflicts is becoming undeniabi e. In 
1996, Kalevi Holsti warned: 
The assumption that the problem of war ( conflict) is primarily a problem of 
relations between states has to be seriously questioned. The security between 
states in the third world, among same of the former republics of the Soviet Union, 
and elsewhere has become increasingly dependent upon security within those 
states. The classical formulae were: International peace and security provide an 
environment in which domestic politics can unfold untroubled by external 
disturbances. The equation is now becoming reversed. The problem of 
contemporary and future politics, it turns out, is essentially a problem of domestic 
politics. The issue now is how to secure peace within states. 292 
However, despite the clear correlation between internal conflicts and weak states, 
and the security concerns that these conflicts bring up, the international community 
remains reluctant to act in order to sol ve these problems. Because of a number of reasons, 
the international coınrnunity has failed to act, acted töo Iate or did not take the appropriate 
approach. First of all most of the instruments available to the International Coınrnunity 
depend on the existence of an effective state. But in weak states and especially in a failed 
290 Robert Cooper The Breaking of Nations Ord er and Chaos in the Twenty-First Centwy, 
(London -Atlantic Books ,2003), pp. 17-18 
291 Francis Fukuyama State Bui/d ing Governance and WorldOrderin the Twenty- First Centwy ( Profıle 
Books LTD, 2005), p.2 
292 Holsti,p 15. 
state, it makes Jhtle sense to exert pressure on or to work with a state to change 
situationo293 For example, in the case of Albania when almost all states institutions ceased 
to exist, the international community faced a real dilemma: to cooperate with the armed 
rebels or not?294 
The !ega! framework of International organizations cannot dea! adequately with 
internal conflictso According to article 2(7) of the UN Charter, the UN is not authorized to 
get involved "in matters, which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
stateo"295 The reluctance of the international community is fueled by the different nature of 
the conflicts that predominate the international arena todayo The !ega! mechanisms to dea! 
with these new problems are not in place yet. 
Domestic armed conflicts are not waged by regular armieso Often, they are 
communal conflicts that ineJude non-state actors and they often escalate into dvil warso 
Macedonia came very close to such a war. Iııdeed, if the conflict had engulfed the 
cthnically ınixcd city of' Skopjc, the couııtry ınay have well siki inlo such u cul-dc-saco In 
this regard, attempts to give a religious dimension to the conflict by some Macedonian 
groups did not hclp ınattcrso Thcsc coıınicls do not of'fcr the "luxury" of one clcar fioont 
line, thus making any military actioııs by an international force very difficulto 
293 Lousie Andersen International Engagement in failed states Choice and trade-Offs ( Denmark- Danish 
Institute for International Studies, working papcr 20, 2005), po I o 
294 The Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi solved this dilemma by appearing on Iocal TV accompanied 
with the chief of arın ed rebels Zani Caushi thus Iegitimizing non-stale factors in the international arena .. 
295 See UN Charter, chapters 6 and 7 o 
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Sometimes, the international coınınunity is forced to take sides in the conflict, as 
was the case of NATO in the Kosovo/o campaign. The UN experience shows that 
international military operations are usually successful only when they occur at the 
acquiescence of all warring sidcs 
Another important factor that aids non-interference is the absence of strategic 
interests in intervening. During the Cold War, the superpowers had strong strategic 
interests in intervening in weak states in order to consolidate their spheres of influence. 
However, after the end of Cold W ar rivalries, Great power interest waned and therefore 
the willingness to intervene decreased as well. Thus, while the number of weak states is 
increasing296 the international community has become increasingly reluctant to intervene, 
especially when it has to do so militarily. Lawrence Freedman297 says: 
"Stili there are interesis that can be deseribed as " vital" relating to trade And raw 
materials, especially oil, but on a close examination even these can appear to less 
substantial than supposed. The west views the world with a general lack of pressing 
strategic interests combined with a confused moral interest. Systemic repression, ethnic 
cleansing, and images of violent internecine wars may affront- the West- without directly 
affecting them" 
The vacillation of the international community on the Bosnian erises is one of the 
examples that prove this point. The absence of direct strategic and economic interests 
coupled with the fact that the Bosnian conflict was easily containable and thus had 
minimal negative effects on the security of the wider region, meant that the international 
comınunity had little interest in stopping the conflict. 
296There were only fıfty member-states at the beginning of the United Nations. At present, the UN has 
around 200 meınber-states, a great many of which ınay be classifıed as 'weak. 
297 Lawrence Freedınan, "Weak States and the West "'Society, Vol32, ( 1 994): p.20. 
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It would be wrong to say that the international community has no vital interesis in 
the Balkans. However, it is true that these interesis have decreased in importance over 
time. The capacity of some of the countries in the region to decrease ties with their 
unstable neighbors and slowly enter the European mainstream (Siovenia and to a Iesser 
extent Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia) has left the rest of the Balkans as a rather isolated 
isiand without any well-defıned economic interesis although stili capable to impact 
European security. Furthermore, since September ll 200 ll, there has been a shift in the 
security concerns of the international community, and especially the United States, from 
the Balkans to terrorism. Dana Allin298 observed the shift ofpriorities: 
"On ll September 2001, NATO offıcials in Brussels were discussing how to 
continue tlıeir third Balkans intervention (in Macedonia-A.R.). In an instant on that 
Tuesday, the terrorists mass ınurders in the New York and Washington transformed 
transatlantic priorities. What can be stated with reasonable confıdence, however is that a 
line has been drawn under a decade in which the wars in Yugoslavia's collapse dominated 
the transatlantic security relationship. While NATO as an organization May continue to 
devote much of its energies to maintaining Balkan Stability, the attention of Westem 
leaders will be elsewhere" 
7.2. HOW DO WEAK BALKAN STATES AFFECT EUROPEAN 
SECURITY? 
Not all weak states are in danger of imploding in internal conflicts. Furthennore, 
not aH-internal conflicts preseni a security problem for other states, regions or 
international security. Similarly, despite the existence of violeııt, anned conflicts between 
some separatist movements and strong European states. !ike Spain and lreland, these 
298 Dana Alliıı, "NATO's Balkan lntcrvcntioıı", Adelp/ıi Paper 347 (London-The International Institute for 
Stratcgic Studics).p.8 
conflicts do not present a security problem to other states or the region. Generally 
speaking, a number of developments has increased the weight of weak states vis-it-vis 
regional or even global sccurity. 
First of all the impact of ncgativc spillovcr cffccts from weak states on the 
international arena has been increasing primarily due to the end of the Cold W ar. The 
spill-over effect of conflict in West Africa and the African Great Lakes regions is well-
known. Instability and criminality have spread in the Balkans and South Caucasus,2'J') 
without mentioning today's Middlc East crisis. 
Weak states present a challenge to the international system of Global Governance 
since the international system has been desigııed to work based on the assumption of 
strong states.30° Furthermore, weak states poseserious threats to health worldwide. States 
that are not capable or not willing to sustain strong public health systems can become 
reservoirs oftransmittable diseases- HIV/AIDS, polio and malaria. 301 • And lastly but not 
last a functional global response to the serious threats that international terrorism poses to 
global security requires that special attention be paid to weak or failed states. The 
existence of a number of weak or failed states in different world regions often translates 
into loss of control on territory and borders. Thus, international terrorist organizations 
have the possibility to timetion and operate using these weak states as a base from where 
they can train, supply and grow. 
299 Hilary Benn As ha red Cha/lenge Promoting Development and Human Security in Weak states, (Center 
for Global Development, Washington, 2004), p.l3. 
300 Ben, p. 14. 
3oı B 5 en, p.1 . 
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The Balkans constitute a case in point as one of the regions where there is a clear 
and distinct connection between the existence of weak states, internal conflicts and the 
implications for regional and European/International security. The Macedonian erisis 
reinforces the existence of such negative dynaınics. If the conflict had cöntinued, there 
was a real possibility of the inclusion of other Balkan states !ike Albania, Serbia, Bulgaria, 
but also of the two NATO member-states, Turkey and Greece . While the Bosnian 
conflict was geographically isolated (and, to a certain extent, so was the Kosovo conflict) 
the Macedonian conflict could have easily threatened European security. 
Geographically, the Balkans is part of Europe and, therefore they infinence 
European security through the spillover effect of Balkan instabilities. In the worst-case 
scenario, the conflict could spread into NATO member-states that could find themselves 
in opposing armed caınps. However, even when Balkan conflicts may be isolated, the 
spillover of "all instabilities" cannot be stopped. The principal form that spillover has 
taken over the past decade is forced migration. As it has become evident - the recent 
exaınple is France- there is a link between migratian and the growth of the extreme right 
in Europe 
The implications for regional and European security even when there is no internal 
armed conflict are evident in the case of Albania due to its geographic position vis-iı-vis 
Europe. A pennanent political conflict that takes place outside the institutions brings 
about the failure of the state. The loss o( bordcr and territory coııtrols creates the 
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' opportunity for human, weapons and drugs traffıcking to flourish. These negative 
implications threaten directly the neighboring countries, while from the point of view of 
European security, the country exports insecurity throughout the continent. 
Also, the mismanagement of the state-building process may have negative affects 
on the future of international institutions such as NATO and the EU. For example, 
although the Alliance was able to preserve its cohesiveness during the Kosovo/o 
intervention, it is doubtful that this cohcsivencss would have becn prescrvcd iıi the case 
that ground forees should have been needed. Witlun the framework of transatlantic 
relations, the conflicts of the last decade had a negativc effect on US-E U relations. As 
Dana Allin302 points out: 
While the wars in Croatia and Kosovo/o troubled transatlantic relations, It 
was the War in Bosnia that most gravely threatened the Alliance's 
fundamental consensus. Bosnia's agony challenged the Assumption of 
shared values and common transatlantic interests. It mocked Europe's 
ambitions for unity and greater presence on the global stage. And it raised 
a stark question about the continued Seriousness of US military 
engagement in Europe. The. war in Bosnia was transformed in (NATO) 
alliance calculations from a peripheral concern into the transatlantic 
security problem, at least if measured in terms of the time and attention 
demanded from allied leaders. 
Within the same framework, the Bosnian and Kosovo/o conflicts harmed US-
Russia relations as well. Thus, in 1995 these relations were frayed to the point that a 
confrontational stance became a distinct possibility. Furthermore, all Balkan states except 
Serbia have signed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreement with NATO, and NATO 
ınembership is a policy priority. However, the failure of the state-building processes and 
302 Dana All in, op. cit., p.l3. 
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' the slide towards internal conflicts will postpone NA TO membership, and it may force 
these countries to seek alliances outside the Euro-Atlantic security structures.303 
Last but not least, the way in which the state-building process will develop in the 
Balkans will affect the European Union as an institution since EU engagement is 
considered to be a test of the capability of the EU to com e up and implement a conunon 
foreign and security policy. 
7.3. FROM MILITARY INTERVENTIONS TO STATE BUILDING 
PROCESS 
The role of the international community in the Balkans vacillates between that of a 
leader and that of an assistant in the state-building processes that are occurring in the 
region. A veritab le ensemble of international institutions such as the UN (and most of its 
agencies) NATO, the EU, OSCE, the Council of Europe, IMF, World Balik, European 
Balik for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and a number of lesser regional 
institutions and NGOs have come to play a vital role in the contemporary Balkan 
processes. 
The end of the Cold W ar signaled the start of a new phase in the state-building 
process in the ex-Coıumunist Bloc. In the Balkans, as everywhere else, the nation-state 
building process was frozen due to the nature of international relations in the Cold W ar 
era. W as it possible that the rekindling of this process would not be as problematic as i ts 
303 Janusz Bugajski ," Kosovo at the Core of Balkan Security," in Albert Rakipi ed. Albanians in the 
Balkans ( Tirana- Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2000), p.46. 
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beginnings? More concretely, was it possible for the Yugoslav federation to break up in a 
pcaccfulınaııııcr? Ata time when the iııtcnıatioıınl coınımınity is iııvcstiııı; int o a "bnck to 
the future" type of model for the region by promoting regional integration, the critica! 
qucstioıı bccoıncs: Will this model fuııctioıı well'! Althouı;h applied ditTcreııtly in difrcrcııt 
countries, the na tion state building process has !ed to some type of violence in almost all 
countries in the region. This commonality has forced the international community to 
intervene and assist these countries in a piecemeal fashion. Primarily, this assistance has 
taken the form of military interventions. Thus, the paradi gm of international interventions 
has been the same in most Balkan countries. This paradigm consisted of military 
interventions that aimed at stopping a coııflict - as was a case in Bosnia, Kosova/o and 
Macedonia - followed by a peace agreeınent signed by all warring sides and a program of 
reconstruction in the name of "peace building". 
The Albanian intervention was similar as well. Despite the fact that there were no 
warring sides in the conflict, the 1997 international intervention followed the same 
paradigm. At the government' s request, an international force intervened to he ip impose 
internal order. The signature of an agreement followed this between the two sides in the 
political conflict. The Comınunity of St. Edigio, a Roıne-based catholic organization, 
mediated the political agreeınent between the main Albanian po!itical parties that !ed to 
the parliamentary elections of June 29, 1997. These elections marked an end to the 
Albanian anarchy. Except the Albanian intervention, there is a continued international 
ınilitary presence in the other countries, although this presence has been much reduced 
from its initial stages. Thus, the presence of th~ international force in Bosnia managed to 
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freeze the Balkans' most severe conflict, and continues to maintain internal order. On the 
other hand, a civilian international presence continues to help the state building process by 
promoting political and economic reforms and implementing a number of development 
projects. 
In Kosovo, an international force under NATO leadership maintains internal order 
and defines the rules of relating to Serbia. Finally, the presence of foreign troops in 
Macedonia, and especially the US contiııgent, has impacted the country' s internal policies 
considerably. Former President Gligorov acknowledged this impact and his adıninistration 
asked for the extension of the mandate of this force not only during the Kosovo/o conflict, 
but following the post conflict period as well. The 2001 arın ed conflict increased the 
military and civilian presence in Macedonia and its impact on domestic politics. At the 
present, this international presence mainly represented by NA TO, EU, the Council of 
Europe and OSCE is assisting in the new phase of the state building process that 
Macedonia has embarked upon. In 1977 Albania invited an International Force to restore 
order and prevent anarchy. At the moment, the country continues to have an extended 
presence of OSCE and other International Organizations, which play a significant part in 
political and economic developments. 
7.4. THE ROLE OF NATO AND EUROPEAN UNION (E U) 
Our analysis of the role of the international community in assisting weak states 
will focus ınainly on the eontribution of ·NATO and the European Union (EU). 
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' Furthermore, despite the fact that these two organizations play a major role throughout the 
Balkans, we will focus on their impact on Albania and Macedonia. Presently, NATO and 
the EU carry a great dea! of weight in Balkan developınents. Both actors have been deeply 
involved in the area in the last decade. NATO' s military interventions in alınost aU Balkan 
conflicts have been a necessary and suffıcient condition for their resolution. 
On the other hami, the role of the EU in the arca has bccn growing over time. 
Currently, the EU has expressed its readiness to assume ınore responsibilities in the 
problcmatic region; due to the direct negative effcct Balkan contlicts have on EU 
member-states. It is within this context that we must see its desire to send a EU contingent 
to Macedonia to take over security issues from NATO. 
Before we analyze the policies and track records of these actors, there are two 
theoretical implications that we need to note. First, making the assumption that the EU is a 
global player means considering it as an operaticnal unit very similar to a state, or as an 
international organizationlinstitution. Keeping in mind the definitions of the terms "state" 
and "international organization", it becomes clear that the EU cannot be classifıed easily 
as either a state or an international organization. According to Brian White, the EU "is 
not !ike a conventional state even if it can act in limited state-like way."304 At the same 
time, the EU is more than ınerely another international organization. 305 
304 Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, ( London- Palgrave ,2001 ), p. 21. 
"" White, p.22. 
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The problem of defming the EU is not simply a theoretical matter. It has practical 
implications on today's global politics and, more immediately, for our topic of interest: 
the role of the international community on weak states. The EU' s "in between" position -
between a "state" and an "international organization" - is one of the main causes of its 
controversial policies, weak foreign policy performance, the failure of its attempts to 
formuiate an effective answer to the erises of the last decade and the uncertainties 
surrounding the EU' s desire to take on more responsibility in the region in order to 
achieve a primary position in the region. Second, from a theoretical perspective, the 
question arises: what is the best theoretical model to explain the policy formulation and 
implementation processes of NA TO and EU on the Balkans? Presently, NA TO and the 
EU are assisting the transition process, w hi ch isa new phase of state building based on the 
principles of liberalism and democracy. What is the practical role of the international 
institutions within this context? According to John Pevehouse, most democratization 
studies present regime transitions as the outcome of a domestic political process that is not 
influenced by actors outside the nation- state. Even literature sympathetic to international 
factors relies on domestic processes to explain regime change.306 
The main streams of International Relations theory - realism and liberalism- offer 
little insight in explaining the recent international interventions in the Balkans. Realisın, 
the dominant theory of International Relations, fıts very well with Great power 
interventions in the region by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Power politics was the driving force of Great power interventions in the Balkans 
in that time. Of course, Balkan conflicts - from Bosnia to Macedonia - may be interpreted 
306 John C. Pevehouse, "Democracy from the Outside-In", International Organizations 56, 3, 92002): p.517. 
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within a realist frlımework. For example, the creation of Republic Srbska is enough to 
prove the relevance of the Realist approach in today's Balkans, if we consider the ex-
Yugoslav Federation as an anarchical setting.307 
Y et, the modem international interventions in the region cannot be explained 
within a realist framework. And of all these conflicts, the 1997 Albanian erisis and the 
subsequent international military intervention is the one that fits the least well with realist 
theory.On the other hand, it seerus that the broader liberal perspective may serve wellasa 
theoretical background for explaining the modem international interventions. However, 
the implementation of this theory has i ts problems as well. The main reason for this "lack 
of fit" is that all liberal theories (the democratic peace theory, neo-liberalism, 
institutionalism) offer insights in order to explain interstate relations. For example, 
according to neo-liberal institutionalism, international institutions play an iınportant role 
in inercasing cooperation and reducing conflict between states. While the main 
assumption of democratic peace theory is that deınocracies do not fıght each other. 
According to this school of thought, the expansioıı of the coınınunity of 
democratic states is an investınent on peace. According to realists, conflict and war are 
inevitable because of the natural anarchic nature of the international system, while liberal s 
(liberal institutionalists) believe that peace and order becoıne possible by setting-up 
functioning international institutions that promote these concepts. However, it is the new 
nature of war - doınestic conflicts - that ınakes the successful application of these liberal 
concepts incapable of explaining the dynaınics of these conflicts. Moreover, the most well 
307 Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conf!ict", Survival, vol. 35, no.l,(1993): pp. 27-47. 
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developed literature on International Institutions - liberal institutionalism - has largely 
ignored doınestic politics. Most neoliberal institutionalist rcsearch has focused on 
international outcoınes, so it is unclear whether the same causal ınechanisms link these 
institutions with doınestic political proccsscs.30x 
However, we ınust look for a theoretical ground in order to observe the dyııamics 
of the relationships between Balkan weak states and international institutions (NA TO and 
EU) within the broad family of liberalism. According to this school of thought, 
international institutions promote cooperation among their members; facilitate 
comrnunication; provide information; develop comınon principles, norms and ruies; 
constrain aggressive behavior and provide a basis for joint actions, conflict prevention, 
management, and resolution. 309 
Karl Deutch's pluralistic community concept and the democratic peace theory 
offer further insights in understanding the dyııamics of this relationship. According to 
Deutch, a pluralistic community is a group of peopie that has developed functioning 
comınon institutions and practices thus having integrated into a community. A security 
coınmunity is not simply the absence of war but also the absence of military options for 
solving disputes. A shared identity and compatible values for the members are the 
conditions of the security community.31° Karl Deutch declares modem Europe as the 
ideal model of the pluralistic security community. Also, the EU serves as the bestreal-life 
308
.Pevehouse, p.518. 
309 Robert Keohane , Joseph N ye and Stanley Hoffman, After the Co/d W ar: Internationallnstitutions and 
State Strategies in Europe,/989-1991,( Cambridge, 1993,), p. 234. 
310 See Karl Deutsch et al., Politica/ Commımity and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton,( New York -
Princeton , 1957) p.S. 
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' model of the demecratic peace theory. It seems diffıcult that the Balkans will achleve a 
similar pluralistic security community model as a subsystem of the larger EU community. 
Instead of creating its own subsystem, the Balkan countries have been invited to join the 
security community that Western Europe has already developed. 
Undoubtedly, international forces impact a state's domestic processes by way of 
constraints and opportunities. This has brought about a voluminous body of research 
trying to investigate the causal mechanism that explains the iınpact that international 
institutions may have in preparing the Balkans for eventual membership in Europe's 
security community 
Usually, in the case of ex-comınunist countries undergoing a transition process, the 
role of international institutions is to influence and assist the transitions from a\lthoritarian 
to liberal regimes. In this sense, the promotion of the demecratic system is increasingly 
bccomiııg a foreign policy objective per sc for cmıntries such as the United States and EU 
member-states. Thus, international institutions such as the Council of Europe, the 
European Union, OSBE and NA TO are being used as tools to achieve that objective. John 
Pevehouse explains the potential causal mechanism that can explain the influence of 
lntcrnalional Organizations in changing u slalc's <.loıııcstic policics: 
First, diplamatic and economic ptessures generated fonn these organizations can, 
in combination with internal forces, compel autocratic regimes to liberalize. 
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' Second, membership in International Organizations can lead to the acceptance 
of liberalization by certain elite groups as it can lower the risks that these 
groups face during the dernocratizatiôn process.311 
During the last ten years, the international community has used both ways in order 
to impact domestic policy in Balkan countries. Diploınatic and econoınic pressures have 
bcen uscd asa matter of routine in the last dccadc. Usually, international economic aid has 
been tied to internal reforms aimed at strengthening the democratic polity. Thus, 
conditionally has served as an instrument for building peace.312 As the case of Serbia's 
policy towards Bosnia and Kosovo/o shows, these pressures soınetiınes have failed with 
tragic consequences. 
As we have already ınentioned, the second way through which the international 
community influences a state's domestic policies is by way of membership in 
international institutions. For example the Conference for Security and Côoperation in 
Europe (CSCE) approved Albania's ınembership application in 1991 not without the 
consent of the Democratic Party, which represented the opposition On the other hand, 
meınbership in the Council of Europe was postponed pending reforms that consolidated 
the democratic regime in the country.On the other hand, ıneınbership in CSCE (1991) and 
the Council of Europe (1995) helped the political elite increase its legitiınacy ata time 
when the state was perfonning weakly. lt was largely unable to guarantee security and 
311 Pcvchousc, p517 
312 For a belter understanding of the conditionality proc!'ss and its impact on the domestic policies of Balkan 
countries, see James Boyce, "lnvesting in Peace: Aid and Conditionality after Civil W ar", Ade!plıi Paper 
351, (London- The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004) 
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access to pu\)!ic goods, while the economic reforms endangered the elite' s ho id on power. 
Intemationallegitimacy gave the political elitea new lease on power. 
Let us look specifically at the role of NATO and the EU in Macedonia and 
Albania. Both organizations have assisted these countries in a three-pronged approach: 
First, both NATO and EU have offered these countries a common future 
Second, both NATO and EU have taken an active role in the state building 
processes that these states are going through. 
Third, both NATO and EU have intervened militarily or set up (or, "aim to" as in 
the case ofEU in Macedonia) a military presence in these countries. 
Let us analyze in more detail these three elements of the two-organization policy 
on the Balkans. The EU and NATO have offered Macedonia and Albania (and the other 
countries in the region as well) a common future: the prospect of membership in the EU 
and NATO. Balkan developments would have been very different had this "carrot" not 
been dan gl ed in front of regional states. The prospect of a common European future acts 
asa great incentive and constraint on the policies pursued by local eli tes. 
At present, Albania and Macedonia ınaintain alınost the same level of relations 
with the EU and NATO. Both countries have applied for ınembership in NATO and they 
are ıncnıbcrs of its Partnership for l'cacc (1'11') prognııır113 • Popular suppor! lor 
.liJ Albania bccamc u rncmbcr or 1'11' on h;bruary 23, 1002, lhus bccoıning one of the lirst Eastcnı Uloc 
countries to do so. . 
313 Macedonia was the 27" country that signed in Novembcr 15,1995 the Partnership for Peace Program 
willı Ni\To. 
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' membership is very high, especially in Albania where there is a large-scale consensus 
among all sections of the elite and population that the future of the country lies within 
Euro-Atlantic structures.314 Both countries also maintain almost the same relationship 
level with the EU.315 They are part of the stabilization and assodation process that the EU 
has initiated for Balkan countries that aim to become members. 
The fact that both NATO and the EU have expressed their readiness to eventually 
accept those countrics as full ıncnıbcrs- "but- lıowcvcr- not just yct"·"''- has inıpacted 
the donıestic policies of both countrics and thcir relations with !heir ncighbors quitc 
powerfully. The pronıised common future has proved to be a guiding Jight for the state 
building process in both countries. As a matter of fact, every step forward in the process 
of integration in NATO and EU has been earued through economic and political reforms 
that have fulfılled the conditions introduced by the EU and NATO. 
Finally, Albania and Macedonia's membership in PfP and their relations with the 
EU have served as guarantors of their territorial integrity and security in a neighborhood 
where such a security has proved to be a luxury. Obviously, this has helped the state-
making process by allowing the govemınenis of these countries to focus on their domestic 
problems. 
314 Accorqing to a public survey organized by the Albanian Atlantic Association, more than 90 percent of 
Albanians support Albania's application for NA TO meml;ıership. 
315 Macedonia signed the Stabilization and Assodation Agreement (SAA) on April 2001. 
316 Nicholas White, The EV and Macedonia, CEPS Comentary, 6 Apri1200!, at http://www.ccps.be 
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' NATO and the EU play vital roles in the daily progress of the state-making 
process. They supply economic and technical assistance, work out development programs, 
monitor elections and take an active part in institutional reforms arid institution 
building.317 Generally speaking, weak states provide few services to their citizens. 
Looking at EU, and to a lesser extent NATO, involvement in Albania and 
Macedonia we observe that these actors are assisting these states to provide their citizens 
with basic public goods.318 More concretely, the EU is runuing programs aimed at 
strengthening public adrninistration and judiciary, police and public order, customs, 
education system and infrastructure development. 
On the other hand, NATO's assistance does not remain within the narrow 
framework of helping thereformsin ami.ed forces. Potential NATO membership consists 
of more then reforming a country's armed forces. NATO-run programs such as 
Partnership for Peace have advanced NATO's role into a supervisor and guarantor of 
civilian control over the armed forces and institutional openness. Both these areas are vital 
for the creation of a functional democracy. Moreover, NATO's Macedonian mission was 
not aimed at simply deterring any possible re-conflagrations of the conflict. The 
availability of Weapons in the black market is one of the sources of instability for weak 
317 From 1991-2000 the EU provided 1021 million (EURO) in total to Albania, ofwhich an im portant took 
the form of balance of paymcııt suppoı1 or spccific budgctary assistancc liııkcd to rcfornıs (agriculturc, 
public adnıinistration) or to refugee related costs during the Kosovo crisis. In humanitari an assistance al one, 
the EU's Hunıanitarian Aid Office has provided a 140 nıillion. Scctoral Progranı anıount to 404 million. 
Source A/bania -The European Contribution, http://curopa.cu.inl/co.mnıfcxtcımıl rclations/Scc/albania/ 
318The EU in Macedonia is assisting the lnter-ethnic dialogue, enterprises, the financial sector, justice and 
home affairs, transport, agriculture, environmcnt, education, local governmcnt development, democracy and 
civil society. See for more details FYROM-The European Contribution, at 
http://curopa.cu.imt/comrn/cxtcmal rcaltioııs/scc/FYROM/ 
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states. The times 'when the state was their only supplier are gone. It was within NATO's 
mandate to gather and destroy the weapons possessed by the armed Albanian fıghters. 
Furthermore, NATO's mandate authorized it tö maintain law and order during the 
parliamentary elections that were supposed to get Macedonia out of the crisis. 
The state building process in the Balkans has been accompanied by domestic 
conflicts. Thus, NATO and the EU's long-term policy goal is to create a situation in the 
Western Balkans (where Albania and most of the ex-Yugoslav republics are located) in 
which military conflicts become unthinkable. However, in order to get there, NATO has 
had to shore up problems by intervening rnilitarily in the area in order to ensure peace asa 
fırst step in this long process. This quagmire remains the most problematic dimension of 
international assistance for the weak states in the Balkans. The problems of international 
military interventions and the perspectives for stability in the Balkans are closely 
interconnected with three main issucs: 
First, the slow and Iate reaction of the international actors, including NATO, in 
Balkan crises; 
Second, the question that is most hcard -" NATO and the EU" or "NATO or EU"; 
Third, for how ınuch tonger will the region nced an international military 
presence? 
The international coınınunity' s slow reaction to the Bosnian erisis was a great 
lesson for the international actors, and especially NATO. The new attitude was reflected 
in Kosovo/o and especially in Macedonia. NATO and the EU tried to prevent a new 
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conflict with a timely intervention in Macedonia. EU presence and participation in 
facilitating a solution to the erisis was vital, although this presence remained within the 
political realm. The EU played a stronger role in Macedonia than in any other Balkan 
conflicts. It had its own representative in the negotiations between the Albanians and 
Macedonians. Also EU's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana traveled to Macedonia 
himself. It seems that the EU was propeUed into the limelight by its ambition to fınaUy be 
part of the solution in at least one of the problems that were occurring in i ts own backyard. 
After all, these problems had a direct impact on regional stability and European security 
problems. Four years earlier, the Albanian Government request for a EU military presence 
remained unanswered by EU institutions, although the eventnal UN military presence was 
comprised overwhelmingly of European countries, i.e. Austria, France, Greece, Italy, 
Spain, Belgium, and Portugal ete. The EU member-states failed to com e to an institutional 
consensus on the Albanian crisis, although as Balkan conflicts go, this one was one of the 
least risky. The European Union did not have the command structure to coordinate a 
multinational military effort in Albania. This left an ad hoc "coalition of the willing" 
under Italian leadership to mount its own form of UN-approved military deployment in 
Albania. 319 
The EU decision to sign the Association-Stabilization Agreement in the spring of 
200 1 in order to neutralize the doınestic conflict that had just started in the young country 
was a critica! point in EU's attempts to get more involved in the region. However, despite 
the fact that the EU tried hard to become an indispensable part of the peace process, it was 
319 Gabriel Partos, Albania Conjlict Prevention and Crisis !ı1anagement, Working papers, www.ciaonct.org. 
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NATO's military'intervention in the country that ensured peace.320 Once again, US 
support proved crucial for the success of international interventions in the region. 
As we have already mentioned, the dynamics of the international intervention in 
Macedonia retained another diınension: the European desire for strengthening their 
common foreign and security policy. In the Jast decade, the Balkans have been the litmus 
test ofEU's capability to formuiate a foreign policy backed up by military capabilities in 
order to so lv e the problems in i ts own backyard. S ince ı 99 ı, when Luxembourg' s 
Foreign Minister declared, "It is the hour of Europe.321 To sol ve the Balkan problems not 
the hour of the Americans"322 the EU has not stopped trying to achieve a foreign policy by 
consensus and develop the military capabilities necessary to carry it out. Without these 
two conditions, the EU can never be the global player it aspires to become. Presently, the 
EU is requesting to take over NATO's mandate in Macedonia on December 151h 2002. 
However, despite its goodwill and its institutional advances towards a common foreign 
and security policy and increased ınilitary capabilities, the Balkans remains a diffıcult test 
for the EU. EU members remain deeply divided on a number of unsolved questioııs such 
as the fina! status of UN-administered Kosovo/o, the future of Macedonia and relations 
bctwccn Montcncgro and Scrbia.nı 
The strengthening of weak states in a conflict-ridden zone requires an international 
ınilitary presence. "The occupation" of West Gennaııy by the United States and, ınore 
320 The US had its own representative in the talks that led to the signiıig ofthe Ohrid Agreeıncnt. 
321 Carnegic Endowmcnt for International Pcacc, UJt/lnished Peace: Report qfthe International Commission 
on the Balkans, Albanian Edition, (Tirana: Shtepia e Libsit, 1 996), p.27. 
322 Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, (New York: Palgrave, 2002). p.I08. 
323 See Morton Abramowitz, "Can the EU 1-laek the Balkans", Foreign Ajflıil:v, (Sept/Oc! 2002), pp.2-7. 
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generally, the US presence in Western Europe after World W ar II not only neutralized the 
security problems faced by these countries, but also played a vital role in the rebuilding 
and reorganization ofthese war-ravaged countries.324 
The Balkan nations have not yet jettisoned completely their old identities. An 
international military presence would help them in their efforts to change these identities 
in favor of integration and inclusiveness. 
7.5. STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY 
If we consider the West European model as a good example of the "strong state" 
concept than a functioning democracy becomes a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for a state to be qualified as "strong". The whole Western European community has been 
organized on the basis of one ideology: liberal democracy. It is not the case that a state 
can be strong only if it uses this organizing ideology. Western European states have 
arrived to this advanced stage after a relatively long period of economic and social 
incubation and development. However, !heir economic and political achievements are 
closely related to the development of democracy in these countries.In the West, stability 
and development are interwoven with the development of deınocracy as a way of 
organizing the state. The community of EU ınember-states is, first and foremost, a union 
of demecratic and liberal values. From the begiuning, NA TO membership also 
guaranteed entrance into a conununity of democratic· states. Both institutions have 
324 See Josef Joffe, "The Axis of Envy", Foreign Policy, (September/October 2002):pp.68-69. 
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' promised that their. Thus, the West views the achievement of peace and stability as 
closely connected to democratic development. However, given the early stage in whic4 
the state building process is in the Balkans, will democracy bring about strong states in a 
relatively risk-free manner? Mansfield and Snyder have noted that the initial stage of 
democratization is extremely dangerous for a number of reasons.325 
How are democracy and stability related in the Balkans? What are the views of 
NATO and the EU on this issue? The international community views the negative 
implications of state weakness in Albania beyond "insecurity exporting" and the creation 
of an ideal environment for the growth of organized erime and the grey economy.326 
Albanian instability and insecurity are viewed as having a direct impact on the security of 
Macedonia and Kosovo/o. Keeping in mind this correlation and the dangers of a "Great 
Albania", has the international community supported the strengthening of an Albanian 
state? Will a strong Albanian state increase the possibility of a Greater Albania becoming 
a reality? 
In the midst of the armed conflict, the Macedonian Academy of Science put forth 
the idea of exchange of people and territories as the only viable solution to the conflict. 
According to this proposal territories from western Macedonia that include Dibra, part of 
Gostivar, Tetova as well as some surrounding Albanian villages should be given to 
Albania proper who in exchange should give up its share of the Ohrid and Prespa Jakes, 
325 See Eduard Mansfıeld and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War", International 
Security, (Vol. 20, No. 1, Summcr 1995): p.56 
n 6 According to ltalhın PM Ucrlusconi during lı is vh;it in Tinın:ı, thc..·ı·c isa growiııg pcn.:ı:ptiuıı of Alh:ınhı •ıs 
part of a "transit route" from East to West. 
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Pogradec and its surroundings as well as small Prespa where there are some villages 
whose inhabitants, number in the hundreds, are thought to be Bulgarian as much as 
Macedonian.327 This territorial exchange would be followed by a voluntary exchange of 
the respective populations. Such a proposal seems to have had as one of its iınmediate 
objectives to substantiate the argument that the conflict was not internal and that the 
Albanians of Macedoııia souglıt to destabiiize the country in order to ereale Grcatcr 
Albania. 
The Macedoııian governıncııt ncithcr opposcd ııor supportcd the proposal of its 
academicians. The Albaııian government on the other hand regarded such a proposal as 
very dangerous, emphasizing that the roots of the conflict should be sought within 
Macedonia, and that Albania was one of the first countries that had recogııized 
Macedonian independcnce therefore supporting without reservations its territorial 
integrity. Furtherrnore, territorial division did not gain the support neither of the 
Macedonians n or of the Albanian population in Macedonia. Despite the fact that the two 
ethnic groups live almost segregated they do not see their future in a divided Macedonia. 
According to an opinion poll conducted by the State Department both ethnic groups 
support the idea of a united Macedonia. "While. 69% of the Albanians are sympathetic of 
KLA, 87% say that it is important for them personally for Macedonia to remain united. It 
is no surprise that 99% of the Macedonians want their country intact". 
327 
"Vecer" Journal, Macedonian edition, Skopje, or ''Korrieri" Newspaper, A1banian edition, Tlrana. 
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According to Bary Buzan, sometimes Great Powers have chosen to keep states 
weak. This has been done because of their own interests, and because regional stability 
demanded that certain states remain weak.328 
As we have already mentioned, the conspiracy theory interpretation for Albania's 
implosion in 1997 is based precisely on this premise. While this interpretation remains a 
highly improbable conspiracy theory, it is true that the 1997 iınplosion and a number of 
other erises have taken the Kosovo and Macedonian issues off the agenda of Albanian 
politics. This was obvious even in the last conlliet in Maec<.lonia, when Tinımı stayc<.l 
more or less aloof without trying to impact the onteome at all. The Maeedonian conflict 
coincided with the eleetoral campaign for parliaınentary eleetions in Albania, but the 
political parties hardly ever mentioned the problems of Albanians in Macedonia. Clearly, 
this does not mean that keeping Albania weak is in the West's pereeived interest. 
However, it is true that the West is not encouraging a closer relationship between Albania 
and Kosovo/o. lt remains very diffıcult for Albanians on both sides of the border to trade 
goods and capital because of high taxes and other administrative measures. A weak 
Albania may have a negative effect on the problems facing Albanians in Kosovo/o and 
Macedonia. For example, the fal! of the Albanian State in 1997 encouraged the 
Miloshevic regime in Yugoslavia and the governınent of Macedonia to undertake radİcal 
policies against the Albanian population under their jurisdiction.329 A strong Albanian 
state does not constitute a threat to the security of its neighbors. "Greater Albania" is not 
part of the political program of Albanian political parties and therefore it is not in the 
328 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear- An Agen§fa for International Security Studies in the Post-Co/d 
W ar Era, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991 ), p. 167. 
329 See Elez Biberaj, Albania in Transition: The Rocky Road to Democracy, ( WestviewPress, 1998), p. 68 
210 
government agenda either. Indeed, there is a consensus among Albanians that" a "Greater 
Albania" is not only an unrealistic concept, but its pursuit is harrnful to Albanian interests. 
Despite this, the attention of the international cornmunity is focused precisely on the 
pösition of the Albanian State relative to its neighbors. · 
Thus Albania for example has been seen as a stabilizing factor in the region and its 
perforrnance has been evaluated in terrus of its foreign policy practices and its 
constructive stands on Kosovo and Macedonia. Therefore, quite often-domestic 
handicaps, such as distorted eleeteral processes or weak institutions have been ignored 
and have been subordinated to regional security considerations. In other words, the 
International Cornmunity has been supporting- I would call it- a negative stability in order 
to preserve the status quo driven by the fear that changes will undermine regional stability. 
Yet this handicap has been the source of instability. It has undermined institutional and 
state building process, w hi ch in tum has led to state failure, as it was the case of 1997. The 
erisis of 1997 showed that there could not be sustainable stability through the distortions 
of a demecratic system and i ts principles. 
The stability of Macedonia, regardless of the way the Macedonian State functions, 
has been the number one priority of the international community. Thus the international 
community shunned away from major problems in the Macedonian - Albanian 
relationship within the newly created state of Macedonia. The internal Macedonian 
problems pertaining to the consolidation of the coınınon jnstitutions were either postponed 
or ignorcd by the international commuııity. The attcmpt to prcscrvc rcgioııal stability at 
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' the expense of domestic problems was the prevailing theme of the international 
community in the Balkans for a long time. !here has been a tendeney especially in the 
Balkans to make a compromise with the international standards with regard to free and 
fair elections, i.e. escaping from these standards, which starts with the · elections of 
September 1996 in Bosnia Herzegovina. It was followed by elections of April 1997 in 
Eastern Slavonia, Croatia, and it reached its peak with the parliamentary elections in June 
1997 in Albania 330 
Compared to the rest of the region, with the exception of Montenegro, Macedonia 
has been appraised as a multi ethnic success story. 331 When the Balkans plunged in to 
warfarc the prc~crvation of the Maccdonian tcrritorial intcgrity wa~ thought to be crucial. 
The international coınmunity in all its actions and initiatives in Macedonia supported 
without reservations the govemment, ignoring or postpaning doınestic matters that were 
systeınatically corroding, almost peacefully, internal stability. "Valid concerns on 
Macedonian security often have been used to justify the delay of diffıcult decisions about 
internal ınatters."332 
The international coınınunity has contributed in creating an image of Macedonia 
that if not false, it is real. Thus, one of the issues Albanians and Macedonians 
continuously disagree on is the percentage of the Albanian population in Macedonia. 
According to offıcial Macedonian sources Albanians are no ınore than 22% of the 
lJO See Albania's parliamentary e leetion of 1 997 prepared by the staff of the Commission on Security and 
cooperation in Europe. Albania newspaper, Albanian edition, August 1997. 
lll International Crisis Group, Macedonia "s Etiın/c Albanians: Bridging the Gu/f.. 2nd August 2000. 
332 lbid. 
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population, whereas according to Albanian sources they constitute no less than 40% of the 
population. The real number of Albanians in Macedonia is certainly more than the official 
census. Y et the second census of the population in Macedonia was sponsored and 
monitored by the international community under the auspices of OSCE and European 
Union and the percentage of the Albanian population according to this census is 22.09%, a 
figure strongly contested by Albanians. The legal framework that provided the basis for 
this census included provisions that deprived over 150 thousand Albanians of Macedonian 
citizenship.333 
7.6. THE BALKANS TOWARD A LIBERAL DEMüCRATIC ORDER 
What is the political map of the Balkans today? At present, there are no armed 
conflicts in the region. Although the absence of armed conflict does not mean that peace 
has been established, it is safe to say that the Balkans is slowly moving towards peace. 
Albania has signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement334 with the European 
Union (EU), marking a new qualitative step in its relations with the European Union. The 
road to signing the SAA was long-it took three335 and a half arduous years. To date, 
Albania has the dubious recognition of being the country with the longest SA process in 
Westem Balkans. The reason has little to do with the technical conduct of the 
negotiations. Instead, Albania needed to convince a skeptical audience in Brussels that 
333 According to the citizen law of the Republic of Macedonia, whoever did not have 15 years of resideney 
in Macedonian territory could not gain Macedonian citizenship. Given the fact that the Albanians of 
Macedonia have much larger emigration rates over the last decades, the Albanian community suffered the 
most from this law. 
334 A1bania signed the Stabi1izatioıı and Association Agreement on June 12th, 2006. SAA remains by far the 
most important agreement the post communist country has signed so far. 
335 The negotiation process started on January 2006 
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' the political processes and institutions were functioning more or Jess properly for a 
country. with a problematic transition whose end is not yet in sight.336 Macedonia after 
almost five years of implementing the SAA is applying for full EU membership while 
Croatia is expecting to get EU membership by 2008. 
Serbia is in the midst of a political and economic transfonnation by demonstrating 
the Jack of capacity or the Jack of will to undertake the required reforms that will bring the 
country back to Europe337 And, as Stewart Patrick argues, state weakness is not just a 
question of capacity but also wi11.338 For the first time in its history, Kosovo has a 
legitimate government that has emerged from democratic elections. After a brief armed 
conflict, the Macedonians and the Albanians signed a peace agreement aiming for a self-
sustainable peace. Although for the time being, the region's economies are oriented 
towards the EU countries a number of economic agreements signal that regional countries 
are trying to integrate their econoınies with each other. 
How should we understand the developments that are taking place in the Balkans? 
Historically, relations within the Balkan region as well as bctwccn the Balkans and the 
international system were explained through the realist thinking of International Relations. 
Basic conccpts of the rcalist thcory such as 'Balance of Power', 'Grcat Power Security' or 
'Security Dilemma' provided plausible explanations to the conflictual relations among the 
33
'' Rakipi Albcıt, "The laek of Ownership und Europe's Dilemma" Tirana Tinuw 15 Juııc 2006, p7 
337 The European Union decidcd to suspcnJ SAA ııegotiations on the Stabilizatioıı and Assodation 
Agreement with Scrbia on May this year ( 2006).The decision in Brussels comes in response to the failure 
of the Scrb governmcnt to hanJ over General Ratko MlaJic lo The Hague where he is aceuscd for crimcs 
during the horrific Bosnian war. .. 
338 Stewart Patriek" Weak States and Global Threaıs: Fact or Fietion?" The Washington Quarterly 29:2 
( 2006): p. 30. 
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Balkans states and the Balkans vis-a-vis . the European system. Moreover, the realist 
framework explained Great Power intervention in the region - aiming to preserve the 
status quo- since the Eastem Crisis. Finally, the alliances and security arrangements in the 
beginning of the twentieth century among the different Balkan states were interpreted 
through the rcalist approach. 
However, developments in the last ten years have raised serious questions on the 
validity of the realist approach of International Relations. As in most other regions of the 
world, modem wars in the Balkans were fought within states, while realist theory focuses 
on war and peace problems between states.339 Also, from a theoretical perspective, the 
hesitation of the West to intervene in Bosnia may be justifıed by the prepositions of the 
so-called "foreign-policy" realism.340 However, in the case of Kosovo/o where the West 
did not have any vital national interests, these prepositions become invalid. 
NATO intervention in Kosovo/o, the internal developments in Balkan states, inter-
Balkan relations, and the relations of the region with the EU and other structures of the 
international system suggest that realist thinking has become obsolete. If the recent 
developments are not driven by realpolitik is the region moving towards a liberal-
demecratic order? 
'
39 A few realists tried to interpret the developments in the Balkans through the realist approach. According 
to Bary Posen, "with the collapse of the authority of the federation, the former republics and other 
consituents of the Yugoslav federation fe lt threatene<! in their very existence faced with security dil em ma" 
See Barry Posen, "The Secw·iry Dilenıma and Ethnic Conflic" Survival, (No.l, Spring 1993): p.78. 
'
40See Sabrina Rame!, "Kosova: a liberal approach", Society, (Sep/Oct 99, Vol. 36, lssue 6,): p.68. 
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' Theoretically, the mainstream theory of neorealism and the broad range of 
Jiberalism (institutional liberalism, democratic peace theory pluralistic security 
Community ete) are both appropriate and at the same time have problems interpreting an<ı 
understanding today's Balkans. Some of these problems are NATO' s reluctance to 
intervene in Bosnia, its speedy intervention in Kosovo/o, and internal armed conflicts such 
as the one in Macedonia.On the other hand, a number of embryonic initiatives from within 
the region signal an authority transfer from states to regional institutions. Furthermore, 
the balance of power concept cannot explain the latest moves towards peace, although 
other phenomena such as the existence ofRepublic Srpska (an entity created by force) are 
easily explainable by realist thinking. Also, the resistance of Macedonian authorities to 
change the nature of the state was broken by force. The future of postwar Kosovo/o also 
depends on the conciliation of these two frameworks. According to International 
Commission on the Balkans if the EU does not devise a new strategy then it will become 
mired instead a neocolonial power in place !ike Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia34 1 
Practically speaking, these two perspectives include and exclude each other at the 
same time - the liberal perspective based on the universal values of the freedom of the 
individual, and peoples' right to self-determination, and the neorealist perspective that 
does not attach any importance to these principles. A liberal democratic order in the 
Balkans has not become a reality as yet, but there are clear moves towards that reality. 
Howcvcr, it takc8 ıııcaningfi.ıl change~ within the states of the region and in !heir rclation8 
341 International Comınission on the Ba1kmıs, The Balkans in F.urope 's Full! N'. (Sofia: Center for Ubcnıl 
Stratcgics. 2005 ) , p.l ı 
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' with each other in order to establish such a reality including a new approach by the 
International Comınunity. 
7.7. A CONTROVERSIAL APPROACH: THE NEED FOR CHANGES IN 
LOCAL/ INTERNATIONAL ASSIST ANCE 
For a region like the Balkans conflicts, wars, anarchy have swept that and 
instability during the last h undred years as well as during the fırst dccade of the Post Cold 
W ar period, creating a stable security order reınains a daunting challenge. Nevertheless if 
one is to take into consideration the recent intra and inter state developınents and the 
rapprocheınent of the region with the International Coınınunity it can be concluded that 
the Balkans are ınoving towards a liberal deınocratic order. Such an order iınplies 
upholding and respecting the principles of liberal deınocracy i.e. the respect for liberties 
and rights for both individuals and peoples. Thus, the strengthening of the weak states in 
the region should be founded upon a deınocratic system that encourages citizen 
participation. Furtherınore, a liberal deınocratic order ıneans that the ongoing state 
building processes should focus on citizenship rather than ethnicity, especially on those 
states that encompass different ethnicities. A liberal Democratic order necessitates - in the 
world of Karl Deutsche - a Pluralistic Security Comınunity in the Balkans, a two fold 
process that implies regional integration after the European model as well as the eventnal 
union of the region with Europe w hi ch in itself is another integraling process. The creation 
of a stable security order through the spread of liberal democracy is also iiıdicated by the 
involvement of the International Community, NA TO and EU in the region. Such an 
involvement does not emulate the traditional Great Powers, when the region became an 
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' arena of Great Power rivalry that aimed to preserve the status quo. The long term and 
sustainable stability ofEurope itselfis founded ona liberal democratic order. 
Despite the fact that the need for a liberal democratic order is very obvious as the 
only viable alternative for a Jong-term sustainable security, traditional tendencies by local 
and international actors seem to linger on. There seems to be a very real tension between 
the need for change if a liberal democratic order is to prevail and the need for stability that 
quite often is understood in terms of preserving the status quo. However, it seems that 
local and international initiatives in the region have been driven by realist foreign policy 
i.e. the preservation of the status quo. The dynamics of such tension is different in 
different countries of the region, reflecting the specifıc conditions of each country.For 
example, in Albania the events of the Jast ten years showed that the unconditional support 
for the country' s stability in the name of regional stability, at the expense of democracy, 
does not ensure long-term sustainable stability. Yet, we stili see the old approach in many 
of the statements and policies coming out of Brussels (NATO and EU). In every offıcial 
statement, these institutions affırm the stabilizing role that Albania continues to play in the 
Balkans 
The relations of the EU with Serbia and Montenegro constitute another example 
that supports our arguınent. According to Abramowitz and Ghelather, Brussels' insistence 
on preserviııg a single Yugoslav state has also hindered Montenegro's postwar transition. 
Iııstead of fostering reform and rapprocheınent with Serbia through a deınocratic process, 
EU ııegotiators bludgeoned Monteııegro into joining a new entity to replace the Federal 
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Republic of Yugoslavia This new entity has two economic systems, two currencies, and 
two speeds of reforrn342 .Macedonia offers the best example of the controversial approach 
of the international community on the region. Macedonia declared its independence at a 
time when the Balkans was inunersed in conflict. Thus, understandably the international 
coınmunity labored for stability without any preconditions. However, this policy 
continued unnecessarily for the rest of the decade. The successful implementation of the 
Ohrid Agreement signed between the Albanians and the Macedonian govemment requires 
a new stance by the international community. Short-terrn solutions accumulate instability, 
as was shown by the conflict that fınally exploded in the spring of 2001. 
Kosovo's case is the most probleınatic. Despite the uncertainty of its future 
political status, the state-building process is ongoing. Although not quite in classical 
terrns, in its roots this process is a transition from colonial status to statehood. The 
international decision on the future of Kosova has been postponed. The consequences of 
this waiting gaınc reınain to be seen, but the current undefıııcd status of Kosovo is having 
a negative impact on the process of state formation. 343 
As long as the status of Kosovo has not been decided, the Albanians will perceive 
the return of Serb refugees as a ınenace, and the process of state-fonnation will not be 
based on citizenship but on nationality. Furtherrnore, the legitimacy of local and 
international actors in the Balkan scene remains in question. Considering the fact that the 
342 Morton Abramowitz and Heather Hur!burt, "Can the EU Hack the Balkans?", Foreign Affairs, ( Sept-Oct 
2002): pp.2-7. . 
343 Susan Woodward, "Kosova and the Region: Consequences of the W aiting Gamc", in The International 
Spectator,( Volume XXXV, No. I, January -March 2000,) pp.35-48. 
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' state formation process is still incomplete, resistance towards the changes required by 
liberal principles can be dangerously effective. The international community, and 
particularly the European Union, has to dea! with the problem of Kosovo's fina! status 
quickly, as the international community will not govetn Kosovo forever. Will Kosovo/o 
gain its independence, or will it return to Serbian rule with soıne kind of autonoıny? 
Which solution is more realistic? Which solution will provide long-term stability? Marina 
Ottaway writes: 
The goal of nation building should not be to impose comınon identities on deeply 
divided peoples but to organize states that can adıninister !heir territories and 
allow people to live together despite differences. And if organizing such state 
within old internationally recognized borders does not seem possible, the 
international Comınunity should adınit that nation building may require the 
disintegration of old states and the forrnation of new ones. 
7.8.THE ECONOMICS OF NATION-STATE BUILDING 
Undoubtedly, the Marshall Plan has been the success story of the history of the 
interventions of the international comınunity to assist other states. Through this plan "the 
United States undertook not only to restore the economies of its defeated eneınies, but to 
organize the Italian, Japanese and West German political systerns along democratic lines. 
The result was the restoration of states that have been proven to be economically 
productive, politically stable, and strongly supportive of a powerful international 
system. 344 
344 Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, "Saving Failed States", Foreign Policy, (Winter 1992-1993.): p.56 
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When Germany•caıne up with the idea of a Stability Pact for South Eastem Europe in 
1999, many analysts called for an approach that was similar to the Marshall Plan.345 The 
Balkan Wars of the last decade were similar to World W ar II in terms of the violence, 
destruction of property and loss of life. These similarities, coupled with the success of the 
Marshall Plan made Balkan countries more hopeful of the Stability Pact. The Pact 
included NATO, the EU and the United States. However, despite the similarities of the 
two conflicts and the extreme needs of the recipient countries, the Stability Pact could not 
and did not prove to be a second Marshall Plan. 346 The histoncal circumstances in w hi ch 
the Stability Pact was conceived are very different from those of the Marshall Plan. The 
international system is very different from what it was half a century ago. Furthermore, 
Westem geo-strategic interests on South Eastem Europe, and especially the Westem 
Balkans, were ınuch weaker than US interesis on the reconstruction of Western Europe. 
However, even if the international coınmunity had the will necessary to o ffer such large-
scale assistance to South Eastem Europe, it is very doubtful that a second Marshall Plan 
would have been as successful as the fırst one was. 
There is a radical difference between Westem European countries and Japan on 
one sidc and the Southcastern European nations on the other. As Marina Ollawa/47 says: 
Although defeated and destroycd, tlıese countrics (West Germany and Japan - AR) had 
stroııg state traditions and coınpetent govermneııt personnel. West Germany and J apan 
345 The Stability Pact was initiated on 10 Junc 1999. For more details see "Stability Pact for South Eastem 
Europe" at: www.sccrecon.org/KeyDocumcnts/KD 1999062401 .htm 
346 See Albert Rakipi, "Stability Pact and the Marshall Plan: A Comparativc Approach'", in Stabiliry Pact 
Just araund the Conw',( Tirana- Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2000), p.97 
347 Marina Ottaway, "Nation Building", Foreign Policy, ( Septembcr-October 2002): p.17, 
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' were nation-states in the literal sense of the tenn- they were ethnic and cultural 
comınunitics as well as po! itical states. 
The fact that statehood is a relatively recent phenoınenon in the Balkans suggests a 
new approach by the international community is necessary. However, this does not meaıı 
that less energy, attention and funds are needed to achieve the required results. The 
success of such an enterprise will depend on the international will to fınd stable, long-tenn 
solutions and to cooperate with local actors in order to iınpleınent theın successfully. 
Building or reconstructing anation state in today's Balkans is very costly. In order to put 
things in perspective, Jet us reıneınber that Marshall Plan provided ınore than US$416 
ınillion, about US$114 billion in 1992 dollars, in bilateral econoınic assistance to the 
countries of Westem Europe which were so ravaged by war as to constitute failing 
states.348 
The theory that explains state weakness in the Balkans in tenns of the conflicting 
stance of the ethnic groups that ınake up these states (Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia 
and, to a certain point, Kosovo) is only one side of the coin. On the other side of the coin, 
w e have the structurally backward econoınies of these states. The reasons for the isolation 
and backward coınınunication and integration between different Balkan countries are 
found not only in the conflicts generated by "unsolved national questions", but also by the 
poor and unproınising econoınic geography of the Peninsula. This backward econoınic 
situation has been, and may continue to be, one of the main sources of instability and 
conflict in the region. For exaınple, in the case of Macedonia the absence of equal 
3
" Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, "Saving Failed States", Foreign Policy, (Winter 1992-1 993): p.l8. 
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economic development and the general backward state of economic development were 
partly responsible for the gap between the two ethnic groups. According to the report 
prepared by the European Stability Initiative:349 
"(The) parall el erises of development have turned Macedonia's po iilical economy 
into a zero-sum game, as the two ethnic communities compele for a diminishing share 
of public resources. Against this background, Albanian demands for equal participation 
in the state and state-sponsored development are seen as a direct threat to the ethnic 
Macedonian community. At the same time, growing economic insecurity on both sides' 
form the background to a breakdown in the inter-ethnic elite co-operation, which 
characterized public life in the fırst decade after independence. This creates 
opportunities for new actors willing to pursue their interesis outside of the political 
process." 
While domestic conflicts in Macedonia have been more severe because of 
society's division in two ethnic groups, domestic conflicts and instability have been quite 
serious in Albania despite the monoethnic make-up of society. This suggests the need for 
further research on sources of conflict that go beyond the classic interpretation of the 
linkages between conflict and overlapping national aspirations. 
Despite the potential security problems deriving from economic problems in the 
Balkans, analysts have noticed a great dea! of reluctance by international actors such as 
the US and the EU to provide econoınic help. For example, not only is the US reducing its 
military presence in the area but it is also reducing econoınic aid and assistance programs. 
In ınonctary terms, these types of assistance dcclined by 1 O percent this year and they are 
slated to fal! anather 20 percent next year, from $621 million to $495 million.350 This 
trend is discernible in terıns of EU aid as well. While the EU remains the largesi donor in 
the Balkans, EU aid is decreasing in nominal and real terıns as well. In Kosovo/o, for 
349 See The Other Macedonian Conjlict, ESI discussion P.aper, Fcbruary 2002ı at www.csiwcb.org. 
350 Mrton Abramowitz and Heather Hurlburt, "Can the EU Hack the Balkans?", Foreign Affairs, (Sept·Oct 
2002). pp.2-7. 
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' 
example, the European Commission's CARDS program (Community Assistance for 
Reconstruction, Democratization, and Stabilization) will cut aid by 70 percent next year, 
from 180 million Euros to 50 million Euros.351 • According to an ESI study on EU 
relations with the Balkans: "The rhetoric of "Europeanisation" underlies many European 
programs in the region, from post-conflict statc building in Bosnia and Kosovo/o to irıtcr-
ethnic mediation in Macedonia to development and economic transition in Serbia and 
Albania. However, as it stands, tlN promise offercd by Europe to the region is curiously 
insubstantial. The states of the Western Balkans have no early prospect of opening fonnal 
negotiations with the European Union on membership. They face sharply dedining aid, 
whatever their fonnal status within the Stabilization and Association Process. Most 
importantly of all, they are excluded from the larger European project of strengthening 
economic and social cohesion across the continent. 352" 
Even without the exogenous variables of "ethnic hatred" and "national questions" 
that have remained unsolved or whose solution is postponed indefınitely, the hesilation to 
taekle adequately the region's econoınic problems may fuel further destabilization in the 
future. The Ohrid Agreement that marked the end of the "h ot" Macedonian conflict, will 
not necessarily transiate into peace and ethnic hannony. Other than the will of the local 
elites to abide by it, the Agreement comes with a hefty economic price tag. On the other 
hand, the Albanian erises cam e to the surface du e to the unwillingness of the political elite 
to abide by the deınocratic rules of the game. However, their degree of severity would 
have been much lower had the country not been in the ınidst of an economic stagnation. 
351 Jbid 
352 See: Western Balkans 2004: Assistance, Cohesion a1;d the New Boundaries of Europe, ESI, November 3, 
2002, at www.csiwcb.oro. 
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7.9.THE WEAK STATE AND DEVELOPMENT 
From the post-communist perspective: almost all Balkan states are weak in view of 
capacities to formuiate and implement policies, to provide public goods for their citizens. 
There is a hierarchy of public goods that a modem state is supposed to provide for its 
citizens. Starting with security, and not necessarily (and only) security with respect to 
threats coming from ab road. According to an AIIS survey only O, 1 percent of Albanians 
feel insecure from threats coming from abroad. State institutions are weak and not capable 
of controlling part of territory or borders. If poverty is one of the main threats in view of 
security, causes are to be found in the weak performance of states and their institutions. 
Reasons why Organized Crime and Corruption constitute threats for domestic stability and 
serious obstacles to the development of these countries lay with the weakness of 
institutions. Here the question is: How to overcome state weakness 
The model of a strong state, which is actually represented by EU member 
countries, is a historical product of the development and tradition of bureaucracy, of the 
development and modemisation of the society. Nevertheless, this strong state is also based 
on and is a product of the econoınic development. The question is: Can the model of 
stroııg states- in the pcrspeetive of capacities and effıcicncy to providc )JLiblic goods- be 
successful in poor countries? The project of strong states otherwise is a product of stroııg, 
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functioning democracies. 353 But, while liberal democracy is the sol e organizing ideology 
for transformation, and for the new stage of state building, our question is: hı the state of 
backward economies, and of Jack of economic development, can the project of liberal 
'o 
democraçy be successful? Given that as regards the question of organizing ideology the 
societies and elites of Balkan states do not have a c ho ice, the question is ho w to accelerate 
economic development, as a strong basis for the development of demoçracies and 
consolidation of states? W e seem to have developed to equations towards a formula that 
may explain the consolidation of strong states in the development perspective: Is a strong 
state that brings about economic development, or is economic development that brings 
about the development and consolidation of dcınocracy, thus of the statc? Which equation 
should we choose to access the magic formula of a strong state? 
Considering the size of informal economy,354 which seeıns dominant at times, and 
considering the high !eve! of corruption355, it is clear that the consolidation of the rule of 
law in Albania and other Balkan countries could bring real impacts for the economic 
development of the country. This means that in our pursuit for the state consolidation 
formula, the fırst equation acquires importance: economic development through the 
consolidation of state and the functioning of laws. Meanwhile, it makes sense to ask 
whether corruption and informal economy, including organized erime, are the sole and 
353 See Albert Rakipi, Understanding _ the Balkan Democratisation Process- a Liberal Approac/ı, 
SUDüSTEUROPA Mitteilungen 04/2004): pp.79 -93 
354 The tax evasion causes damages of about 900 million USD to the state budget, or around 70 per cent of 
it. It is clear that this missed state budget revenue may not be used to provide public goods or improve 
services. See Sabina Yıneri Human Security in Albania, ( Tirana - Albanian Institute for International 
Studies ,2004). 
355 For corruption in Albania see Sabina Y mcri and Albert Rakipi Htmımı Security in Albania, ( Tirana -
Albanian Institute for International Studies 2004), Se also' Aldo Bumci Debating National Security !ssues, ( 
Tirana- Albanian Institute for International Studies, 2004),pp.88-93 
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' definite answer to the state of poverty and lack of economic development? The right 
answer to this question exposes a series of economic development problems, of limited 
employment opportunities/56 of the often primitive structure of economy, and scarce 
' 
' 
financial resources for economic development, the solution of which is notconfined to the 
addressing of issues of corruption and organized erime. 357 .From this perspective, it 
becomes evident that the second equation is valid for the pursuit to the consolidation of 
weak states. In other words, economic development brings about the consolidation of 
state. The consideration of a combin ed perspective in the efforts of international actors to 
assist in the building of state is important, if we acknowledge that frequently issues as 
organized erime and corruption have been over evaluated.358 It is comprehensible that 
organized erime and corruption in the Balkans may have a series of security related 
impacts on BU member countries. Thus, organized erime and corruption topping the 
hierarchy list of threats presented by the international community, it seems that their 
priorities differ from those of the Albanian administration, and especially of the Albanian 
society. Thus, for instance, it seems that the priority of the international community and 
European Union in particnlar remains higher security of international borders to the ends 
of reduction of illegal migration, monitoring and relocation of emigrants, by completely 
ignoring the needs of the neighbouring, origin countries. 359 Financial support has also 
been channeled according to this priority. Accordingly, in the case of Albania, from 2002 
to 2004 the BU has agreed to spend 49 million pounds on issues relating to border 
356 If in Kosovo unemployment reaches 70 percent, or in Albania 30 percent, while 50 percent of the 
Albanian labor force is currently situated in Greece and italy, this does not happen because ofcorruption or 
informal econonıy. See Sabina Yıneri Human Security,p. 64 
357 Bunıci, p.35. 
358 Ynıeri, 18. 
359 Russel King, Nicola Mai; Mircla Dalipi Slıembja e Miteve te Migrinıit Analiza dlıe Rekonıandime per 
Bashkimi Europian, Sritanine e Madlıe dlıe Slıqipiirinii; ( Tirana- Fabiaıı Society and Oxfanı GB 2003), p. 
107. 
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management, po !ice and judiciary refonn, but only 29 million on the economic and social 
development. 360 
Within the need for development, another issue that acquires importance in the EU 
efforts to prepare Westem Balkan countries for EU membership, which practically means 
the consolidation of states in the viewpoint of capacities, is related to the hannonization 
and approximation of legislation, and the economic refonns to be implemented. It seems 
that structural changes in the economy of weak states have priority over the approximation 
of legislation. With an agriculture system that looks much more African than European 
are ham1onization of legislation and integration with Europe the posing priorities . 
compared to more fıındamental developments efforts?361 
7.1 O. EU MEMEERSHIP- A DRIVING FOR CE TO ST ATE -BUILDING 
PROCESS 
For a relatively long time the presence of an enemy mobilized elites and peoples 
alike in the Balkans and beyond. Rather than soliciting a need for matkets and 
development, the way in which Balkan peoples tried to communicate with each other and 
come out of isolation was the war and the presence of an enemy. Also on a theoretical 
!eve!, it has been claimed that the existence of an eneıny provides a crucial key in 
understanding the nature and the essen ce of political activity. 362 
360 Ibi d, p. ı 08. 
361 Evaluation EC Country Strategy: Albania 1996-2001 September 2001 (Roma- Strategies, 2004),p.34 
362 Aristat/e Tziampiris, The Weak State and Organized Crinıe, corruption and The Euro-Atlantic Future of 
Westem Baliikan in Albert Rakipi,ed. Debating lntegration, (Tirana- Albanian Institute for International 
Studies,2004), p. ı 87 
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Transition in the Balkans has been associated with the intervention of the 
international coınmunity, firstly aiming at putting an end to conflicts, which later evolved 
into the Stability Pact and the Stabilization and Association Process, and after 1999 to the 
present the new initiative named the Stabilization Association process in order to assist 
the organization of the states on the basis ofliberal democracy. The question, however, is 
to what extent a common future, European integration, may turn into the key for solving 
current problems in the Balkans; whether a common future is going to be the key for 
mobilizing the societies, elites and governments of these countries for building a 
functioning democracy. 
The state building process is the most im portant issue of the world coınmuniıy363 
because as it was argued they present the modern threat to national, regional and 
international security. The state building process actually is the core of the International 
Institutions 1 Organizations including EU. During the last decade and especially after the 
end of Kosovo war the prospect for EU membership of the weak Balkan countries has 
been e real driving force of state building process. Compared to other major hotspots in 
the world map, the Balkans is one of the regions where state building has a realistic 
chance to succeed in the short-term through a unique combination of internal and external 
factors. Primary among these is the presence of the European Union o ffering perspectives, 
guarantees and ai d that virtuously feeds into the state-building cycle. 
363 See Francis Fukuyama State Building Governance andOrderin the Twenty-First Century (London-
profıle books, 2005), p.J9. 
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' When the Balkans burst in flames in the 1990s, they presented the EU with the 
fırst immediale challenge to its comman foreign and security policy testing its capacities 
to become a global player through deepening EU integration. Unfortunately, the EU failed 
this test. The famous statement of the Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Pos- -this is 
the hour of Europe 364 - almost 15 years ago , predicting a new role of European Union in 
the Balkan erisis was received with much optimism and skepticisms at the same time. 
However analyzing the dynamic of EU intervention in the Balk~ns after the first erisis 
of 1991 one would accept the inercasing role of EU actually concentrated to the core of 
the security problem in today's Balkan: the weak state. In order to overcome state 
weakness the European Union - and other players too - are involved in day to day state- . 
building process in countries !ike Albania365 Macedonia and other Balkan countries366 by 
proınising them a EU ınembership. The local elites are under the pressures to undertake 
the required reforms in order to meet EU criteria. Further the EU conditionality serves as 
a basis for domestic lcgitimacy of the goverıımcnt in Balkan states. Failing to mcct EU 
conditions ıneans otherwise losing govemıneni legitimacy which is a essential features 
of weak states. From an other perspective keeping ali ve the EU ıneınbcrship for Balkan 
countries is a strategic test for the future of European Union itself67• Progress in EU 
widening-which, historically has in no way iınpeded EU deepening-will remain the 
litınus test for a united Europc. Al most all prcvious wavcs of cıılargcıncııt in 1981, 1986, 
or 1995 cannot be considered real tests of progress because all the new ıneınber states 
were meınbers of what Karl Deutsch calls "a pluralistic security community". The first 
364 Valeriana Calab Unfınishcd Peace (Berlin- Aspeıı Institute, 1996), p. 56 
365 See Judith Hoffınan, "lntegrating Albania: The Role of European Union in the Democratization 
Process" Albanian Journal~( Politics 1 ,( 2005): pp.55-74 
3(ı 6 Albcrt Rakipi Debating Integration ( Tirana- Albuni~m Institute for lntcrn;.ıtionut Studies 2003), p.89 
367 Balkans in Europe's Future, areport of International Commission on the Balkans ( Sofıa- Center for 
liberal strategies ,2005),p. 18 
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powerful test that the EU managed to pass with flying colors was the "big hang" 
enlargeıncnt in 2004 with 1 O new ıneınbers ınainly from the Eastenı Bloc. W ith hindsight, 
the experience of enlarged Europe proved all ·the enlargement doomsayers wrong-the 
new ıneınbers provided the EU witlı econoınie vigor and did not encuınber the decisioh-
making processes or burden EU budgets. In a way, they too were members of the 
pluralistic security coınınunity having industrialized a long time ago following the 
European pattern of strong states. The rcal test of EU w iden ing, which is at the same time 
the real test for the future of EU itself, will be the Balkan states. 
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